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PART II 
STUDIES AND CRITICISMS OF THE 
UNITED KINGDOM SYSTEM 
Chapter 7: A Review of the Principle of Aggregation. 
Chapter 8: A Review of the Principle of Accountability. 
Chapter 9: A Review of the Principles Underlying 
the Allowances. 
Part I of this thesis discussed the principles 
which currently govern the taxation of the family unit in 
the United Kingdom and the historical development of those 
principles. This Part examines the occasions upon which 
these principles have been reviewed and criticised. 
Such consideration has been directed mainly 
towards the three main principles which govern the taxation 
of husband and wife, namely, aggregation, accountability and 
allowances, and a chapter is, therefore, devoted to each 
principle. No reference is made in this Part to the 
capital taxes or the taxation of children : these subjects 
have received very little consideration or criticism, and 
such consideration as they have received has already been 
mentioned where appropriate in Chapter 4 (capital taxes) 
and Chapter 5 (children). 
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CHAPTER 7-A Review of the Principle of Aggregation 
Section 1- Before 1894. 
Section 2- 1894 - Disaggregation of wife's earnings. 
(1) Amendment in'Committee 
(2) Amendment on Report. 
Section 3- 1894 - 1909. 
(1 Questions in the House of Commons. 
(2 New clauses moved in 1907 - the quotient system. (3 A new clause moved in 1908 - disaggregation. 
Section 4- 1909 - Supertax. 
Section 5- 1910 - 1914 - Pressure for reform. 
1 1912 - Income tax on married women's property. 
2 1913 - The Budget Resolutions. 
3 1913 - The Women's Tax Resistance League. 4 1913 - Questions as to timing of amendment. 
5 1914 - The Debate on the Budget Resolution. 
Section 6- 1914 - Option for separate assessment. 
Section 7- 1920 - The Colwyn Report. 
(1) The quotient system. 
(2) The aggregation rule. 
Section 8- 1954 - The Radcliffe Report. 
(1) Alternatives to aggregation. (2) The aggregation rule. 
Section 9- 1969 -A new clause. 
Section 10 - 1971 - Disaggregation of wife's earnings. 
Section 11 - 1975 - The Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Section 12 - 1978 - The Meade Report. 
(1) The eight criteria. 
'ka)Criteria affecting all tax structures. 
b Criteria relevant to an individual-based structure. 
c Criteria relevant to a "family-based" tax. 
d Criteria relevant to a "household" based tax. 
2 The rejection of an individual basis of assessment. 
3 Alternatives to the present option. 
4 Conclusions . 
Section 13 - The Equal Opportunities Commission's Campaign 
for reform. 
1 Aggregation of investment income. 
Z The tax unit. 
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Section 14 - 1980 - The Green Paper. 
1 The effects of the present rule. 
2 The reasons for reform. 
3 The reasons against reform. 
4 The alternatives to disaggregation. 
a The quotient system. 
b) Some developments of the present system. 
5 Conclusion. ý6 
The response to the Green Paper. 
Section 15 - Conclusions. 
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CHAPTER. 7 
A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AGGREATAION 
Section 
1. Before 1894. 
2. 1894 - Disaggregation of wife's earnings. 
3. 1894 - 1909. 
4. 1909 - Supertax. 
5. 1909 - 1914. 
6. 1914 - Option for separate assessment. 
7. 1920 - The Colwyn Report. 
8. 1954 - The Radcliffe Report. 
9. 1969 - A new clause. 
10. 1971 - Dis aggregation of wife's earnings. 
11. 1975 - The Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
12. 1978 - The Meade Report. ' 
13. 1979 - The Campaign for Reform. 
14. 1980 - The Green Paper. 
15. Conclusions. 
This chapter discusses the occasions on which 
the principle of aggregation has been reviewed. The reports 
of the three main Reform Committees (Colwyn, Radcliffe and 
Meade) are, of' course, of prime importance in this context, 
as is also the Green Paper on the taxation of husband and 
wife' published in December 1980. But other studies are 
also relevant and, in particular, a review of the Parliamentary 
consideration of the subject sheds much light on contemporary 
1. Cmnd 8093. 
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thinking and develops the reasons which were advanced at 
different times both in favour of, and against, the 
retention of the principle of aggregation. 
A chronological treatment of the subject has been 
adopted because it is thought that this best highlights the 
development of the differing views on the subject and places 
these within the correct historical context. A surprising 
feature emerges from this treatment v namely that, in the 
final analysis, the reasons put forward both in favour of 
the retention of aggregation and also in favour of its 
abolition are limited in number and recur with great 
frequency : further, some of the reasons are of considerable 
antiquity. The reasons on both sides will be identified as 
they occur so as to enable the development of each to be 
traced through its historical evolutions; references will 
also be made to proposals for the replacement of the 
existing system of aggregation by some alternative systems. 
1. Before 1894 
Although the principle of the aggregation of the 
incomes of husband and wife was first introduced in 1805 it 
took nearly a century for any fundamental reform to be 
proposed. This may be explained in three ways. First, 
income tax was, at that time, in principle a proportionate 
tax and not a progressive tax and thus aggregation, of 
itself, did not affect the amount of tax paid to any large 
extent. As is stated in the Radcliffe Report1 c. - 
1. Paragraph 117. Royal Commission on the Taxation of 
Profits and Income, Second Report, 1954, Cmd 9105. 
317 
"It is worthwhile to point out that so long as 
income tax remained a proportional tax, as it 
did in substance throughout the 19th century, 
the principle of aggregation raised no issue 
of major importance". 
However, it will be recalled that in both 1805 and in 1842 
an exemption was given for small incomes and it would 
therefore seem that perhaps there should have been some 
objection made to the aggregation rule which could have 
resulted in two persons both with incomes below the 
exemption limit losing both exemptions on marriage. The 
reason why no such objection was made could be explained by 
the second and third reasons, namely that during the years 
1816 - 1842 there was no income tax at all and when it was 
re-introduced in the latter year the Married Women's 
Property Act was still forty years away; it is therefore 
understandable that until the general law relating to 
married women's property was changed there would be no 
pressure for the reform of the income tax laws; finally, 
it is probable that in these years very few married women 
had earnings of their own. 
The acceptance of the principle of the aggregation 
rule can be deduced from the fact that the Select Committee 
on Income and Property Tax, under the chairmanship of 
Mr. Joseph Hume, which was appointed in 1851 and reported 
in 1852, made no mention of the taxation of husband and wife. 
This is of particular significance as one of the witnesses, 
Mr. John Stuart Mill, who gave evidence to the Committee on 
a number of matters relating to the tax, did not mention 
the tax treatment of married-women;, as a distinguished and, 
widely known champion of their rights it is thought that he 
would then have raised the question if he had thought it 
relevant or if there had been any widespread feeling in 
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support of a change., 
The Married Women's Property Act was passed in 
1882 and the first discussion of the aggregation rule took 
place twelve years later, in 1894. 
2.1894 - Disaggregation of wife's earnings 
The first discussion of a proposal for dis- 
aggregation arose out of the injustice felt at the loss of 
the two exemptions for small incomes on marriage. When 
income tax was re-introduced in 18421 persons with incomes 
of less than £150 a year were exempt from tax. This was 
reduced to £100 in 1860.2 but there was an abatement where 
income did not exceed £150. The figures were altered in 
1872 and again in 18763 when the £150 exemption limit was 
restored and an abatement given for incomes below £400. Of 
course, the 'incomes of husband and wife were aggregated for 
the purpose of these exemptions and abatements as for all 
other purposes. 
Following the passage of the Married Women's 
Property Act 1882 the income tax provisions began to give 
rise to dissatisfaction and this came to a head in 1894 when 
the Finance Bill contained a clause designed to increase the 
exemption limit for small incomes to £160 with abatement for 
incomes under £500. In the same year estate duty was 
introduced and, it will be recalled, that whereas legacy 
and succession duties had contained some reliefs for transfers 
1. Section 163 5&6 Vict c. 35. 
2. Section 9 23&24 Vict c. 14. 
3. Section 8 Customs and Inland Revenue Act 1876. 
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between husband and wife, estate duty when it was introduced, 
contained no relief-at all. 
(1) Amendment in Committee 
The first move was made during the Committee stage 
of the Finance Bill1 when Mr. Darling moved an amendment to 
clause 29 which imposed the charge to income tax for that 
year : the amendment would have resulted in complete . 
dis- 
aggregation and read: - 
"The income of any married woman shall, for the 
purposes of this Act, be deemed to be her own 
separate income and she shall be chargeable with 
income tax thereon as if she were actually sole 
and unmarried". 
In moving this amendment Mr. Darling referred to the first 
two reasons for reform which will occur with great 
frequency . 
First Reason : The tax laws should follow the 
for reform property laws. 
In 1894 Mr. Darling was able to say that "it would astonish 
a good many members to know that even though the Married 
Women's Property Act had given a married woman the right to 
own her own property, no amendment had been made in the 
income tax laws". He went on to say: - 
"The husband was assessed just as though the 
income of the wife was his own. If the income 
of the wife was taken as it ought to be, as 
separate from that of the husband, in many 
cases both would be entitled to a large abate- 
ment or be completely exempt. By uniting the 
incomes the married woman was deprived of the 
relief which was given to a single woman It. 
Of course, the husband would also be deprived as 
1. Hansard 28th June 1894 Col 492. 
320 
well. Mr. Darling then gave details of actual cases where 
married couples paid more tax than two single persons and 
said that-he did not put forward the amendment on behalf 
of the "idle and rich" but gave, in particular, the example 
of a schoolmaster and schoolmistress, both with modest 
incomes, who lost their reliefs on marriage. 
Mr. Darling then referred to the second reason 
for reform. 
Second Reason : Reform was being demanded 
for reform : by many people 
Mr. Darling said that he had received letters on this subject 
and a deputation had visited him to discuss the position; 
the amendment was one "designed to remedy a wrong that was 
felt to bear hardly on a large and deserving class of 
people". 
In replying to the proposed amendment Sir William 
Harcourt brought forward two reasons against reform which 
were to be heard very frequently on future occasions. 
First reason Advantages depend on 
against reform proportions of income in 
household 
This reason for retaining the aggregation rule has 
been brought forward on very many occasions but here let it 
be stated in Sir William Harcourt's own words: - 
"Take the case of a husband and wife, each 
with an income of £500. Though the joint 
income was £1,000 a year each of them 
-would get an abatement. Take, again, the 
case of a man with a little over £500 a 
year who had a wife with no money at all. 
He would get no abatement; so that the 
joint menage with £1,000 a year would 
receive two abatements, while the, other- 
establishment establishment with half the income would 
get none". 
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The fallacy of this argument is, of course, that 
if two unmarried persons lived together, each with £500 a 
year, they would each get an abatement and, again, if one 
of the unmarried' persons had slightly more than £500 and 
the other had nothing, there would be no abatement : so 
that the unmarried joint menage with £1,000 a year would 
receive two abatements while the other establishment with 
half the income would get none. Unlike rates, income tax. 
is a tax on persons, not on households, and the equity of 
the tax is constructed by a comparison of individuals and 
not of households. It is a logical fallacy to introduce 
the household concept only when discussing married couples 
and to ignore it when discussing other'households; if the 
household argument had ever had any validity then it should 
have been applied to all adults sharing the same household 
and not just to those who were married. 
I 
Sir William Harcourt also referred to the second 
reason against reform, which is still used'at the present 
day. 
Second Reason It would cost too much 
against reform 
In 1894 the figure given as the 'cost' of dis- 
aggregation was "E500,000 a year and more probably 
£750,000 a year". "The cost made it impossible to accept* 
the amendment, said Sir William Harcourt. 
It is perhaps appropriate at this stage to con- 
sider why the representatives of government have always 
1. See the discussion in Chapter 1 pages 33 and 34 and 
ante about the relevance of the 'household' to the 
assessed taxes, which preceded income tax and also the 
'reporting' duty of a householder in the first Income 
Tax Act of 1799. 
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considered the argument as to cost to provide an adequate 
answer to proposals for reform. It is not thought that 
such representatives were so naive as to confuse the tax 
base with the tax yield : they must have known that if the 
tax base had been altered by disaggregation then the yield 
could have been maintained by an (upward) adjustment'of the 
rates. And it is thought that that is, in fact, the true 
reason behind the continuing opposition to disaggregation, 
namely that an upward adjustment of the rates of income tax 
was politically unacceptable : it is always more 
acceptable. to announce a (comparatively) low basic rate 
of tax knowing that the operation of the aggregation rule 
would disguise the fact that the effective rate for much 
of the population would be higher : again, politically it 
is always more acceptable to announce (comparatively) high 
exemptions and reliefs knowing that the aggregation rule 
would operate to reduce these substantially for most of the 
population. Compare these two announcements : either : the 
mortgage interest relief limit is to be £25,000 : or : 
the mortgage interest relief limit is to be £12,500 except 
for single persons who will get a limit of £25,000. It is 
clear which is most acceptable politically and it is thought 
that this is the (unspoken) reason why the aggregation rule 
has remained so long. 
After pronouncing these two reasons against 
reform Sir William Harcourt may have thought there was 
little more to say, but-the accuracy of the estimated cost. -. 
of reform was questioned and a request made for dis- 
aggregation, at least for married couples with joint incomes 
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below £750 a year and the possibility of an amendment at 
Report stage was promised. Before the debate concluded 
Mr. A. J. Balfour offered for consideration the third 
reason for reform. 
Third reason The tax laws should be con- 
for reform sistent between themselves 
Mr. Balfour said that he had watched throughout 
the whole debate the principles which the Government held 
as subsisting between the relation of man and wife - 
"... and he found that the view the Government 
took of the matter was that when they con- 
sidered it could be profitable for the 
Exchequer to consider a man and wife as one 
then they were considered as one. On the 
other hand when it was to the advantage of 
the Revenue to consider them as two dis- 
tinct persons then they were considered as 
two... For the purpose of calculating income 
tax husband and wife were considered as one 
... for the purpose of death duties two... 
could any system be more absurd, more 
indefensible, more unjust? " 
(It will be'recalled that estate duty had been introduced in 
1894 containing no reliefs for transfers between spouses)' 
(2) Amendment on Report 
The second move towards disaggregation was made 
also in 1894 during the Report stage of the Finance Bill 
when Mr. Darling moved an amendment2 to clause 33 (the 
charge to income tax) which would have resulted in the com- 
plete disaggregation of joint incomes below £500. However, 
at the same time Sir William Harcourt moved an amendment 
1. See Chapter 5 page ante. 
2. Hansard 16th July 1894 col. 111. 
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to clause 34 (abatements and reliefs) giving a separate 
"small income" exemption if two conditions were satisfied: 
first, the joint income had to include earnings of the 
wife; and, secondly, the joint income had to be below £500. 
The new.. relief was, of course, given to the husband as a 
reduction in the tax payable by him on the joint income. 
The amendment, therefore, provided the first alternative 
to disaggregation 
The first alternative : Partial disaggregation 
to disaggregation of wives earnings only 
The principle of a partial disaggregation was not 
accepted by Mr. Darling : he did not see why the new 
arrangements should not also apply to a wife with invest- 
ment income as she would have had an abatement if she were 
not married and pointed out that the amendment 
"did not accept the fact that it dealt with 
two separate incomes of two separate 
persons... what they were dealing with was 
not joint income at all but two separate 
incomes, the one the income of the husband 
and the other the income of the wife". 
However, the amendment was agreed to, although 
the view was expressed that it was to be regarded as a 
partial improvement only and that logically completely 
separate taxation was desirable. Thus, at the end of 
the year. 1894 three of the reasons for reform (that the tax 
laws should follow the property laws, that reform was 
required by many people, and that the tax laws should be 
consistent between themselves); two of the reasons 
against reform (that the advantages would depend upon the 
proportions of income in a household and that it would 
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cost too much); and one alternative proposal (partial dis- 
aggregation of wife's earnings) had all been ventilated 
and the latter had also been implemented. 
3.1894 - 1909 
Although throughout the period from 1894 - 1909 
the position was not considered to be satisfactory, no 
comment was made on the subject of family taxation in the 
Report of the Departmental Committee on Income Tax, under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Charles T. Ritchie, published in 
1905.1 Again, the Select Committee, which reported. in 
1906, made no mention of the, aggregation rule which is 
2 
significant in view of the fact that their report dealt 
with differentiation and graduation and graduation would 
have had an effect on the aggregated incomes of husband and 
wife. 
(1) Questions in the House of Commons 
By 1906, however, the movement in favour of some 
alleviation of the treatment of married couples was 
gathering force. On 10th December 19063 a request was 
made for greater relief for married persons; on 11th 
April 19074 a question was asked in the House of Commons 
about "the estimate of the cost to the Revenue of separately 
assessing for abatement the several incomes of man and wife" : 
1. Paper 365. 
2. Cd. 2575. 
3. Col. 1559. 
4. Cols 333 and 334. 
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the reply was given that "the Inland Revenue had no 
materials for forming such an estimate". 
On 24th April 19071 the view was expressed that 
the time had come when some relief should be given to 
married persons who each had a small income: - 
"A man and a woman with incomes of £400 a 
year got a rebate each of £160 when single 
but if these two were married their incomes 
were put together and they were not allowed 
to claim any abatement. Yet two sisters or 
two brothers who had similar incomes and 
lived together could each claim abatement". 
Here, then, is the fourth reason for reform. 
Fourth reason :A man and a woman who are 
for reform : married should be no worse off 
than two single persons. There 
should be "no penalty on 
marriage". 
The extract quoted above is enlightening in two 
respects : it compares a married man and woman with their 
position before marriage and also with other unmarried per- 
sons who share households. 
In reply, however, Mr. Asquith called in aid the 
Second Reason against reform : it costs too. much; "the 
loss to the Exchequer would be far greater than(the mover 
of the amendment) had any conception of". 
(2) Two new clauses moved in 1907 
On 11th July 1907 a new clause was moved during 
the Committee stage of the Finance Bill 
2 in which it was 
proposed that the incomes of husband and wife should be 
1. Col 119. 
2. Col 190. 
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added together and divided by two for ascertaining the 
exemption or abatement of income tax. 
"the point was that when husband and wife 
were living together their incomes should 
be taken as that of separate people and 
not of one person". 
Here is the first mention of the second alternative 
to complete dis aggregation. 
The second alternative The division of the joint 
to disaggregation : incomes by two : the 
quotient system . 
Under the "quotient system" husband and wife are 
both treated as being in receipt of half of the joint 
income : this system recognises a married couple correctly 
as two individuals rather than one but in its operation it 
will always give a married couple a tax advantage over two 
separate individuals save in the unlikely case where two 
individuals have exactly similar incomes. 
The reply given to this proposal by Mr. Asquith 
repeated the Second Reason against reform : it would cost 
too much. "Such a change would involve the Revenue in-a 
loss of most enormous magnitude". The reply also 
introduced a new reason against reform. 
Third reason : Married couples are members 
against reform : of one household and have 
a joint income. 
Let the third reason be stated in the words of Mr. Asquith: - 
"The theory of the law was that where two 
persons became domestic partners they 
became members of one household and their 
two incomes were fused together". 
The third reason against reform is, in fact, a 
variant of the first reason (which compared households not 
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individuals). As stated by Mr. Asquith, however, it is 
open to a number of objections. First, 'the theory of 
the law'is mentioned without any reference to which law : 
it certainly could not have been the general law of the 
land, because, since 1882, the principle of separate 
incomes had applied to husband and wife; the only law to 
retain the theory was income tax law and it was income tax 
law which it was proposed to amend : it is no answer to a 
proposal for an amendment of the law to reply that "the 
theory of the (existing) law is against the amendment". 
Secondly, Mr. Asquith states as a generality that "when 
two persons became domestic partners they became members 
of one household and their two incomes were fused together; " 
this was also true as regards unmarried persons sharing a 
household but their incomes were not aggregated for tax 
purposes. Finally, the illogicality of importing the 
'household' concept into a tax which is levied on individuals 
is discussed on page 321 above. 
The new clause was,. by leave, withdrawn, but on 
10th July 19071 during the Report stage of the Bill another 
new clause designed to introduce the quotient system, was 
again introduced. In reply, Mr. Asquith mentioned again 
the Second Reason against reform : it would cost too much : 
the loss to the Exchequer would be "very considerable 
indeed". He also brought forward two new reasons against 
reform. 
Fourth reason Aggregation does not stop 
against reform people from marrying 
Fifth reason All cases of hardship are met 
against reform by the partial disaggregation 
of wives earnings. 
1. Col 578. 
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Although Mr. Asquith could correctly state that 
"he did not know anyone who had failed to marry because. of 
the aggregation rule" that is really no reason for 
perpetuating an unjust tax. If a tax were to be levied 
on children it would not be a valid argument in favour of 
the tax to say that one did not know anyone who had failed 
to have children because of the tax. 
The illogicality of countering an argument for 
complete disaggregation by a reference to provisions for 
partial-disaggregation is self-evident. Before leaving 
the subject Mr. Asquith did give a specific reply to the 
proposal for a quotient system - he pointed out the 
advantages which such a system gave to married couples as 
against single individuals, namely 
"that a husband with an income of £999 and 
a wife with an income of E1 would be taxed 
as two incomes of £500, each of which would 
be entitled to an abatement". 
This is a valid comment to make on the quotient 
system. The new clause was, by leave, withdrawn. 
(3) A new clause moved in 1908 - Disag-cregation 
The point was, however, pursued the following 
-year. On May 25th 19081 Sir William Bull drew-attention 
to the fact that two married people paid more. tax than if 
they were not married - the Fourth Reason for reform. He 
asked if it was right that "the state should offer an 
annual premium to the man and woman who would consent to 
live together... without entering into the married state". 
1. Cols. 838-840. 
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He thought not and concluded that the tax imposed "was a 
penalty on marriage". On July 15th 19081 Mr. Watt moved 
a new clause to the effect that "the income of husband and 
wife be taken to be the income of separate persons". He 
gave in support the First Reason for reform : that the tax 
laws should follow the property laws; he said that "the 
tendency of the law during the last thirty years had been 
to separate the incomes of husband and wife and the last 
link that remained with the past was the system of 
estimating the two incomes as one for the purposes of the 
income tax". 
In reply Mr. Lloyd George referred to the Second 
Reason against reform (it would cost too much) and here it 
is interesting to note that the cost of implementation had 
now risen to £1,500,000. He also called in aid the Third 
Reason against reform (married couples are members of one 
household and have a joint income) : the merits of this 
are discussed on page 321 above. 
Thus, between the years 1894 and 1909 no progress 
was made towards any further disaggregation but a persistent 
pressure for reform has been present; one further argument 
in favour of reform (that there should be no penalty on 
marriage); three further arguments against reform (that 
married couples are members of one household and have a 
joint income; that aggregation does not stop people from 
marrying and that all cases of hardship are met by partial 
disaggregation. of wife's earnings); and-one more alternative. 
(the "quotient" system) have all been discussed. 
1. Cols 941-942. 
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4.1909 - Supertax 
In 1909 two Finance Bills were passed, the first 
in the Spring and the second in the Autumn. In the spring 
budget' resolutions a reference was made to the fourth 
reason for reform : the penalty on marriage, which it was 
thought could lead to immorality "because a man and a 
woman living together both got reductions whilst if they 
were married no reductions were made". During the debate 
on the Second Reading2 a reference was made to the First 
Reason for reform (that the tax laws should follow the 
property laws) and it was pointed out that since 1882 a 
husband had no-control over his wife's income yet was 
still liable for tax on it. The autumn Finance Bill of 
1909 was of interest in two respects : it imposed the super- 
tax on incomes in excess of £5,000 and so, for the first time, 
a return of total income from all sources was required. 
Secondly, it extended the legacy and succession duties to 
property passing between husband and wife, although 
admittedly at a lower rate than applied to other beneficiaries. 
The new liability for supertax - the first truly 
graduated tax - brought to the fore once again the anomalous 
position of husband and wife. 
On 20th September 1909, during the committee stage 
of the Bill, the disquiet which was felt was summarised by 
Mr. Walter Guinness3 as - 
1. Hansard 17th May 1909 col. 99. 
2. Hansard, May 1909, vol. 6 col. 164. 
3. Col. 94. 
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"If one partner has F-2,000 and another 
_£3,000 
it is very hard, just because 
they are married, that-they should pay 
an extra tax... surely if it is fair to 
lump the incomes of husband and wife 
together you ought to lump the incomes 
of brother and sister when they live 
together". 
In replying to the amendment the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer brought forward again the third reason against 
reform (married couples are members of one household and 
have a joint income) and also a new reason. 
Sixth reason : Disaggregation would lead to 
against reform : tax avoidance by transfers of 
property. 
Responding to this Mr. Snowden' referred to these 
two reasons for opposing the amendment: 
"The first was that for the purpose of assessing 
for income tax the household is regarded as a 
unit. I do not think that that is the case at 
all. I have always understood that the income 
tax was a personal tax. It is only where hus- 
band and wife are assessed together that 
income tax can be regarded as a household tax. 
In the case of a son over 21 years of age his 
income is not taken as that either of the hus- 
band or the wife". 
Turning then to the proposal that disaggregation 
would lead to tax avoidance through transfers of property 
Mr. Snowden pointed out that details of ownership would 
be in the possession of the Inland Revenue. There is, how- 
ever, a more fundamental response to this reason against 
reform, namely that a right to enter into bona fide trans- 
fers of property, even with motives of tax avoidance, is 
given to every other taxpayer subject to the "settlement 
1. Col 102. 
333 
provisions" referred to in Chapter 31 There is prima facie 
no justification for withholding such a 'similar right from 
husband and wife although it is appreciated that the tax 
code2 does nullify certain obvious forms of tax avoidance, 
e. g. revocable settlements and settlements on children. The 
types of tax avoidance which are nullified in this way must 
remain a matter for political decision but in reaching a 
conclusion on which transactions should be nullified the 
legislation will, no doubt, evaluate the ease with which 
tax can be avoided and whether such avoidance causes genuine 
detriment to the transferor. For example, a distinction 
could be drawn between the desire of a taxpayer to share 
his income with a stranger (which can be tax effective 
within certain limits) and the desire of a taxpayer to share 
his income with his wife, whom he has an obligation to 
support and from whom he could expect some benefit in 
return. On the other hand, income splitting between spouses 
is not considered reprehensible in many of the overseas 
countries considered in Part III and, indeed, in some of 
these countries income is split by statute to give maximum 
tax relief for spouses. Although therefore, the repeal of 
the aggregation rule would mean that consideration would 
have to be given to tax avoidance provision for spouses, 
the conclusion is reached in Part IV of this thesis that 
such provisions should not be introduced but that the 
capital taxes exemptions for spouses should be withdrawn 
so that in all respects bona fide transfers of property 
between spouses are taxed in exactly the same way as 
1. See page 216 ante. 
2. Part XVI Taxes Act. 
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such transfers between other persons. During Report stage 
of the 1909 Bill1 a further new clause, designed to bring 
about complete disaggregation, was moved, referring to the 
fourth reason for reform (there should be no penalty on 
marriage). 
"It is a very hard case indeed that if a 
man lives with a woman who happens to be 
his wife they should be in a worse pbsition 
than if she was not his wife". 
In reply Mr. Lloyd George found nothing new to 
say; he referred to the second reason against reform "a 
serious diminution of the revenue could result from the 
amendment"; and again referred to the third reason against 
reform : "married people live together and have a,. joint duty 
in regard to the expenses of the household". 
The logical fallacy of the 'household' test had 
been exposed on so many previous occasions that Sir William 
Bull could not let this rather tired reference to it slip 
by without expostulating: - 
"A brother and sister live together, and 
they pool their incomes, and they go to 
the household expenses in exactly the 
same way as husband and wife but their 
incomes are not aggregated together for 
income tax purposes". 
The new clause was defeated by 119 votes against 
46 and thus supertax was introduced with no amelioration in 
the aggregation rule. However, a sixth reason against reform 
had been brought forward - namely that disaggregation would 
lead to tax avoidance by transfer of property. 
1. Col. 16o7. 
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5.1910 - 1914 : Pressure for Reform 
In the years following the introduction of 
supertax the main difficulty which was brought to the fore 
concerned the husband's liability to make a return of total 
income, including his wife's income, when he had no means 
of discovering what that income was. This difficulty will 
be discussed more fully in Chapter 8, which deals with 
accountability, but here it may be noted that on those 
occasions when accountability was considered, aggregation 
was also discussed. 
(1) 1912 - Income tax on married women's property 
For example, in the debates in the House of Lords 
on the subject of Income Tax on Married Women's Property' 
Earl Russell referred to the first and fourth reasons for 
reform (the tax laws should follow the property laws and 
there should be no penalty on marriage) when he said: - 
"This is. really an antiquated piece of legis- 
lation, no longer appropriate to the 
circumstances of the case... It is unreasonable 
because you are putting a particular difference 
in taxation upon two people who live together 
when they happen to be husband and wife as_dis- 
tinct from the case when they are father and 
son or two brothers or two sisters in the same 
house". 
In reply, Lord Ashby St. Ledgers said: - 
"If the incomes are taken together for the 
-purposes of abatement 
they should be taken 
together for the purposes of collection.  .,..,. ,. Perhaps you may say, why not treat the 
husband and the wife's incomes as entirely 
separate? That is a suggestion that appears 
1. Hansard 14th October 1912 Cols. 823-834. 
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to have some advantages but it would be 
attended with much loss to the Exchequer 
and on that ground alone... it is not likely 
to be contemplated". 
Here again is the second reason against reform 
it would cost too much; and the Marquess of Landsdowne 
pointed out that the incomes were aggregated for income 
tax purposes but taxed separately for the purposes of the 
death duties. In winding up the debate the Lord Chancellor 
(Lord Haldane) accepted that: - 
"in the case of income tax, the law dates 
from a period when the position of married 
women was very different from what it is 
today... the result of that is, of course, 
hardship... and my Rt. Hon. Friend the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer... has under- 
taken to consider it". 
(2) 1913 - The Budget Resolutions 
On 7th May 19131 Mr. Cassell moved an amendment 
to the Budget Resolutions to the effect that "the separate 
income of a married woman should not be deemed to be the 
income of her husband but should be treated as her 
separate income". Unfortunately, but inevitably, such an 
amendment was ruled out of order on the Budget Resolutions 
but it did give Sir F. Banbury the opportunity of attacking 
the aggregation rule, comparing the position of a husband 
and wife on the one hand with that of a brother and sister 
and that of two unmarried people living together on the 
other. 
1. Hansard Vol. 52 Col. 2108. 
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(3) 1913 - The Women's Tax Resistance League. 
On 10th June 19131 a deputation from the Women's 
Tax Resistance League attended on Mr. Lloyd George at the 
Treasury and "laid before him what they considered to be 
grievances in connection with the taxation of married 
women". The deputation discussed both aggregation and 
accountability. On the subject of aggregation, Miss May 
Hicks said: - 
"that although for all other purposes the 
married woman was allowed to have a 
separate income, yet for the purposes of 
taxation her income was still considered 
simply as part of her husband's. That 
imposed an unfair tax. on marriages. The, 
income tax law ought to be brought up to 
date and the income of husband and wife 
made separate taxable units". 
Replying, Mr. Lloyd George said that he admitted 
that the present condition of the income tax law was 
adapted to a condition of things which existed before the 
new'views with regard to married women's property came into 
existence but there were practical difficulties in the way 
of any change. 
"He agreed that in its present form the law 
rather treated married women as if they had 
no legal existence at all., That was a legal 
humiliation and they were entitled to protest 
against it but the difficulties were of a 
political character... It would involve his 
finding £1,500,000 of revenue elsewhere 
immediately. He could not find that money 
elsewhere without imposing it on other people 
and married people, like others, would have 
to bear their share of it". 
This exchange is of interest because the Chancellor 
appears to. acknowledge the difficulty and to give some hope 
1. The Times, 11th June 1913, page 10. 
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for the future; here again is the second reason against 
reform (it costs too much); no doubt the Deputation would 
have agreed that the money could not be found. without 
imposing upon other people but would have wondered why 
that should not be done; if married people were to bear 
their share, why should not those who were not married bear 
their share also? 
(4) Question as to timing of amendment 
On 4th August 19131 Mr. Snowden referred to the 
Chancellor's reply to the Deputation and asked why the 
matter had not been dealt with in the Revenue Bill : the 
Chancellor replied that he hoped "to deal with the position 
of married women as regards income tax in committee in the 
Finance Bill". 
(5) 1914 - The Debate on the Budget Resolutions 
During the debates on the financial statement 
on 4th May 19142 Mr. Cassel referred to the promise made in 
the previous session to alter the law "in connection with the 
income tax levied on the joint incomes of husband and wife"; 
no amendment-had been proposed by the Government and 
Mr. Joynson-Hicks pointed out that the budget "was dealing 
with income tax and supertax combined of something like 2/- 
in the E" and thus: 
"the hardship to a married couple becomes very 
much more intensified than it was a few years 
ago" . 
1. Hansard Vol. 56 Col. 1038. 
2. Hansard Vol. 62 Col. 98. 
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It will be noted that these remarks were 
addressed at the aggregation rule and a feeling appears to 
have been abroad that something was about to be done. For 
example later in the Debate Mr. J. M. Henderson1 said that: 
"some time ago, when the married women went 
as a deputation to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer they seemed to a large extent to 
prevail upon him their case being absolutely 
unanswerable". 
But some foreboding that all might not be as it should may 
have visited Mr. Evelyn Cecil who, during the course of the 
same debate, commented on the 
"perpetual hostility which the Treasury show 
to man and wife... they are always trying to 
load the dice against the man and the wife". 2 
Mr. Henderson put the whole of the aggregation problem in 
a nutshell when he said: 
3 
"It seems to me absolutely indefensible that 
you should treat a man and his wife as one 
individual for the purposes of taxation. 
They are two people. Their expenses are 
those of two individuals and so are their 
responsibilities". 
In reply Mr. Lloyd George brought out once again the second 
reason against reform (it costs too much): 
"The effect would 
of other persons 
they can in just: 
should share the 
order to redress 
injustice". 
be to put 
and the p, 
ice demand 
burden of 
what they 
up the taxes 
Dint is whether 
that other people 
£1,500,000 in 
regard as an 
1. Hansard, 11th May 1914 Col 816. 
2. Hansard 18th May 1914 Col. 839. 
3. Col. 1346. 
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This point was ably answered by Captain Clive a little 
later in the debate when he said: - 
"I cannot understand how the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer is able to dismiss the 
grievance (of married people) with so little 
sympathy. His chief argument seems to be 
that although there was some justification 
for the grievance it would cost £1,500,000 
and he asked who is to pay that. I do not 
know why, if the grievance is admitted, it 
should not be removed simply because it is 
the bachelors and those who are not married 
who would have to pay a little more". 
Mr. Lloyd George may have anticipated some such 
reply because he also brought out once again the third 
reason against reform (the household reason) and said: - 
"I think the question is the income available 
for running the household". 
This must have sounded entirely unconvincing 
because at this stage Viscount Hemsley 'made a remark 
which was inaudible in the Press Gallery' - or at least 
the delicacy of the editor of Hansard led him to record it 
as such. Mr. Lloyd George then went on to promise that a 
clause would be moved "when the Revenue Bill got into 
Committee". 
However, nothing emerged and on 29th June, 30th 
June, 1st July, and 2nd July questions were asked as to 
how the Chancellor of the Exchequer intended to deal with 
the point. On 2nd July he promised that a new clause 
'would be tabled next Monday'. Mr. Hoare stated that he 
was very anxious that the matter should be raised 
"because there is a good deal of feeling in 
the country about it... time after time, 
owing to some particular reason, we have 
been prevented from dealing with it". 
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In fact, it was not until 15th July 1914 that the new 
clause was introduced. 
6.1914 - Option for Separate Assessment 
On 15th July 1914 the House of Commons got its 
first opportunity of debating the new clause containing 
"provisions with respect to income tax of married persons". 
The clause, of course, deals only with accountability and 
is therefore fully discussed in Chapter S. However, 
comments were made later in the debate 
l 
about the fact 
that the proposals had been brought in 'almost at the 
last moment' and had not been included in the Finance Bill 
as originally presented. Mr. Dickinson said: 
"I had hoped that when we were called-upon 
to deal with it it would not be in relation 
to a clause brought in at the last moment". 
The fact that the clause did not deal with 
aggregation did not prevent Mr. Cassel from introducing 
that subject when he rose to speak to the House. In 
acknowledging that the clause might be of assistance in 
removing the difficulties arising out of accountability he 
deplored the fact that nothing had been done to effect 
disaggregation. He referred to the first reason for 
reform (the tax laws should follow the property laws) and 
said: -2 
"The anomalous position of the law at the 
present moment arises from the fact that 
the Income Tax Act of 1842 was passed long 
before the Married Women's Property Act. 
1. Col. 2041. 
2. Col 2016. 
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It was passed in the time while married women 
were still incapable of owning property and 
that property was, in fact and in law, con- 
sidered the property of the husband... Under 
our law you still treat the income of husband 
and wife added together, although it is the 
income of two persons, with the requirement 
of two persons, as if it were the income of 
one person. The result is that husband and 
wife are called upon to pay more income tax 
in proportion to their ability to bear taxation 
than either bachelors or spinsters or persons 
who live together or whose relationship is of 
any other description than that of husband and 
wife legally married". 
This was, of course, a re-statement of the fourth 
reason for reform (there should be no penalty on marriage). 
This point was reinforced later when Mr. Cassel stated 
specifically: - 
"It is impolitic and unjust to select marriage 
as the one relationship for special and 
penal taxation... as a result of this clause 
not a single married couple will be relieved 
from a single farthing of what I call the 
marriage tax". 
Then Mr. Cassel introduced a fifth reason for reform: 
Fifth reason : Husband and wife were two 
for reform : persons and should be taxed 
as such. 
"You treat husband and wife as if they were 
one person when for all practical purposes 
and requirements they are two persons. They 
eat twice as much - they want twice as much 
clothes [An Hon. Member: "Three times as much"]. 
They require more house accommodation and for 
that reason they contribute more to the local 
authority in the shape of rates (and indirect 
taxes)". 
Later' Mr. Cassel suggested two further alternatives to 
dis aggregati on: 
1. Col 2023. 
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Third alternative : 
to disaggregation 
Partial disaggregation of 
all income up to a specified 
limit 2700 
Fourth alternative : 
to disaggregation 
A percentage deduction from 
the tax payable by a married 
couple 
No doubt bearing in mind the speedy success 
enjoyed by Mr. Darling in 1894, when he suggested partial 
disaggregation as an alternative to complete disaggregation, 
another version was proposed : this would apply to both 
earned and unearned income, up to a joint limit of £700, 
and would no doubt have made the wife separately accountable, 
although that point was not elucidated. The fourth 
alternative, of allowing married persons "a certain per- 
centage off the tax which otherwise they would have to pay" 
was suggested as having the merits of simplicity. 
In replying to Mr. Cassel, Mr. Lloyd George dealt 
at length with the whole subject of aggregation bringing 
forward again the arguments which had been used on previous 
occasions to prevent reform. Before these are considered, 
however, it may be of interest to note that Mr. Lloyd George 
referred to the deputation which had attended on him on 
10th June 1913 and described the cases which had then been 
mentioned to him; all these concerned accountability and 
in respect of them all, he said, the clause provided a 
remedy. Without specifically saying so, he implied that 
the deputation had not been concerned with aggregation. 
But later in the Debate1 Lord Robert Cecil said: - 
1. Col. 2045. 
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"I do a little regret that the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer should have been led... 
to have said that in the deputation he 
received no claim was made in respect of 
the substantial question namely that 
husband and wife are treated as one per- 
son for the purpose of income tax. He is 
entirely mistaken. That point was 
certainly raised. I find that Miss Amy 
Hicks said this: - 
"You lay stress on the fact that it is 
the household which should be taxed 
and not the separate parties making up- 
that household. I should like to know 
if there is any reason why a husband and 
wife should be singled out for taxation 
and why the household should not be 
taxed in the same way as for instance, 
a mother, brother and sister or father 
and daughter.... why is the household 
regarded as the unit? " 
"That is the whole argument and the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer dealt with it afterwards 
and if you read the whole of his speech it is 
quite plain that that was by far the largest 
part of the matter which was brought before 
him on that occasion". 
Turning now to the reasons against reform developed 
by Mr. Lloyd George the interesting fact emerges that nearly 
all repeat the reasons already described and, although these 
appeared in a different order in his speech it is proposed 
here to treat them in the order which has been established 
by reference to their first appearance in point of time. 
To begin, then, 
The first reason : Advantages depend on 
against reform : proportions of income in 
household 
This reason was first put forward in 1894 and 
is mentioned on page above. Let the argument be stated 
again by Mr. Lloyd George: - 
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"Take, first, a case where there is' an income 
, of 
E400 all belonging to the husband - £200 
earned and £200 unearned. In that case the 
tax paid is_Zl0.16s. 8d. But supposing it 
is a joint income of which £200 earned belongs 
to the husband and 2200 unearned belongs to 
the wife. In that case, if this amendment 
were carried, they would pay only £3.10s. Is 
that fair? Is it fair that a man whose income 
is his own should pay £10.16s. 8d. while in 
the other case, simply because the income is 
divided between husband and wife, only £3.10s . 
-should be paid as the contribution of that 
household to the state? Where is the justice 
of that? " 
The justice, is of course, that income tax is a 
tax on individuals, not on households. Husband and wife are 
two individuals and should therefore be taxed separately on 
two incomes. If the desire was to tax households then the 
principle should be applied to all households and not just 
to husbands and wives. Further, as was pointed out later 
in the debatel cif a husband has £600 a year it is all in 
his control but if he has £300 and his wife has £300 the 
wife could spend all her money". 
Second reason : It costs too much 
against reform 
In 1894 the figure for disaggregation was 
£500,000 a year; in June 1913. it was £1,500,000 a year; in 
July 1914 it was £2M a year "without making any allowance 
for the kind of'arrangement that would undoubtedly spring 
up" and with that "the deficiency would mount up by 
millions". 
Third reason : Married couples are members 
against reform : of one household and have 
one income. 
1. Col. 2043. 
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Perhaps because the 'household' argument is by 
now beginning to look a little thin, it is for the purposes 
of this debate somewhat rephrased as: - 
"The essential principle of marriage it 
identity of interest - you cannot have it 
both ways - that goes to the very root idea 
of the marriage law". 
This statement is difficult to place within the 
context of English law : there has never been any system of 
community of property in England, and the property of the 
spouses was completely separate at law since the Married 
Women's Property Act: finally the so-called "identity of 
interest" was then mainly ignored for death duties, thus 
enabling the Inland Revenue, but not the married couple, 
to 'have it both ways'. Later in the debate' Lord Robert 
Cecil provided a very complete answer to the 'household' 
argument when he said, in referring to the theory that 
income tax depends on the ability to pay: - 
"Of course, in that sense, that is true of 
every tax but the theory of the income tax 
is a much simpler matter. It is a tax upon 
the income of the individuals who make up 
the population... There is no trace of any 
other form of taxation in the whole of the 
income tax and it is perfectly plain that 
that is so because, in fact, households are 
not taxed. The incomes of households are 
not taxed in any other case whatever... Each 
individual is taxed". 
Later he says: - 
"I know of my own knowledge several households 
where unmarried sisters, who have been left 
tolerably well off, have lived together for. 
the purpose of joining their incomes and 
living more comfortably, treating their joint 
incomes as one for the purposes of the house- 
hold... In none of those cases are the individuals 
taxed on their household income". 
1. Col. 2046. 
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And later Mr. Pretyman put it this way: -' 
"We do not tax households, we tax individuals. 
If our taxation were based on a tax on house- 
holds the argument would have very great 
force but we do nothing of the kind... we 
should have to remodel our entire law if we 
were going to start on a'basis of taxing 
households instead of taxing individuals". 
Fourth reason Aggregation does not stop 
against reform : people from marrying 
Again Mr. Lloyd George brings forward the argu- 
ment that aggregation does not stop people from marrying. 
He was supported later in the debate by Mr. Rees Smith2 
when, in speaking of the fact that he knew of no single 
case where a couple were deterred from marrying because of 
tax, made the astonishing statement: - 
"If such a case had occurred I should say 
that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had 
acted like a wise father in forbidding 
the marriage because neither of them are 
likely to bring happiness to the other or 
to anyone else". 
Fifth reason : All cases of hardship are 
against reform dealt with by partial dis- 
aggregation of wife's earnings 
Strangely, this reason against reform was not brought up in 
the debate. 
Sixth reason : Disaggregation would lead to 
against reform : tax avoidance by transfers 
of property. 
This argument had first been used in 1909 and was re-stated 
as: 
1. Col 2137. 
2. Col. 2056. 
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"Husband and wife would undoubtedly make 
-arrangements 
to reduce their taxation... 
stocks, shares and other property would 
be put in the name of the wife, or the 
husband as the case might be, in order to 
save income tax". 
The examples which followed assumed that such 
transfers would only be of investments,. thus favouring the 
family with a large unearned income at the expense of_a 
family whose resources lay in one income which was all 
earned. This, however, ignores the fact that transfers of 
income, earned or unearned, under the covenant procedure 
were then available to other taxpayers and the abolition 
of the aggregation rule would have made the same procedure 
available to husband and wife; so the argument that 
families with unearned incomes would benefit at the. expense 
of those with earned incomes appears misconceived. The 
fact that transfers of property, even for tax avoidance, 
are permitted to other taxpayers and should be permitted 
for married persons is developed on page above but was 
also referred to later in-this debate by Mr. Pollock1 when 
he referred to the provisions of the death duties "which 
would prevent the wholesale alteration in the tenure of 
property" and again by Mr. Reif Jones who said2 
"The idea of collusive arrangements is very 
much exaggerated. They are rather difficult 
to carry out. I do not see amongst my 
acquaintance any marvellous generosity of 
character in husbands handing over half of 
their incomes to their wives to do what 
they like with. These arrangements involve 
a complete giving up of the control of the 
money". 
1. Col. 3037-- 
2. Col. 2140. 
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Seventh reason Husband and wife get advantages 
against reform with death duties 
This is the first appearance of the seventh 
reason against reform and it was in fact brought forward 
to reply to the fourth reason for reform - that there 
should be no penalty on marriage. Mr. Lloyd George thought 
that the aggregation rule did not work unfairly for married 
persons 
"because this was a case where the death 
duties come to the rescue". 
He pointed out that brothers and sisters cohabiting 
together would pay death duties as if they were strangers. 
Now it will be recalled that before 1909 legacy and 
succession duties were not imposed on transfers, between 
husband and wife but in that year Mr. Lloyd George had 
actually imposed such duties on property left between hus- 
band and wife, albeit at a lower rate than if they were 
strangers; and although in 1909 a limited exemption had 
been introduced into estate duty law it only applied on the 
death of the surviving spouse and therefore benefited only 
the ultimate beneficiary. Further, the death duty saving, 
such as it was, only benefited those spouses with capital, 
whereas the aggregation rule penalised those spouses who 
both had incomes; it was likely that those who benefited 
were not the same as those who were penalised. Thus the 
reason given was not quite as valid as might be thought 
and the same could be said for the next new reason against 
reform which was then introduced. 
1. See Chapter 5 page 287 ante. 
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Eighth reason It would not be used 
against reform in practice 
"I believe that even if the grievance were 
attempted to be redressed the vast majority 
of people would not claim this special 
treatment so complete is the identity of 
interest among married people". 
This is, in fact, a reason for reform, as if it 
were correct then nothing would be lost by introducing 
the amendment. Thus, all the reasons against reform, with 
the exception of a reference to partial disaggregation, 
were re-stated. Two alternatives to disaggregation were 
also mentioned; a very brief reference was made to the 
second alternative, i. e. the 'quotient' system by Mr. 
Rawlinson, and Mr. Lloyd George discussed the fourth 
alternative (a percentage deduction from tax payable by a 
married couple) and this appeared to find some favour. 
However, no amelioration of the position was made; the 
Chancellor thought that he might prefer to give some relief 
through the child allowances and said that the point would 
be referred to "the Committee to enquire into the question" : 
it is thought that this is a reference to the Colwyn 
Commission which reported in 1920 and which did ultimately 
recommend alterations in the wife allowance: this will be 
discussed further in Chapter 9. 
As the draft clause introduced into the 1914 
Finance Bill dealt only with accountability the position 
with regard to aggregation remained unchanged. The debates, 
had, however, seen a re-statement of the arguments for and 
against reform and a discussion of some of the alternatives 
to aggregation. One new argument in favour (that husband 
and wife should be treated as two persons) had been 
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mentioned, and also two new arguments against reform 
(that husband and wife enjoyed advantages with death duties 
and that the reform would not be used in practice). Also 
two new alternatives to disaggregation were mentioned, 
namely, the partial disaggregation of all income below a 
specified limit and a percentage deduction from the tax 
paid by a married couple. 
During the year following 1914 the debate on 
aggregation lay somewhat dormant, the emphasis being 
placed now on the allowances which are considered in 
Chapter 9. The next occasion for a review of the principles 
was occasioned by the Report of the Colwyn Commission in 
1920. 
7.1920 - The Colwyn Report 
The Report of the Royal Commission on the Income 
Tax in 1920, (the Colwyn Report)' deals with the tax treat- 
ment of the family unit in eight pages (54-62) and 45 
paragraphs (238-283). On the subject of aggregation three 
paragraphs (263-265) are devoted to a discussion of the 
quotient system (the second alternative to aggregation 
already mentioned) and thirteen paragraphs (248-261) to an 
examination of the existing aggregation rule. A brief 
reference will therefore be made to the discussion of the 
'quotient' system before the consideration of the aggregation 
rule is reviewed. 
1. Cmd 615. 
352 
(1) The quotient system 
The Colwyn Report examines the quotient system 
only in its "extreme form" which 
"involves the aggregation of. the incomes 
of the members of a household or family 
and the division of the aggregate amount 
by the umber of the individuals main- 
tained out of the income". 
The proposal is discussed only in its application 
to a family with children and not to husband and wife alone ; 
the proposal for a family quotient system did not find 
favour with the Commission and here it may be appropriate 
to regret that the Commission did not devote 'a. little time 
to examining the proposal as an alternative to the 
aggregation rule within the context of the taxation of hus- 
band and wife only. 
(2) The aggregation rule 
It is clear that prior to the Colwyn Report the 
subject of aggregation had received a great deal of public 
attention: - 
"The correct method of assessing married 
persons has received a great deal of public 
attention both before and since the appoint- 
ment of this Commission. The matter has been 
freely ventilated in the Press and has been 
raised on several occasions in the House of 
Commons. In the course of our enquiry a con- 
siderable volume of-evidence on the subject 
has been presented to us and we have examined 
witnesses from representative women's societies: 
we have also received a large number of letters 
in connection with this part of. our invest-, 
igation". 
This would support the second reason for reform - 
that a change was demanded by many people. The Report 
refers to the option for separate assessment introduced in 
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1914 and records that many witnesses were unaware of the 
option "which had rarely been taken advantage of". It 
was acknowledged that this option did not affect the 
aggregation of the joint incomes and it was disaggregation, 
the assessing of husband and wife as "separate taxable 
units" which was urged by many witnesses. Reference was 
made to the fourth reason for reform, stated by these 
witnesses that there should be no penalty on marriage, and 
also to a variant of the first reason, namely: - 
Sixth reason The principle of absolute 
for reform :- equality gives te right 
to separate taxation 
The reason is stated more fully in paragraph 251 of the 
Report: - 
"By those who take this view it is claimed 
that the-right to a completely separate 
assessment is an essential part of separate 
citizenship and that the principle of 
absolute equality in regard to civil 
obligations should override any principle 
of taxation". 
Having thus referred briefly to three out of the 
six reasons for reform so far identified the Report 
proceeds to deal in detail with the reasons against reform:. 
many of the points are now very familiar and indeed the 
wording used in one or two places almost exactly echoes 
the wording used on previous occasions. Although the 
reasons advanced-in the Report appear in a different order 
they will be considered here in the order which has now 
been established by reference to the date of their introduction 
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First reason :. Advantages depend on 
against reform proportions of income in household. 
l 
The Commission is very impressed at the anomalies 
which would result 
"if different sums of income tax were 
-levied 
on two married couples enjoying 
equal incomes merely because in one 
case the income belonged wholly to one 
spouse and in the other to both". 
No reference is made to the similar anomalies 
faced by unmarried households; the Commission thinks that, 
as regards married persons only, an amendment which would 
result in such anomalies would be both inequitable and 
ridiculous. Figures are quoted which compare a household 
where a husband earns £1,000 a year and his wife nothing 
(tax of £187. 10s. Od) with a household where the husband 
earns £500 and the wife £500 (tax of £120. Os. Od). The 
Commission fail to point out that the same position would 
apply to a comparison of, say, a household where an earning 
son supported a widowed mother on the one hand and another 
household of two sisters with similar incomes on the other. 
Second reason It would cost too much 
against reform : 
In 1894 the cost of reform would have been 
£500,000 a year, in June 1913 it would have been £1,500,000 
a year; in July 1914 the figure was £2M" a year and in 1920 
it had risen to £20M "increasing possibly to £45M in 
consequence of avoidance of tax by transfer of income from 
the husband to the wife 112 
1. Colwyn Report - paragraphs 252 - 253. 
2. Colwyn Rep ort - paragraph 255. 
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Third reason : Married couples are members 
against reform of one household and have 
a joint income 
The Colwyn Commission refers to the third reason 
against reform in these words: - 
"We must regard the social conditions of 
. 
the country in which the taxation is 
imposed. The great majority of married 
persons live together and use their 
several incomes for common purposes". l 
The Commission repeatedly emphasise this principle 
by reference to "the law of taxable capacity" and "the 
ability to pay" . So - 
"The incomes are aggregated because the 
law of taxable capacity is the supreme 
law in matters of taxation and taxable 
capacity is in fact found to depend upon 
the amount of the income that accrues to 
the married pair". 2 
and 
"The outstanding principle of ability to 
pay which we recognise as governing all 
questions of taxation". 3 
Again, no reference is made to the "ability to 
pay" of households shared by unmarried persons. It is 
thought that the severe inadequacies of the third reason 
against reform are fully dealt with earlier in this 
Chapter, but two short references are particularly 
appropriate here. In 1914 Mr. Cassel had said: 
4 
"Under our law you still treat the income 
of husband and wife added together as if 
it were the income of one person. The 
result is that husband and wife are called 
1. Colwyn Report, paragraph 258. 
2. Paragraph 259. 
3. Paragraph 258. 
4. Page 342 above. 
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on to pay' more income tax in proportion 
to their ability to bear taxation than 
either bachelors or spinsters or persons 
who live together or whose relationship 
is of any other description than that 
of husband and wife legally married". 
And again, in 1914, Lord Robert Cecil referred 
to the theory that income tax depended on the ability to 
pay but pointed out that income tax was a tax on individuals, 
not on households, because households were not taxed in any 
case other than husband and wife. 
1 
Fourth reason Aggregation does not 
against reform : stop people from marrying 
The Colwyn Commission2 had an answer for those 
who said that aggregation did stop people from marrying. 
It said: - 
"If the allegation is correct that joint 
assessment is conducive of immorality 
(an allegation unproved in the course of 
our enquiry and characterised by one of 
the women witnesses as being neither 
reasonable nor probable) the logical, 
even if not the practicable, remedy is to 
render liable to joint assessment the 
income of two unmarried persons living 
together". 
The further logic would be to jointly tax any 
unmarried persons, whether two or more, sharing the same 
household : this was clearly further than the Colwyn 
Commission wished to go and they agreed that even their 
suggestion was 'impracticable'. 
Fifth reason All cases of hardship are 
against reform : met by partial disaggregation 
of wife's earnings 
1. See page 344 above. 
2. Paragraph 254+. 
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As in 1914 this reason against reform is not 
brought forward on this occasion : this seems to 
indicate that-it was widely considered to provide no 
answer to the difficulties and, in any event, the Report 
later recommended the abolition of the provision. 
2 
Sixth reason : Disaggregation would lead to 
against reform : avoidance by transfers of 
property 
The Commission refers' to the cost of reform and 
the additional loss which would arise from transfers of 
income between spouses. The continuation of the rule which 
deprives married persons from exercising rights available 
to all who are unmarried is justified in this way: 
"To shift a burden from the shoulders of 
persons whose joint income is such that 
their ability to pay permits of its being 
equitably borne by them and to place that 
sort of burden, by means of an increased 
rate, upon the shoulders of other tax- 
payers would be, in our opinion, entirely 
contrary to all principles of equitable 
assessment". 
The equity in a system which prevents a husband 
with £1,000 a year from sharing it with his wife, while 
permitting the man next door, with £10,000 a year to share 
it with his mother, or common law wife, is sometimes hard 
to discern. 
Seventh reason : Husband and wife get 
against reform : advantages with death duties 
The Colwyn Commission point out3 that "the joint 
dependency is recognised, to the benefit of the wife, for 
other purposes of taxation, e. g. legacy and succession 
1. Paragraph 233. 
2. Paragraph 255. 
3. Paragraph 258. 
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duties payable by a widow are less than those payable by 
a person unrelated to the deceased". To the extent that 
some benefit was available, this is a valid comment, but 
it is thought that, on balance over the whole field of 
taxation, the aggregation rule in itself brought more 
disadvantages than advantages to married persons. 
Eighth reason A change would not be 
against reform : used in practice 
Again, this reason is not mentioned by the Colwyn 
Commission, rather wisely it is felt. The Commission did, 
however, introduce a new reason against reform - the ninth. 
Ninth reason : Disaggregation would result in 
against reform : the abolition of the marriage 
allowance 
"It seems to us that it would be quite illogical, 
under the same system of taxation, to make an 
allowance which recognises the joint respon- 
sibilities of husband and wife and at the same 
time to grant relief to each Qf the partners to 
the union as though they were complete strangers. 
If separate assessment were granted the marriage 
allowance should logically be abolished and the 
result would be a shifting of burdens from rich 
to poor because in the vast majority of cases 
the wife has either no separate income at all 
or a separate income less than the amount of the 
present marriage allowance and far less than the 
allowance we suggest should be made". l 
Now this reason against reform is defective in 
two respects. First, the abolition of aggregation would not 
'logically' lead to the abolition of the marriage allowance. 
The two matters are entirely distinct : each has a separate 
history and separate statutory provisions : aggregation 
existed for nearly a century and a quarter 'without the 
marriage allowance and the marriage allowance could exist 
1. Paragraph 257. 
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independently without aggregation : other personal 
allowances, e. g. child allowances and housekeepers allowances 
were given to taxpayers who supported others out of their 
income without any concomitant requirement of aggregation. 
Child allowance has, of course, now been abolished1 but 
other minor personal allowances still exist on this basis. 
It is in fact a major defect of the Green Paper on the 
Taxation of Husband and Wife2 that it fails adequately to 
distinguish between the effects of the abolition of the 
aggregation (and accountability) rules and the completely 
separate considerations which apply to the marriage . 
allowance. The subject of the allowances is considered 
more fully in Chapter 9, but here it may be recorded that 
any difficulties as to the future of the allowance are not 
relevant to a consideration of the aggregation rule; this 
is shown by a consideration of the systems adopted in 
Canada and Australia, dealt with in Part III. 
The second defect in the ninth reason against, 
reform is that it ignores the fact that with the abolition 
of aggregation transfers of income would be available to 
all husbands and wives, whether the income were earned or 
unearned; each wife would have her own (full) personal 
allowance to use in respect of such transferred income: 
there would be no shifting of burdens from rich to poor - 
3 
the poor would benefit the most from the arrangement. 
1. Other than the child allowance for unmarried persons in 
section 14 Taxes Act. 
2. Cmnd 8093. 
3. The concept of transferred income is discussed in 
Chapter 16 post; it is, however, not put forward as the 
ideal practical solution to the provision for a nil or 
low income spouse -a claim for a transferred allowance 
is preferred. 
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Finally, the Colwyn Commission led into the 
tenth reason against reform: 
Tenth reason : 
against reform 
The obligations of marriage 
recognised by the wife 
allowance 
"There are two methods of recognising, by 
. 
diminished taxation the obligations of 
marriage. One is to make an allowance... 
The other method is by a complete severance 
in the treatment of husband and wife for 
income tax purposes... The first method, 
seeing that it affects every married couple 
is far more likely than the second to 
encourage marriage". 
The distinctions between the aggregation rule and 
the allowances are discussed above : the two provisions are 
completely distinct and the marriage allowance could con- 
tinue after disaggregation although the consequent 
entitlement of the wife to her own full single personal 
allowance would diminish its importance substantially. 
Following the publication of the Colwyn Report no amendment 
in the aggregation rule was made, although alterations in 
the allowances were introduced and these are discussed in 
Chapter 9. 
The Report is of great interest in this respect; 
it referred briefly to two of the reasons for reform 
(that it was demanded by many people and that the aggregation 
rule was a penalty on marriage) and introduced one new 
reason, namely, that the principle of equality gives the 
right to separate taxation. But in enumerating the reasons 
against reform all the old arguments are used : it is true 
that two new reasons are introduced but both these concern 
the allowances which had only been first given in 1918 
and could not therefore have been considered on a previous 
occasion. 
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8.195 4- The Radcliffe Report 
The Radcliffe Report dealt rather more fully 
than had the Colwyn Report with the subject of family 
taxation : aggregation, however, is considered quite 
briefly in nine paragraphs (113-121). As did the Colwyn 
Report, it considers some alternatives to aggregation 
before considering the rule itself. 
(1) Alternatives to aggregation 
Three alternatives are discussed : one is the 
second of the alternatives already mentioned (the quotient 
system) and two new alternatives are introduced, namely 
separate taxation with a wife allowance and separate 
taxation with the right to opt for a quotient system. A 
short reference will be made to each. 
Second alternative : The quotient system 
to aggregation : 
The Colwyn Commission considered the quotient 
system only in its application to a family with children; 
the Radcliffe Commission also considered its application to 
husband and wife. The quotient system, as applied in 
France, was summarised as: - 
"The incomes of husband and wife are 
aggregated ... the. aggregate income is then divided... and tax is charged separately 
on each part... Thus in effect a married 
couple pays twide the tax paid by a single 
person with half their joint income... If this 
system were to be adopted its immediate effect 
would be a marked improvement in the relative 
position of most married couples... in the 
upper income ranges". 2 
1. The Report of the Royal Commission-on the. Taxation of 
Profits and Income, Cmd 9105. 
2. Paragraph 114. 
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The adoption of the quotient system is not recommended: - 
"Adoption would mean a shift in the dis- 
tribution of the tax burden from married 
persons to single ones to an extent that 
seems to us excessive". l 
This is a valid comment : the quotient system 
not only neutralises the effect of aggregation but gives 
a positive tax advantage to married persons over single 
persons unless both husband and wife enjoy nearly identical 
incomes. One disadvantage of the quotient systen, however, 
lies in the fact that a joint account of income is - 
essential - there is no possibility of separate accounting. 
Fifth alternative : Separate taxation with 
to aggregation : wife allowance 
The Report points out that in Canada and Australia 
the incomes of husband and wife are separately taxed but 
that: 
"if... a wife... has no income or only a'small 
one the husband receives a special personal 
allowance varying with the amount of the 
wife's means". 
Unfortunately, apart from mentioning this 
alternative, the Report contains no further comment on it; 
at least it is not specifically rejected as are the other 
two alternatives which are discussed. 
Sixth alternative : Separate taxation with option 
to aggregation : to choose quotient system 
In the United States, says the Report: - 
"assessment of husband and wife is made 
separately but they have the right to 
choose aggregation (under the quotient 
system) in which event the tax charged is 
twice the tax on half the joint income"-2 
1. Paragraph 121. 
2. Paragraph 115. 
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The Report does not recommend the adoption of 
this system; in addition. to the shift in the burden of 
taxation which results from the quotient system, and 
which is mentioned above, the following reason is given: - 
"The U. S. system is based on an equation 
between the combined incomes of husband 
and wife and the separate income of two 
individuals which does not strike us as 
sufficiently convincing". l 
This is a valid comment on the quotient system 
generally; the advantage of the U. S. A. system over the 
French system is that the former gives an initial right 
to separate accounting but with the option to choose the 
money advantages of the quotient system if the spouses 
are willing to forego the right to separate accounting 
with the French system a joint account is compulsory. 
(2) The aggregation rule 
Having referred to the alternatives to aggregation 
discussed in the Report a reference can now be made to the 
discussion of the aggregation rule itself : and here it is 
disappointing to note that no new reasons are mentioned 
either for or against reform : the old ground is re-trodden 
once more with some of the illustrations brought up to 
date. Here the reasons are considered in the order 
previously adopted in this Chapter, beginning with the 
three reasons for reform which are briefly mentioned. 
First reason : The tax laws should follow 
for reform : the property laws 
1. Paragraph 121. 
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The Report stated: - 
"It is true that aggregation has been a 
feature of the tax since t was first 
imposed in the year 1799: 1 and that a, 
married woman's legal control of her 
property was restricted then and there- 
after in a way that it is not now... It 
does not follow that aggregation has ever 
had any real connection with her 'servile' 
status in relation to her property... It 
is more likely that aggregation was 
introduced (because) it afforded a con- 
venient means of collecting the tax, more 
especially as the husband was a necessary 
party to any suit against his wife at 
common law... In fact the historical 
argument seems to us neither a good 
argument for retaining the rule, nor a 
good argument for abolishing the rule if 
it is a good one". 
Now the statement that the aggregation rule was 
introduced purely as a means for collecting the tax. must 
be misconceived, as husband's accountability was introduced 
six years before aggregation; further, for other persons 
under a disability in 1799, e. g. children and "lunaticks" 
arrangements were made for the tax to be collected from 
other persons, usually trustees, without any necessity 
for aggregation : finally, where the wife had separate 
trustees the tax could have been collected from them 
without any intervention by the husband. Although the 
historical argument may not be a good argument for 
abolishing the rule "if it is a good one" the historical 
argument does show the complete change in the underlying 
principles upon which the rule was constructed and the 
burden of proof that the "rule is a good one" must 
therefore change so that those who argue for retention 
1. It will be recalled from Chapter 1, page 40, that 
aggregation was not in fact introduced until 1805. 
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of the rule have to make out a positive case in support. 
The view is taken that this has not been done. 
Second reason : Reform was demanded by 
for reform many people 
The Report says that the Commission 
"received such a volume of representations 
from different quarters to the effect 
that aggregation of incomes of husband and 
wife ought to be abolished and the income 1 
of each assessed as that of an individual" 
that they found it necessary to express an opinion on the 
rule. This confirms the view that the rule was of concern 
to many people and reflects a similar statement made by 
the Colwyn Commission (page 
Fourth reason : 
for reform : 
above). 
There should be no penalty 
on marriage 
"It was said to us that aggregation is 
socially undesirable since it tends to 
discourage marriage and to induce a man 
and woman with separate incomes to live 
together without becoming husband and 
wife.. We can give very little weight to 
this argument... It is not true as a general 
statement that aggregation operates as a 
tax on marriage. It is only true of a man 
and woman both of whom have incomes and then 
only if certain ranges of income are 
exceeded". 
The Report then points out that, as a result of 
the system of allowances, a two-earner married couple 
could, in 1955, be paying less tax than two single persons. 
This is a valid comment but it ignores the fact that the 
system of allowances is completely distinct from the 
system of aggregation. The disadvantages of aggregation 
have always been most acutely felt in cases where both 
1. Paragraph 116. 
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husband and wife had incomes and where certain ranges 
of income were exceeded but there are other disadvantages 
also which could apply in any income range : these arise 
out of the inability of a wife to enjoy a separate 
personal allowance against her own investment income 
however small; the inability of a husband to transfer 
income or assets to his wife or vice versa; and the 
restriction of some quite substantial reliefs and 
exemptions (e. g. mortgage interest relief and the capital 
gains tax relief) so that husband and wife have only one 
set between them and not two. The fact that aggregation 
is not a tax on all marriages is not an answer to the fact 
that it is a tax on some. 
The reasons against reform which are contained 
in the Report have all been heard before. 
First reason : Advantages depend on pro- 
against reform : portions of income in 
household 
Here is this reason in the words of the Radcliffe Commission: - 
"Such a method of taxation (i. e. disaggregation) 
would mean that one married couple bore a 
greater or less burden of tax than another 
according to what must surely be an irrelevant 
distinction for this purpose, namely the 
proportion in which the combined income was 
divided between the partners, for under a 
system of graduation if each of two married 
couples has the same combined income but one 
owns its combined income in proportions more 
nearly equal than the other, that one would 
be the likely to pay the less tax". 1 
The logical fallacy of comparing the joint income 
of married couples in a tax system which only taxes 
individuals and not households has been fully discussed above. 
1. Paragraph 119. 
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Second reason : It costs too much 
against reform 
In 1894 the cost of reform had been £500,000; 
in 1913 £1,500,000; in 1914 £2M; in 1920 £20M and in 
1955 £143M, assuming that all married couples would 
equalise their incomes, and- 
"even if transfers of holdings are not contem- 
plated there would necessarily be a big loss 
of tax in abolishing aggregation". 
The true reason behind the argument of cost is 
discussed above and the problem is becoming more difficult 
to solve with the passage of time. 
Third reason : Married couples are members 
against reform : of one household and have a 
joint income 
This is the way the Radcliffe Commission put it: - 
"Tt does appear to us that marriage creates 
.a social unit which is not truly analogous 
with other associations involving some 
measure of joint living expenses and that to 
tax the incomes of two married people living 
together as if each income were equivalent to 
the income of a single individual would give 
a less satisfactory distribution than that 
which results from the present rule". 
The reasons for the "less satisfactory dis- 
tribution" are given as the first, second and sixth reasons 
against reform; namely, that the advantages would depend 
upon the proportions of income in the household, that it 
would cost too much, and that disaggregation would lead to 
avoidance through transfers of property; these are con- 
sidered in the appropriate order but here it may be noted 
that no attempt is made to define the way in which, for 
income tax purposes, the social unit of marriage in fact 
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differs from other associations involving joint living 
expenses. Further, the surprising statement that any new 
rule would treat the incomes of two married people living 
together "as if each income were equivalent to the income 
of a single individual" ignores the fact that each income 
is the income of a single individual. 
I 
Fourth reason : 
against reform : 
Aggregation does not stop 
people from marrying 
The Commission say: 
"We are sceptical of the suggestion that men 
and women are in fact dissuaded from 
marriage by any such nice calculation of 
the financial odds. In the nature of things 
it is impossible to establish or reject it 
by any concrete evidence... the present treat- 
ment of the income of married couples for the 
purposes of tax is not more likely to lead 
people away from marriage than to tempt them 
into it". 
This is fair comment : but it does not remove the 
injustice which results from retaining the rule. 
Fifth reason : All cases of hardship are 
against reform met by the partial dis- 
aggregation of wife's earnings 
It will be recalled that the partial disaggregation 
of wife's earnings, which had been introduced in 1894, had 
been abolished in 1920 after the Report of the Colwyn 
Commission. This reason against reform was not therefore 
relevant in 1934 and was not mentioned in the Radcliffe 
Report. 
Sixth reason Disag regation could lead to 
against reform : tax avoidance by transfers of 
property 
The Commission say that if the aggregation rule 
were to be abolished: 
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"there would be a natural tendency for 
-husbands 
to try to arrange to transfer 
so much of their incomes to their wives 
as would produce an equal division". 
They go on to say that no doubt legislation could 
be introduced to counteract this but: 
"it would mean an arbitrary insistence 
on maintaining the existing position as 
between different married couples at the 
date of the new system and would thus 
confer. a permanent but unreasonable 
advantage on those whose combined incomes 
at that date happened to be more or less 
equally divided". 
The ability of any non-married taxpayer to 
transfer income and assets quite freely is discussed above : 
such transfers must be bona fide, though, and the genuine 
relinquishing of control over the assets or income would 
be a disincentive to wholesale transfers especially in cases 
of some marital disharmony. In addition, the capital taxes 
on such transfers would have to be taken into account. 
' 
Seventh reason : The husband and wife have 
against reform : advantages with death duties 
By 1955 legacy and succession duties, which had 
given some advantages to transfers between husband and 
wife had been abolished and the limited advantage given 
by estate duty was of benefit to the remainderman only 
after a limited interest to the surviving spouse. Rather 
wisely, the Commission did not mention this reason against 
reform. However, in 1982 there is no doubt that husband 
and wife do have advantages with capital transfer tax and 
also some advantages with capital gains tax although here 
1. See further discussion in Chapter 16 post page 627. 
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account must also be taken of the disadvantages : all 
these are fully discussed in Chapter 5 above. 
Eighth reason : It would not be used in 
against reform : practice 
Wisely, it is thought, the Radcliffe Commission 
made no mention of this reason against reform, originally 
suggested by Mr. Lloyd George in 1914 and sensibly for- 
gotten about ever since . 
Ninth reason It would lead to the abolition 
against reform : of the marriage allowance 
Tenth reason : The obligations of marriage 
against reform : are recognised by the wife 
allowance 
The Radcliffe Commission consider these two 
reasons together as follows: - 
"An income on which two people have to live 
as married persons has not the same taxable 
capacity as the income of a single 
individual. But in our view the right way 
to allow for the difference is to make an 
appropriate allowance for the fact of 
marriage in the assessment of the unit... 
given aggregation the marriage allowance is 
due whatever the size of the wife's income". 
If the Radcliffe Commission had accepted the 
logical corollary of their first sentence, namely that 
two incomes on which two people have to, live as married 
persons have the same taxable capacity as the income of 
two single individuals, they would not have confused dis- 
aggregation with the question of allowances. But the 
inability of the Commission to see married people as two 
individuals seriously affected the quality of the 
recommendation they made which was: 
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"that taxation of the combined incomes 
_of 
husband and wife is to be preferred 
to their separate taxation as separate 
units because the aggregate income 
provides a unit of taxation that is fairer 
to those concerned". 
Whether this. means fairer to married people or 
to unmarried people is not stated : the system is not 
fair because it does not provide equity as between 
individuals :a married woman generally pays more tax 
than a single woman and a married man pays less tax than 
a single man. The present system of allowances has created 
distortions but, leaving allowances aside, aggregation can 
only bring disadvantages to married couples as compared 
with single tax payers. 
9.1969 -A New Clause 
During the 1960's pressure for some reform of 
the tax system as it affected married women began to 
mount : as a result of the 1944 Education Act the 1950's 
had seen the entry of more young women into higher education 
and then into the professions : more women were earning 
high incomes and more women wished to continue with their 
professions after marriage. In 1968 Mr. Heath set up a 
Committee of the Conservative Party (the Cripps Committee) 
and as a result proposals were put forward for discussion; 
a study group of the Labour Party was also set up to 
examine the subject. Both subsequently recommended 
separate taxation for married women. At about the same 
time the Women's Taxation Action Group, an offshoot of 
the Women's Interprofessional Working Party, also issued 
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a report calling for separate taxation. 
On 6th January 1969 The Times published a letter 
from Dr. Hilary Summerskill about the tax burden on 
professional women. She said: 
"Two people each earning £5,000 a year pay 
a total of £3,031 in tax if they are 
single but £4,062 if married". 
She said that the country was being deprived of the 
talents of many professional women, especially doctors and 
scientists, and recommended that husbands and wives should 
be capable of being separately assessed for tax purposes. 
' 
Published correspondence followed, some in support, some 
not, and on January 17th The Times published an article 
showing that the additional tax paid by a married couple 
with joint earnings of £20,000 was £4,000. A couple with 
four children and joint earnings of £9,500 would be 
£841.13s. 6d. better off after a divorce. 
Other newspapers took up the theme. The 
Guardian on 25th March 1969 said: 
"Society has changed but the law and adminis- 
tration have not kept pace". 
On the same day the Financial Times said that any revenue 
estimate of the cost of a change 
"must take account of the fact that many 
women might then find it worth their 
while to work and be taxed who now find 
their husband's rate of surtax too 
formidable a deterrent"; 
and on 28th March the New Statesman said: 
"The system actively discourages many 
trained doctors and teachers from 
practising their professions". 
1. The Times 6th January 1969 p. 19a. 
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On 17th April 1969, during the debate on the 
Budget Resolutions Mr. Patrick Jenkin deplored the lack 
of any amending provision and promised to bring the 
subject forward in Committee : he said that 
"The Treasury have long had a hostility to 
married women". 
Later in the same debate Mr. Houghton said: - 
It is time... that we relieved women of 
some of the humiliations and injustices 
of the taxation system". 
The new clause was introduced as promised by 
Mr. Patrick Jenkin in Standing Committee on 26th June 
and briefly debated. The clause was designed to dis- 
aggregate the earnings of a 
. 
married woman,. entitling her 
to get her own allowances and reliefs against her own 
income, but on the basis that the existing levels of 
married man's allowance and wife's earnings allowance 
should remain. 
In introducing the clause Mr. Jenkin referred 
to the first, second and fourth reasons for reform.. .. 
First reason : The tax laws should follow 
for reform the property laws 
"The Victorian attitudes to married women 
which are enshrined in our tax legislation 
... stem from an age when a married woman 
was regarded as subsidiary and inferior to 
her husband and indeed in some ways little 
better than a mere chattel". 
"The fossils of the ancient common law view 
of women lie deeply embedded in our tax laws 
many of them unchanged for over a century". 
"All this stems from the basic concept that 
a married woman has no separate fiscal 
existence". 
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And later in the same debate Mr. Macleod said: 
"I regard the taxation of married women 
in this country as barbaric in com- 
parison with the way in which many other 
countries treat the same problem". 
Second reason : Reform was demanded by 
for reform : many people 
Mr. Jenkin referred to "the growing resentment 
about this tax treatment of married women", and later: - 
"The women's organisations of all sorts 
have been pressing for relief along 
these lines for many years". 
Sir Henry D'Avigdor Goldsmid referred to the 
Press Campaign which has been mentioned, and later Mr. 
Macleod referred to the people who had been writing to him 
"to express very deep resentment" at the state of the law. 
Fourth reason : There should be no penalty 
for reform on marriage 
In 1969 Mr. Jenkin could state that the tax laws 
were preventing at least one couple from marrying but the 
main thrust of the 1969 debate was that the tax laws were 
a disincentive to married women who wished to work - this 
was a new penalty on marriage 
"The new clause, by disaggregating the earned 
income of married women... would give great 
encouragement. '.. to those many women who 
would work were the tax penalty not so high". 
Mr. Jenkin made it clear that the limitation 
in the clause to disaggregation of wives earnings was 
only a first step on the way to complete disaggregation, 
the clause was to be a "modest start". 
In replying to the address on the new 'clause Mr. 
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Diamond, to his eternal credit, brought out only one of 
the previously stated reasons against reform - the second - 
and put forward no less than five new reasons; they were 
not very good reasons but at least they were new. 
Second reason It would cost too much 
against reform 
The previous costs given for complete disaggregation had 
been: 
1894 500,000 
1913 1,500,000 
1914 2,000,000 
1920 20,000,000 
1955 143,000,000 
The cost of disaggregation of wife's earnings only in 1969 
was to be £9M and Mr. Diamond said: 
"I could not possibly 
Committee that if we 
reduce the tax yield 
to benefit would be 
rates of tax because 
joint incomes". 
suggest to the 
were going to 
by £9M the first 
those bearing heavy 
of their high 
This ignores two points : it was not necessary 
to reduce the yield as the rates could have been adjusted; 
and the change need not necessarily have benefited persons 
with high incomes - the compensating taxes to maintain 
the yield could have been levied at the higher rates. 
These were the new reasons against reform 
introduced in 1969: - 
Eleventh reason : At lower income levels a" 
against reform married couple are better 
off than two single persons 
This is true but it results in the distortions 
arising from the anomalous provisions regarding allowances 
and is no answer to a proposal for disaggregation. In any 
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event, the clause proposed would have retained the 
existing allowances. 
Twelfth reason : Husband and wife both earning 
against reform : pay less tax than if all 
income earned by husband 
This is an extraordinary statement. What it means 
is that two people pay less tax than one person with an 
income equal to their joint income. As this is an essential 
result of any progressive tax system it is not thought that 
the point takes the discussion any further. 
Thirteenth reason : Married women work for satis- 
against reform : faction and not for money 
Mr. Diamond said: 
"The satisfaction felt by a married woman 
in resuming her professional work is to 
my mind far more important than the 
remuneration involved. We all have 
massive experience of this sort of thing 
- that they enjoy their work and are not 
concerned with the level of taxation that 
is brought to bear". 
Why married women should feel more satisfaction 
in their work than single or widowed women, or any men, 
is hard to see. Replying, Mr. Macleod said: 
"I do not meet these 
as the Chief Secret 
write to me express 
at the state of the 
Fourteenth reason 
against reform 
saints as regularly 
ary. The people who 
very deep resentment 
taxation law". 
The Royal Commission did not 
favour disaggregation 
Said Mr. Diamond: 
"The principle is one... which was examined 
by the Royal Commission... who found nothing 
to object to in the idea of aggregating 
husband's and wives income". 
Comments on the views of the Royal Commission (in 
the Radcliffe Report) are set out above. 
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Fifteenth reason : The present rule only adversely 
against reform : affects a few higher rate tax- 
payers 
Mr. Diamond put this reason this way: - 
"This is broadly a surtax problem... the 
difficulty arises at an area not below 
E5,085 a year" 
In replying to this Mr. Macleod said: 
"The fact that comparatively few people 
are involved is never acceptable to me 
as an argument for perpetuating an 
injustice if an injustice exists". 
He concluded with a commitment that as soon as 
his party had an opportunity of doing so, they would greatly 
improve the position : the new clause was lost. Perhaps 
this is not surprising when it is borne in mind that the 
Government of the day had, only the previous year, introduced 
the aggregation of the investment income of minor children. 
10.1971 - Disaggregation of Wife's Earnings 
When the Conservative Party formed the next 
Government they fulfilled their promise and clause 15 of 
the Finance Bill in 1971 introduced provisions for an 
option for disaggregation of wife's earnings. The principle 
was similar to that introduced in 1894 and abandoned in 1920 
but there were many differences in detail. Among the 
points of similarity were that in both cases the dis- 
aggregation only extended to a wife's earnings and not 
her investment income, and for the purpose of the rule in 
each case the wife's earnings were treated as one income 
and the rest of the couple's total income (husband's earnings 
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and investment income of both spouses) formed another 
income. The differences were more numerous : in 1894 
there was a maximum limit on the joint income'(Z500) above 
which the rule could not apply : no such limit was imposed 
in 1971. Again in 1894 the husband, on behalf of both 
husband and wife, had to make the claim for relief and the 
relief was given against his total liability : in 1971, the 
option had to be exercised by both husband and wife as, on 
exercise, the husband lost the (higher) married mans 
allowance and the wife was given the relief against her 
earnings. The 1894 option was only of benefit to low- 
income couples : the 1971 option was only beneficial to 
wives who either had high earnings themselves or whose 
husbands had a high income. In neither case did an option 
alter the principle of husband's accountability. 
The Reports of the two Royal Commissions (Colwyn 
and Radcliffe) and the Parliamentary Debates previously 
referred to exhaustively considered all the reasons against 
reform so it is refreshing to note in the debates on 
clause 15 a re-statement of the existing six reasons for 
reform and the propounding of two new reasons. 
First reason : The tax laws should follow 
for reform : the property laws 
This reason could not have been better stated than 
it was by Mr. David Marquand who, on other grounds, opposed 
the clause; he said: 
"... it is monstrous in the present day and 
age that Victorian conceptions of the 
status of married women should still be 
enshrined in the taxation system". 
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Second reason : Reform was demanded by 
for reform : many people 
The Solicitor-General, Sir Geoffrey Howe said: - 
"The truth is that the change in question 
has been recognised as both necessary and 
fair... by all the women's organisations 
over a number of years... it has been supported 
by the Women's Taxation Action Group, The 
Interprofessional Working Party, the Association 
of Headmistresses, the British Dental Assoc- 
iation, the Medical Women's Federation and other 
bodies". 
Third reason : The tax laws should be con- 
for reform : sistent between themselves 
As was pointed out by Mr. Derek Coombes: - 
"On death capital is treated as if it were 
separately owned. Surely that is totally 
contradictory when income from capital is 
treated and taxed jointly in life". 
Such comments must, of course, now be read sub- 
ject to the capital transfer tax provisions, introduced in 
1975, which do provide for exemption on transfers between 
husband and wife . 
Fourth reason : There should be no penalty 
for reform 0 on marriage 
The obvious reason for the introduction of the 
clause, namely to reduce the penalty on marriage, is men- 
tioned by the Solicitor-General: - 
"The object of the clause is to remove the 
inequity of the harsh effect of aggregation 
on the minority who pay more tax because 
they are married - in effect to remove the 
tax on morality". 
The disparity between married and unmarried 
couples is also mentioned by Mr. Hamling: - 
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"It is becoming increasingly common for 
. couples 
not to marry but simply to live 
together in which case... they make tax 
returns as single people - Increasingly 
as the custom grows of couples living 
together but not marrying there will be 
an increase in anomalies in this regard". 
Finally, the disincentive effects m working wives 
of the tax laws generally were widely discussed : the other 
"penalty on marriage" was the lack of any adequate 
financial reward for work, after the high rates of tax had 
been paid. 
Fifth reason : Husband and wife should be 
for reform : taxed as two persons 
Mr. Marquand accepts the argument: - 
"that married women ought, on principle, to 
be treated as separate individuals for tax 
purposes because it is inherently discrim- 
inatory to treat them as though their 
incomes belonged to their husbands". 
and later Sir Brandon Rhys Williams said: - 
"The income of every man woman and child 
should be taxed at the same rate. It is 
objectionable to treat a married woman 
as an adjunct. She should be treated as 
a person in her own right". 
Sixth reason : The principle of equality 
for reform : gives the right to separate 
taxation, 
Mr. Hamling, although opposing the clause, agreed: - 
"I accept the argument for separate taxation 
of incomes of husband and wife on the 
ground of sexual equality". 
and later: 
"I submit that if we are to proceed along the 
road of sex equality then all her income 
should be regarded as hers and... no income 
of hers ought to be aggregated with that of 
her husband". 
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The two new reasons for reform were: 
Seventh reason : Disaggregation should also 
for reform : apply to investment income 
It was widely agreed that the provisions of the 
clause were only a "modest start". Mr. Derek Coombes 
said: - 
"The clause should apply to all income 
and not just to earnings". 
Mr. Bruce-Gardyne did not like the 
"distinction between so-called earned 
and so-called investment income". 
The Solicitor-General refers to the 'Treasury 
argument' that to include investment income in the clause 
"would allow manipulation between two investment incomes" 
but prefers his own argument for confining the clause to 
earned income namely that 
"If one begins recasting the whole tax 
system upon the theoretical basis of 
equality of the sexes one embarks upon 
an exceedingly complex task", 
and that equity in the way proposed in the new clause 
"seems to be enough to be going on with". 
Eighth reason An injustice which only 
for reform : affects a minority is still 
an injustice 
In support of the clause the Solicitor-General 
sai. d: - 
"Of course if one is removing an inequity 
. 
from a minority it is by definition a 
minority but that does not destroy the 
strength of the case for removing the 
inequity". 
Objections were made to the clause on the erroneous 
382 
ground that it conferred some benefit on those with large 
incomes which was not available to those on small incomes; 
this, of course, was not the case. The clause gave no 
right to separate accounting at all and at lower income 
levels a married couple benefited from the combination of 
the (higher) married man's allowance and the wife's 
earnings allowance; these were both lost when the option 
under the clause was exercised and replaced by two single 
personal allowances. 
A considerable amount of discussion also took 
place about the timing of the notice required under the 
clause but ultimately the clause was accepted and still 
represents the only alternative to aggregation : its 
defects have been mentioned above but here it may be 
recalled that among these are: - 
(1) the option must be exercised by both husband 
and wife :a wife alone has no entitlement to 
disaggregation under the clause; 
(2) the option does not extend to a wife's 
investment income; 
(3) the option does not involve separate accounting 
although this 'could be achieved by an option for 
separate assessment, the complexities of which, 
however, are daunting; 
(4) the advantages of the option depend on a number 
of ever-changing factors, e. g. size of incomes 
of both spouses, the amount of personal 
allowances and the level of higher rate tax bands: 
spouses have to be constantly vigilant in 
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exercising the option if it is advantageous and 
withdrawing it if it is not; and 
(5) the clause did not provide any solution to the 
other disadvantages of aggregation i. e. no 
transfers of income between spouses and no 
entitlement to a second set of reliefs. 
11.1975 - The Institute for Fiscal Studies 
In 1975 Mr. Graeme Macdonald gave a lecture to 
members of the Institute for Fiscal Studies on "Taxation 
and the Family Unit". Mr. Macdonald later became a member 
of the Meade Committee and some important ideas which were 
subsequently developed in the Report of that Committee 
first appeared in the 1975 lecture. 
The author accepts that "horizontal equity" means 
"that people with the same taxable capacity are taxed in 
the same way" but does not quite extendthis correctly to 
married persons. So he asks the question: 
"Does a married couple, each spouse earning 
£2,500 have a taxable capacity equal to a 
single person with an income of £5,000 or 
one equal to half a single person with a 
£5,000 income? " 
The answer is, of course, neither; in this case the 
married couple have a taxable capacity equal to two single 
persons each with an income of £2,500. Again, another 
question is asked: - 
"Does an income of £10,000 for a married unit 
really represent twice the £5,000 income of 
a single unit or is it equivalent to only 
half of the £10,000 of another single unit. 
The individual basis avoids such questions... 
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It does implicitly deny, however, the argument 
that two can live more cheaply than one : 
that an income of £10,000 to a married unit 
is worth more than the sum of two £5,000 
incomes each accruing to an individual unit". 
This passage is full of difficulties : for example, 
what does the phrase "two can live more cheaply than one" 
really mean? An income of £10,000 to a married unit is 
not worth more than the sum of two £5,000 incomes each 
accruing to an individual unit. To the limited extent that 
a shared household can reduce expenses, then an income of 
£10,000 to persons sharing might be more than two £5,000 
incomes to persons living separately, but this is not 
what is actually said. 
The author concludes that an individual basis 
cannot produce equity and brings out the first reason 
against reform, i. e. that advantages depend upon the 
proportions of income in the household. 
"The individual basis could easily prove to 
be inequitable : depending on the rate 
schedule a couple relying on one income of 
£5,000 might find themselves more heavily 
taxed than one with two incomes of £2,500 
each". 
The author agrees that aggregation can prove 
inequitable between married couples and other individuals 
living together but concludes that this is not a significant 
problem as "income levels of individual units are so 
significantly lower than those of married units that even 
if incomes of single individuals were aggregated there 
would not be many in the higher tax ranges". Now this 
appears to ignore the fact that married units comprise 
two persons and single units only one. 
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The author then points out that if an 
individual basis of taxation were adopted there would be 
an incentive to equalise investment income by transfers 
of property and recommends 
"that to avoid encouraging such transfers of 
property purely for tax reasons it would 
seem preferable under the individual basis 
to legislate formally for what would other- 
wise be possible informally by attributing 
half of aggregate income to each spouse". 
The author concludes that he regards the 
application of the individual basis to married units as 
inequitable but does favour the adoption of a quotient 
system (mentioning a ratio of 1: 1.4); however this is not 
meant to apply to investment income; finally, the author 
clearly regards the present-disaggregation of wife's earnings 
as "excessively lenient". 
12.1978 - The Meade Report 
After the Report of the Radcliffe Commission in 
1954 no large scale review of income taxation was made 
until the publication of the Meade Report' in 1978. Again, 
family taxation was only one of the many topics covered in 
the Report and the recommendations made have to be read in 
the light of the underlying proposal in the Report that the 
basis of taxation should be altered away from incomes and 
on to expenditure. The interesting proposals for an 
expenditure based tax will, however, not be considered here 
1. The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation - Report 
of a Committee chaired by Professor J. E. Meade. 
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as they are not relevant to a review of the existing system. 
As might be expected from such a distinguished 
committee the treatment of "The Tax Unit" in Chapter 13 of 
the Report is thorough and constructive. One need not 
agree with all the conclusions but one must be impressed 
by the detailed analysis of the principle of aggregation 
and by the number of useful alternatives proposed. 
The Report deals with three main questions : 
first the eight criteria which, it is considered, should 
form the basis of the tax treatment of married couples; 
next the reasons for rejecting the adoption of an 
individual basis of assessment (i. e. complete disaggregation); 
and finally the description of a number of possible 
alternatives to complete disaggregation. Each will be con- 
sidered separately. 
(1) The eight criteria 
The Report lists eight criteria to be adopted 
when determining the basis of assessment for married couples 
and concludes that, as a number of these conflict, the 
solution must be a matter of compromise. The statement 
of these criteria in itself assists in understanding the 
nature of the conflict : it becomes obvious that some are 
relevant to a tax system constructed by reference to 
individuals and some are relevant to a tax system con- 
structed by reference to "families" or to "persons living 
together". Now the tax system in the United Kingdom is 
constructed by reference to individuals only and the 
importation of concepts relevant to a "family" based 
system or a "household" system must give rise to conflicts 
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and illogicalities. It would be perfectly'possible to 
construct a tax system based on families or households, as 
defined, but it would not be possible, for example, to 
have a family based tax which imported households or 
vice versa. The solution to the problem of the conflict 
in the eight. criteria is not to compromise but to choose 
one basis of taxation and apply it consistently throughout. 
The difficulties in the present system arise from the fact 
that the concept of 'a married couple' has been imported 
into a tax on individuals. 
Bearing this in mind, the eight criteria can be 
logically re-organised as follows: - 
(a) Criteria affecting all tax structures. These- 
criteria are mainly of an administrative nature 
and would be relevant in any tax structure. They 
are: - 
8. The. arrangements involved should be reasonably 
simple for the taxpayer to understand and for 
the tax authorities to administer. 
This criterion would favour an individual basis 
but if a family basis or household basis were 
logically and consistently adopted both could 
in theory comply with this criterion; for 
example, rates are assessed consistently on a 
'households basis and are reasonably simple to 
administer. However, rates are a proportional 
tax whereas income tax is a progressive tax and 
it is thought that, as presently structured, 
income tax could not be imposed either on a full 
3bb 
family basis (i. e. not just husband and wife) or 
an a household basis. The complications which 
were experienced in 1969-72 in attempting to 
aggregate an infant child's investment income 
on divorce illustrate the problems of inter- 
pretation and definition which could arise. 
7. The choice of tax unit should not be excessively 
costly in loss of tax revenue. 
Actually, no choice of tax unit would result 
in a "loss of tax revenue"; any base can 
yield any amount of tax if the rates are 
correctly structured. 
(b) Criteria relevant to an individual based structure. 
These criteria would be satisfied only by the 
adoption of an individual - based structure: - 
1. The decision to marry or not to marry should 
not be affected by tax considerations-. Not 
only would this criterion exclude the present 
United Kingdom system of aggregation but it 
would also exclude the 'quotient' system which 
gives a positive advantage to marriage. 
3. The incentive for a member of the family to earn 
should not be blunted by tax considerations which 
depend on the economic position of other members 
of the family. 
This points to complete independence of allowances 
and to complete disaggregation at least as 
regards earnings. 
389 
(c) Criteria relevant to a "family-based" tax. 
2. Families with the same joint resources should 
be taxed equally. 
4. Economic and financial arrangements within the 
family (e. g. as regards the ownership of 
property) should not be dominated by sophis- 
ticated tax considerations. 
5. The tax system should be fair between families 
which rely upon earnings and families which 
enjoy investment income. 
The difficulty of these criteria is that 
family' is not defined; it could be meant to 
refer either to husband and wife, or it could 
also include children, either minor only or 
adults as well, or it could include other 
'families' e. g. a man and woman living 
together. If a tax system were constructed 
so that all citizens belonged to a "family" by 
reference to which they were taxed then these 
criteria would be relevant : the great 
difficulty would be in defining a "family" 
for this purpose. But in a tax system which 
is structured on individuals it is illogical 
to single out one type of family (i. e. husband 
and wife) for special tax treatment and ignore 
all the other types of family which exist. 
(d) Criteria relevant to "household" based tax. 
6. Two persons living together and sharing house- 
hold expenditures can live more cheaply and 
therefore have a greater taxable capacity than 
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two single persons living separately. 
"Two persons living together" are not res- 
tricted to husband and wife and the same 
principle would surely apply to three, four 
or more persons living together. However, the 
great difficulty in imposing a 'household' tax 
would be the problem of aggregation; rates is 
a household tax but it is at a flat rate; a 
proportional tax could never be imposed on a 
'household' basis and that is why it is unjust 
to impose it on husband and wife who represent 
only one of the many types of household. 
The conclusion therefore is that it is not possible 
to have-equity between families in a system structured by 
reference to individuals and it is not possible to have 
equity between individuals in a system which is structured 
by reference to families :a choice must be made and con- 
sistently applied : the injustice of the United Kingdom 
system arises from the fact that the system is based on 
individuals with an artificial deeming of two individuals 
(husband and wife) as one for the purpose of the tax. 
Those who support a 'family' tax or a 'household' tax 
should be prepared to carry their proposals to their 
logical conclusion and not restrict them to husbands and 
wives only. 
(2) The refection of an individual basis of assessment. 
Although the Meade Report clearly holds the 
view 'that there should be no penalty on marriage' it does 
not recommend the adoption either of the 'quotient' system 
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or of the individual basis of assessment; either of these 
would neutralise a penalty on marriage and no other system 
does so. The 'quotient' system is mentioned below : in 
rejecting the individual basis the Report brings out a 
number of the familiar 'reasons against reform'. 
First reason : Advantages depend upon 
against reform : proportions of income in 
household 
"The adoption of an individual basis would 
mean that the tax burden for two families 
with the same total income would not be 
the same if the income were concentrated in 
the hands of one partner in the one family 
but divided between the two partners in the 
other". 
This reason against reform was first mentioned 
in 1894 and is commented on above. It ignores the fact 
that if an individual basis were adopted spouses could 
choose to equalise their incomes. If this reason had any 
validity the solution would be to adopt the 'quotient' 
system, under which all households are deemed to hold 
income in the same proportions i. e. equally. 
Second reason 
against reform 
"Another possible 
arrangement (i. e 
is that it could 
stantial loss of 
It would cost too much 
disadvantage of this 
the individual basis) 
easily lead to a sub- 
tax revenue". 
Here the Report confuses the tax base with the 
tax yield and this has been fully commented on above. 
Third reason : Married couples are members 
against reform : of one household and have 
a Joint income 
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"Two persons living together and sharing 
-household expenditure 
can live more 
cheaply and therefore have a greater 
taxable capacity than two single persons 
living separately". 
Any saving from joint housekeeping comes not 
by being married but by setting up a joint household : 
in any event the major expenses of life are not sub- 
stantially saved by joint housekeeping : the individuals 
do not eat less, or wear less clothes; although they may 
live in the same house they will certainly require more 
house accommodation than one single person. Minor savings 
may be made, as the couple may, for example, share furniture, 
motor cars, etc., but most married persons would agree that 
in practice joint housekeeping leads to an expansion of 
consumption rather than a reduction. 
Fifth reason : All cases of hardship are met 
against reform : by partial disaggregation 
of wife's earnings 
The Meade Committee accept that husband and wife. 
should be assessed separately on their earned income: - 
"We all agree that it is desirable to have 
a tax treatment for married couples, 
which allows separate assessment of the 
earned incomes of the two partners". 
The Committee do not, however, agree with dis- 
aggregation of investment income, mainly because its 
continuing aggregation is a feature of the expenditure 
tax proposed elsewhere in the Report. 
Sixth reason : Disaggregation would lead to 
against reform tax avoidance by transfers 
of property 
The Report points out that: - 
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"it would always be possible for a couple who 
owned property to seek to equalise their 
taxable incomes by a suitable transfer of 
the ownership of income-yielding property from 
one partner to the other... some would regard 
it as a positive virtue of a tax arrange- 
ment that it would encourage a more equal 
division of income between married partners 
... But to treat the individual as the tax 
unit... would lead to property arrangements 
between spouses planned in such a way as to 
avoid taxation". 
The fact that such property transfers are 
available to non-married persons is mentioned above, and 
also mentioned is the deterrent effect of loss of control 
over the income or assets transferred. Further, -this 
argument proceeds on the basis that all investments are 
owned by one spouse, the husband : the situation where 
investments are owned equally by the spouses, the wife's 
investments possibly purchased from savings from earnings, 
is ignored and the injustice suffered in this case gets no 
comment. 
Seventh reason Husband and wife get advantages 
against reform : with death duties 
This reason against reform was again relevant in 
1978 as capital transfer tax, introduced in 1975, did give 
spouses valuable exemptions and further, capital gains tax, 
introduced in 1965, gave exemption for transfers between 
husband and wife, the value of which, however, was 
reduced by the aggregation rule which gave only one set of 
exemptions and reliefs to a married couple. The Meade 
Report stressed that if an individual basis of assessment 
was adopted, then "a further set of tax considerations" 
would need to be considered in connection with transfers 
of property to equalise incomes : this is a valid comment. 
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Ninth reason : It would lead to the abolition 
against reform of the marriage allowance 
The Report indicates that if the individual basis 
were adopted "there would be nothing corresponding to the 
allowance for dependent wives". This is, however, not an 
automatic result of disaggregation as the allowances are 
imposed separately and could be constructed so as to retain 
an allowance for a dependent wife with disaggregation. In 
any event, with an individual basis, a wife would be able 
to use her own full personal allowance against her own 
investment income or against income transferred to her by 
her husband. 
Eleventh reason : At lower income levels a 
against reform married couple are better 
off than if they were 
_ single 
The Report does not in fact use this effect as 
a reason against moving to an individual basis - it 
recommends that the anomaly be removed in any event: - 
"We all agree that the present arrangement 
by which, when both husband and wife are 
earning, the couple can enjoy both the 
married man's allowance and a single per- 
son's allowance against the wife's earnings 
is unsatisfactory and that when a personal 
allowance is claimed against the wife's 
earnings the husband should enjoy only a 
single person's allowance". 
The Report does not mention the other reasons 
against reform previously proposed (that aggregation does 
not stop people from marrying (fourth); that a change 
would not be used in practice (eighth); that the obligations 
of marriage are recognised by the wife allowance (tenth); 
that husband and wife both earning pay less tax than if 
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income earned wholly by the husband (twelfth); that 
married women do not work for money (thirteenth); that 
the Royal Commission are against it (fourteenth); or that 
the present rule only adversely affects surtax payers 
(fifteenth). 
Having rejected the individual basis the Report 
examines some alternatives to the present system - these 
include a reference to the second alternative already men- 
tioned (the quotient system) and four new alternatives. 
(3) Alternatives to the present system 
The Report considers: -. and rejects the second 
alternative to aggregation. 
Second alternative : The division of the joint 
to aggregation : incomes by two- the 
"quotient" system 
The Report calls this the "unrestricted quotient 
system" and considers that it is open to three serious 
objections. First, "it gives to every married couple, 
whether working or not, the equivalent of two personal 
allowances". Now why a personal allowance for each person, 
whether working or not, should be available to every single 
taxpayer except to a woman who is married is hard to dis- 
cern. Secondly, says the Report, the quotient system 
"makes no allowance at all for the fact that by sharing 
household expenses a married couple can probably live more 
cheaply than can two single adults". Now a married couple 
sharing a house and two single adults sharing a house have 
exactly similar expenditures : on the other hand two single 
adults sharing a house might be able to live more cheaply 
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than-two single adults living separately but, as mentioned 
above, it is just as likely that the facilities required 
by the joint household will expand leading to additional 
expenditure. Finally the quotient system is rejected 
because it will provide a disincentive for a wife to-work 
as if her personal allowance is already covered by the 
split income of her husband she will be taxed on the whole 
of her earnings. This is a valid point but actually applies, 
to every individual after the personal allowance is 
absorbed and the fact that after that level any individual 
is taxed on the whole of his earnings does not operate as 
a disincentive in practice. Three of the four new 
alternatives proposed in the Meade Report all proceeded 
on the basis of a disaggregation of wife's earnings but 
with different treatments for the couple's investment 
income. 
Seventh alternative Separate taxation of earnings 
to reform and all investment income 
added to highest earnings 
"In order to rid the tax system of its 
present sex discrimination it might be 
ruled that the couplets investment income 
should be aggregated and added not to the 
husband's earnings but rather to the higher 
of the two sets of earnings". 
This is called "a radical modification of the present 
system". 
' 
The Meade Committee acknowledges the two dis- 
advantages of this system, namely the disincentive effect 
of a high rate of tax on the highest earner and also the 
1. This is the system adopted in Sweden -See Chapter 13 
page 577 post. 
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'serious tax on marriage' which would result. Actually, 
both of these disadvantages exist under the present system 
where the highest earner is usually the husband : at least 
the present system could possibly produce a benefit for a 
wife with very high earnings and very high investment 
income with a husband with very low earnings and investment 
income : by disaggregating her earnings only, she could 
possibly reduce the rates on her investment income which 
is deemed to belong to the husband; the seventh alternative 
proposed by the Meade Committee would remove this unlikely, 
but possible, advantage., 
Eighth alternative : Separate taxation for earnings 
to reform : and quotient system for 
investment income 
This is called "partial income splitting". 
"With this system each partner in a marriage 
would be taxed. . . on his or her earnings plus 
one half of their joint investment income 
against which each partner could set a single 
personal allowance... Equalisation of invest- 
ment income for tax purposes would be brought 
about automatically without the need for any 
equalisation of the income-yielding property". 
The disadvantages of this system are the same as 
those applicable to the full quotient system - namely that 
it gives a positive advantage to married persons : the 
disadvantage is that it retains the need for joint 
accounting. In addition this system would give advantages 
to married couples with investment income owned by one 
partner (split between two) as against those where all 
income is earned by one partner (no split). 
Ninth alternative A married couple progressive 
to reform : scale of one and a half times 
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This is called "the restricted quotient' system" and would 
operate as follows: 
"The earnings and the investment income of 
the partners in a marriage would be 
aggregated... the married couple would 
unconditionally enjoy only one single per- 
son allowance with an additional single 
person allowance that could be set only, 
against the second set of earnings if both 
partners were earning. After deduction of 
these personal allowances the combined income 
of a married couple would be subject to tax 
on a married couple progressive scale the 
brackets in this scale being, say, one and a 
half times as broad as those applying to a 
single person". l 
This is a variant of the fourth alternative to 
reform, first proposed in 1914, namely that there should be 
a percentage deduction from the tax payable by a married 
couple. The Meade Report discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of this alternative as compared with the 
eighth alternative (partial income splitting) and also draws 
attention to its serious disadvantage - namely that it 
renders the fact of marriage as a determinant of tax 
liabilities - at lower income levels marriage will increase 
liability (if one partner had investment income but no 
earned income where the personal allowance would be lost 
on marriage); with unequal high incomes marriage could 
reduce liability. 
Tenth alternative : Separate taxation for earnings 
to reform : but investment income 
gated and taxed on a one and 
a half times scale 
1. This is similar to the system adopted in the U. S. A. 
See Chapter 14 post. 
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This is a variant of the eighth alternative 
(partial income splitting) and the ninth (the restricted 
quotient) and is called the partial quotient system. This 
would permit: - 
"separate assessment for earned incomes 
but joint assessment with a quotient of,. 
say, 1.5 for investment income"1 
Again, this alternative would avoid many of the 
disadvantages arising out of the eighth and ninth 
alternatives but, as proposed, it would be extremely com- 
plicated to administer. 
(4) Conclusions 
The Meade Report concludes: - 
"If investment income is aggregated on 
marriage... there are bound to be certain 
tax implications from a decision of two 
individuals to be married". 
However, within the context of the Meade Report 
the aggregation of investment income on marriage was an 
essential feature of the expenditure tax and it remains 
open to question whether the Committee could not have 
recommended disaggregatiön of investment income if this 
Report had only reviewed the existing system : the 
Committee concluded that none of the alternatives they 
proposed was perfect. 
13. The Equal Opportunities Commission's Campaign for Reform 
Between 1977 and 1979 the Equal. Opportunities 
1. This is similar to the system adopted in Norway. 
See Chapter 13 page 573 post. 
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Commission conducted a campaign for reform : the main 
areas of concern which were highlighted in that campaign 
concerned the principle of accountability and are fully 
discussed in Chapter 8. Here, however, it may be con- 
venient to note the discussion of two matters concerning 
aggregation : neither of these were mentioned in the 1977 
consultative documentI but both were raised in the 
analysis of the response to the consultative document. 
2 
The first is the aggregation of investment income and the 
second is the subject of the tax unit. 
(1) Aggregation of investment income 
"The present treatment of the investment 
income of married couples and the desire 
to change this... was a major concern in 
the comments received... this complaint - 
the high level of taxation resulting from 
aggregation of investment income - was 
frequent... "2 
Although the Commission appreciates the 
difficulties of disaggregating investment income, i. e. 
income splitting by transfers of property, it suggests 
that the capital taxes could be modified in this area in 
order to maintain the tax yield. 
(2) The tax unit 
"The fundamental question posed by the 
Commission's consultative document was 
that of the basic tax unit : should this 
be the family or the individual? The 
view that this unit should be the individual 
was almost unanimous. This is the only 
aspect of the response received which shows 
a consistency throughout all the comments made". 
1. Income Tax and Sex Discrimination: Equal Opportunities Coirmission. 
2. With all my worldly goods I thee endow... except my 
tax allowances. 
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A number of alternatives to aggregation are 
discussed and reference is made to the quotient systems 
adopted in the United States, France and Germany; these 
are more fully discussed in Part III. 
During 1980 the campaign was further stimulated 
by two Articles published in the British Tax Review which 
concluded that an individual basis of taxation should be 
introduced. 1 
14.1980 - The Green Paper 
As has been said above, the Green Paper2 does not 
distinguish in terms between aggregation, accountability 
and allowances. Each of these can be considered separately : 
this Chapter is concerned only with the aggregation rule 
and here it may be useful to summarise the effects of the 
rule as it exists today. 
(1) The effects of the rresent rule 
First, then, the wife's income is deemed to 
belong to the husband : only one set of rate bands, 
including investment income threshold, is available for 
the joint income; and, generally, only one set of reliefs 
(mortgage interest, capital gains tax exemptions etc), are 
available for the married couple. 
There is only one exception to the aggregation 
rule - and that is the option introduced in 1971 for 
1. N. A. Barr: The-Taxation-of Married Women's Income. 
B. T. R. 1980. 
2. Taxation of Husband and Wife Cmnd 8053. 
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disaggregation of wife's earnings. The net effect, 
therefore,, of the present aggregation rule, is that the 
wife's investment income is added to her husband's total 
income for tax purposes and there is no entitlement to a 
second set of reliefs Further, although like all other 
taxpayers, spouses may transfer assets or income between 
themselves, unlike other taxpayers, the, aggregation rule 
nullifies any tax saving effect of such transfers. 
The Green Paper acknowledges 
"the criterion that where husbands and wives 
both have investment income the tax bill can 
be higher than if they were two single people 
with the same total investment income split 
between them. This criticism is more 
frequently heard now that there are some 2j 
million wives with income-producing assets". 
It also recognises that the abolition of the 
aggregation rule would render inter-spouse transfers tax 
effective and 
"measures would be needed to prevent 
avoidance through schemes for trans- 
ferring income between spouses". l 
There is, however, no recognition of the effect 
of aggregation on the other reliefs although paragraph 86 
recognises that disaggregation would result in separate 
thresholds for the investment income surcharge. 
(2) The reasons for reform 
The Green Paper sets out the reasons both for 
and against reform and proposes some alternatives to com- 
plete disaggregation. These will now be considered in the 
1. Paragraph 87. 
403 
order previously adopted in this Chapter. 
First reason : The tax laws should follow 
for reform the property laws 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer states in the Foreword: - 
"It is not surprising that there has been 
growing criticism of a tax code which 
proceeds on the basis (originally enacted 
in 1806)1 that 'a woman's income chargeable 
to tax shall... be deemed for income tax pur- 
poses to be his income and not to be her 
income". 
And later2 - 
"A : good deal of the recent criticism of 
the present system... has been directed 
initially at the aggregation rule... 
under which a wife's income is deemed to 
be her husband's for tax purposes". 
Surprisingly, however, the Green Paper makes no 
mention of the changes in the property laws made since 
these provisions were enacted : the impression is gained 
that the desire for change is of recent origin and arises 
out of modern notions of tax equality and the recent 
incidence of working wives. So - 
'There has been a growing dissatisfaction 
with the present system, particularly over 
the last few years". 3 
and - 
"Within the last 50 years society has changed 
dramatically and it is these changes which 
underlie much of the present criticism of the 
taxation of married couples... Much the most 
important social development has been the 
changing role of a married woman within the 
family. At the time the income tax system 
took shape the vast majority of women gave 
up work on marriage to spend the rest of 
their lives looking after their home and 
family. This is not true today". 
1. Actually, this should be 1805. See Chapter 1 page 40 ante. 
2. Paragraph 6. 
3. Paragraph 2. 
4. Paragraph 27. 
Loy 
From the historical outline earlier in this 
Chapter it will be seen that the aggregation rule had been 
strongly criticised since 1894 and it was not criticised so 
much for social reasons as for legal reasons - namely that 
it ignored the property amendments of 1882. However, in 
the light of the Green Paper perhaps the first reason for 
reform could be stated as : the tax laws should follow the 
property laws and respond to social changes. 
Second reason Reform was demanded by 
for reform : many people 
In the Foreword the Chancellor of the Exchequer acknowledges 
"Many people feel that we should break away 
from present arrangements". 
and later - 
"Many would not accept the (present 
arrangement) as the foundation upon 
which the tax laws should be built". l 
Third reason : The tax laws should be 
for reform : consistent between them- 
selves 
In 1980 the application of the capital taxes to 
husband and wife had reached the confusion outlined in 
Chapter 5. The point is dealt with fully in paragraph 88 
of the Green Paper where the changes to the capital taxes 
which would be required on the introduction of independent 
taxation are discussed; while noting in passing that the 
separate capital gains tax reliefs are not mentioned, one 
can agree with the conclusion that many more transactions 
would become subject to capital taxes but the fact is that 
1. Paragraph 2. 
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an overall saving of tax is likely to be seen by those 
with higher incomes and modest capital at the expense 
of those with more modest incomes but with substantial 
capital. 
Fourth reason : 
for reform 
There should be no tax 
penalty on marriage 
The Green Paper acceptsl 
"that for investment income (the present 
system) is arguably unfair : the tax bill 
on the combined incomes may be greater if 
the couple are married than if they are 
two single people... Critics could fairly 
point out that, in this admittedly limited 
area, there is a fiscal disincentive to 
marriage". 
No mention is made of the other-"fiscal disin- 
centives" i. e. the halving of reliefs available to two 
single persons and the restriction on tax effective inter- 
spouse transfers. 
Fifth reason for : Husband and wife are two 
reform persons and should be 
taxed as such 
Nowhere in the Green Paper is it acknowledged 
that husband and wife are two separate individuals : 
throughout, the discussion takes place on the basis that 
the mere fact of marriage alters the status of the 
individuals concerned : no attempt is made to justify this : 
it is accepted as a fact. 
Sixth reason : The principle of equality 
for reform : gives the right to separate 
taxation 
1. Paragraph 4(b). 
4o6 
The Green Paper does not recognise that the 
principle of equality gives the right to separate taxation; 
there is much discussion of the various alternatives to 
aggregation, and of the difficulties of. introducing any 
reform, but no acknowledgement of any "rights". 
Seventh reason Disaggregation should be 
for reform complete and should not be 
restricted to earnings 
The Green Paper recognises the criticisms of the 
aggregation of investment income - 
"that the system is unfair because it is 
not neutral as between the married couple 
and two single people living together... "l 
but concludes that individual taxation would require ` 
"measures to prevent avoidance through schemes for trans- 
ferring incomes between spouses", and re-consideration of 
the capital taxes exemptions; no reason is given as to why 
avoidance measures would be necessary, nor is any 
justification attempted as to why some measures should 
apply to inter-spouse- transfers only and not to transfers 
between two single people living together. 
Eighth reason An injustice to a minority 
for reform : is still an injustice 
The Green Paper recognises that the criticism 
of aggregation of investment income 
"is more frequently-heard now that there 
are some 2j million wives with income- 
producing assets". 2 
1. Paragraphs 86-88. 
2. Paragraph 38. 
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(3) The reasons against reform 
The Green Paper, being a discussion document, 
also discusses many of the reasons against reform. 
First reason Advantages depend on pro- 
against reform : portions of income in 
household 
The Green Paper recognises the impossibility of 
importing the concept of a family tax into a system 
structured around individuals. So - 
"No system can satisfy all criteria; for 
example it is inevitably difficult to 
reconcile sex equality with those 
definitions of fairness which favour 
families rather than individuals"l 
But later, confusion is introduced by using the "family" 
as the comparative base - 
"Mandatory independent taxation would mean 
a substantial shift in the relative tax 
bills paid by different types of family". 2 
and - 
"whether allowances were fully or partially 
transferable there would be an effect on 
the relative incidence of taxation among 
different types of families". 
As in the Meade Report, "family" in this context 
is not defined but probably means "husband and wife"; no 
attempt is made to discuss the underlying question as to 
why "husband and wife" units should have any special treat- 
ment in a tax system which is structured on individuals 
and ignores all other household units. 
Second reason It would cost too much 
against reform 
1. Paragraph 8. 
2. Paragraph 40. 
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The Green Paper does not distinguish the 'cost' 
of disaggregation from the 'cost' of revising the personal 
allowance but does' indicate two types of cost which require 
consideration. The first is the cost to the Exchequer of 
financing the changes: 
"The more substantial the change the greater 
the cost of ensuring that those who are 
made worse off in relative terms are 
protected, wholly or in part, from an 
increase in their tax bills". 
This does recognise the difference between 
altering the tax base and the tax yield but it is not 
clear why "those who are worse off should be protected" 
when no such protection is offered when tax bills are 
increased in any other way. The second type of cost is - 
"the administrative cost, which includes the 
number of additional civil servants needed 
to operate a change in the system... the 
more far reaching the change the greater the 
number of extra civil servants likely to be 
needed". 
Again, no distinction is drawn between the adminis- 
trative cost of disaggregation as such and the adminis- 
trative cost of re-structuring the allowances on the lines 
discussed in the Green Paper. As far as disaggregation 
only is concerned much administrative cost would be saved 
by the abolition of the wife's earnings election and by 
the treatment of all women as individuals throughout their 
life, with no necessity for a change of treatment on 
marriage or divorce, thus eliminating the need for costly 
liaison between the tax offices of husband and wife during 
marriage. 
1. Paragraph 9. 
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Third reason : Married couples are members 
against reform of one household and have a 
joint income 
The Green Paper accepts that joint taxation is 
possibly not appropriate where husband and wife each have 
an income - 
"In most cases, where husband and wife each 
have an income, ' the best answer probably 
lies in some form of separate taxation". l 
but returns to the "household" concept when discussing the 
allowances. 
2 
"The married. man's allowance is essentially 
an allowance for two people but it has 
always been less than twice the single 
allowance since the expenses of two married 
people sharing the same household are con- 
sidered less than those of two single 
persons maintaining separate households". 
No mention is made of two single persons sharing 
one household or two married people maintaining two 
separate households. No mention is made of the fourth to 
eighth reasons against reform but the ninth reason is men- 
tioned as follows: - 
Ninth reason : It would logically lead to 
against reform : the abolition of the marriage 
allowance 
"... ä mandatory system of independent taxation 
would mean the abolition of the marriage 
allowance and of the aggregation rule so that 
all. married women would become taxpayers in 
their own right, with their own personal 
allowance and rate bands". 
Chapter 6 of the Green Paper discusses the 
effects of a system of mandatory independent taxation. Of 
its 23 paragraphs (67-89), 19 discuss the personal allowance, 
1. Foreword. 
2. Paragraph 13. 
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3 the effect of disaggregation on investment income and 
one the 'other effects' of independent taxation which 
concern privacy of accounts and the allocation of reliefs. 
There is no acknowledgement that aggregation could be 
achieved without any statutory alteration in the personal 
allowances and that the effects of disaggregation would 
include a doubling of certain reliefs and exemptions. 
The tenth reason against reform is not mentioned. 
Eleventh reason At lower levels a married 
against reform : couple are better off than 
if they were single 
"Mandatory independent taxation would 
mean a substantial shift in the relative 
tax bills paid by different types of 
family. In particular couples where both 
spouses are earning would, in relative 
terms, be worse off than at present". 1 
This argument, of course, applies only to a 
change in the allowances and not to disaggregation as 
such but in any event the present advantage to two earner 
couples cannot be justified especially as the same system 
penalises the one-earner couple. 
(4) The alternatives to disaggreEation 
The Green Paper discusses two types of alternatives 
to disaggregation : first a new tax unit (Chapter 5) and 
secondly some developments of the present system Chapter 4). 
(a) The quotient system. In discussing a new tax unit 
reference is made to the second alternative system already 
mentioned. 
1. Paragraph 40. 
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Second alternative : The quotient system 
to reform 
The Green Paper distinguishes the quotient 
system as applied to husband wife and children, as it 
applies in France, with the system as applied to husband 
and wife only, as applied in West Germany, and, to a 
limited extent in the U. S. A. 
l However, the basic dis- 
advantages of "considerable shifts in the tax burden of 
different family groups" and the necessity for joint 
accounting are given as reasons why "it seems unlikely 
that... a family tax system... would be generally acceptable 
in the U. K. today". 
(b) Some developments of the present system. In discussing 
possible developments of the present system, the Green Paper 
mentions four new alternatives to disaggregation. 
Eleventh alternative Joint taxation 
to disaggregation 
"Several variants would be possible but 
essentially this would involve sub- 
stituting for the present aggregation 
rule a rule under which the income of 
husband and wife would be jointly 
returnable by them, and jointly assessable 
on them, and there would be a joint-res- 
ponsibility for payment of the tax". 2 
Now this arrangement would have no effect at all 
on the aggregation rule, which determines the amount of 
income on which tax is paid and the amount of reliefs 
available : it is in fact only a change in the accountability 
rule and has the grave disadvantage of placing a joint 
liability for her husband's income tax on the non-earning 
wife . 
1. The quotient "system also, applies in-Luxembourg and 
Ireland - see Part III. 
2. Paragraph 45. 
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Twelfth alternative : Re-wording the aggregation 
to disaggregation rule 
"The aggregation rule could be re-worded 
not to provide for joint taxation but 
simply to treat the income of husband and 
wife as if it were one income, the tax 
remaining assessable etc. on the husband 
with the existing exceptions of separate 
assessment and wife's earnings election... ' 
Such a re-wording is not considered to be an 
alternative to the aggregation rule : it is purely cosmetic 
in effect and would have no effect on the quantum of tax 
payable, or indeed on the accountability principle. 
Thirteenth alternative : Option for individual 
to disa, g regation taxation 
"Tais would mean extending the existing 
wife's earnings election to investment 
income". l 
Although at first sight, this appears to offer 
a genuine, possibility of disaggregation, there are a number 
of unsatisfactory features. First, it is not proposed that 
the optiön would be accompanied by separate accounting 
automatically although - 
"it would seem sensible to allow a husband 
and wife to make separate returns if they 
wished". 
Next, this alternative is proposed as an option 
and before the option is exercised 
"husband and wife would have to tell each 
other sufficient about their incomes to 
establish that it would be beneficial to 
take up the option". 
Again, it appears that this would be an election 
requiring the consent of both spouses, as it would result 
1. Paragraph 46. 
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in the loss-of the married man's allowance; thus there 
would be no automatic entitlement to the option. Further, 
there is no indication that the exercise of the option 
would entitle each spouse to a full set of reliefs and the 
impression is gained that these would have to be shared in 
some way; and finally it is proposed that the option would 
make it - 
"necessary to give consideration to the 
prevention of artificial methods of 
reducing the tax bill by transferring 
income between husband and wife or vice 
versa. It would certainly be necessary 
to nullify for tax purposes inter-spouse 
payments under covenants". 
Thus the option for individual taxation falls 
very far short of treating married persons in the same way 
as other individuals. 
Fourteenth alternative : Option for eaual split 
to disaggregation : of allowances and rate 
bands 
The thirteenth alternative (the option for 
individual taxation) would not be beneficial if the loss 
of the married allowance was greater than the benefit of 
a full personal allowance against the wife's investment 
income and a separate set of rate bands : the fourteenth 
alternative therefore proposes a variant of separate assess- 
ment where the allowances and rate bands are split equally 
between husband and wife, and not in proportion to-income 
as under the present procedure. The advantages would be 
greater privacy and more simplicity : the disadvantages 
would be that the principle of aggregation would continue : 
only one set of reliefs and allowances. would. remain available 
and the anomaly of the married man's allowance would be 
retained. 
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(5) Conclusion 
The Green Paper accepts that mandatory independent 
taxation "would totally end the problem of discrimination 
between husband and wife" but in its treatment of an 
individual basis it- confuses aggregation, accountability 
and allowances. The criticism to be made of all the 
alternatives to disaggregation posed in the Green Paper 
is that they all retain the concept of the "married couple, " 
and the married man's allowance, with a complicated system 
of elections : even with the most favourable alternative, 
the option for independent taxation, neither spouse 
individually has the right to exercise the option and it 
is not clear whether, on exercising the option, each 
spouse will become entitled to a full set of reliefs, 
although it is made clear that inter-spouse transfers will 
be restricted. 
(6) The response to the Green Paper 
The Green Paper attracted submissions from over 
forty organisations and several hundred individuals' who 
"almost unanimously" declared themselves in favour of a 
change to a system of mandatory independent taxation. 
15. Conclusions 
Although the aggregation rule was modified in 
1971, on the introduction of the wife's earnings election, 
it otherwise remains today as it was first enacted in 1805; 
1. The Taxation of Husband and Wife :A view of the debate 
in the Green Paper. John Kay and Catherine Sandler 
June 1982. 
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there can be no disaggregation of spouses' investment income 
and, for the purposes of reliefs, two married persons are 
treated as one individual. The principle has been under 
attack since 1894 since which date eight major arguments 
have been proposed for reform of the rule and fifteen 
reasons have been given for its retention; no less than 
fourteen alternatives have been proposed. However, all 
pressure for reform has come from Opposition Members of 
Parliament, the taxpaying public and learned commentators, 
and most of the justification of the present system has 
been made by the three main Commissions (Colwyn, Radcliffe 
and Meade) and supported by the Government in power; 
however the impression is gained that the better view 
now supports a move towards mandatory independent taxation, 
i. e. the complete abolition of the aggregation rule. 
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CHAPTER 8 
A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Section 
1. Introduction. 
2.1894-- Limited Disaggregation of Wife's Earnings. 
3.1909 - Introduction of Supertax. 
4.1911 - Inland Revenue's Power to Charge Wife. 
5.1912 - The Case of Mr. Wilks. 
6.1914 - The Option for Separate Assessment. 
7.1920 - The Colwyn Report. 
8.1954 - The Radcliffe Reports. 
9.1956-78 - The Tax Reform Papers. 
10.1977-79 - The Campaign for Reform. 
11.1980 - The Green Paper. 
12. Summary. 
1. Introduction 
Although the principle of husband's accountability 
is even older than the principle of aggregation, it is not 
always appreciated that the two concepts are distinct and 
have an existence independent of each other : their history 
and development differ widely. Aggregation could exist 
without accountability and in fact does so in those cases 
where an election for separate assessment under section 38 
Taxes Act 1970 is in force; and accountability could exist 
without aggregation, and does to the limited extent per- 
mitted by law where an election for separate taxation of 
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wife's earnings under section 23 Finance Act 1971 is in 
force. 
The principle of accountability has a number of 
different facets each of which has given rise to dis- 
cussion at different times followed by some modification. 
However, in its basic form as originally enacted in 1799 
and re-enacted in 1842 the principle involved the 
following: - 
(1) Making the return. The husband was responsible for 
making a return of the wife's income; this gave 
rise to difficulties after the passing of the 
Married' Women's Property Act 1882 as, after that 
date, a husband might not know what his wife's 
income was and had no means of finding out where the 
wife refused to tell him, the wife being then under 
no legal obligation to inform her husband of her 
income. 1-1 
(2) Privacy. The wife was not able to preserve any 
privacy as regards her income, as, in practice, she 
had to disclose this to her husband to enable him to 
complete the return, whereas the husband was under 
no corresponding obligation to disclose his income 
to his wife. 
(3) Pav ing the tax - the husband's res ponsibility. 
(a) The husband was liable to pay the tax on his 
wife's income even though she was under no 
obligation to assist him with such payment and 
might be in receipt of a larger income than his. 
(b) The husband was liable to have distraint levied 
on his goods for his wife's unpaid tax but no 
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distraint on the wife's goods was possible as 
she was under no legai obligation to pay the 
tax. 
(c) The husband was liable for imprisonment for 
non-payment of his wife's tax. 
(4) Repayments. All repayments due in respect of a 
wifets income were sent to her husband. 
(5) Correspondence. All correspondence as regards the 
wifets income tax was sent to the husband. 
(6) Claiming the allowances. Only the husband could 
claim any reduced rate relief for his wife and later, 
when personal allowances were introduced, all had to 
be claimed by the husband, including the wife's 
earned income allowance. The same principle applied 
to other reliefs (e. g. mortgage interest relief and 
life assurance relief) due in respect of payments by 
the wife and all expenses incurred by her in 
connection with her trade or employment. The wife 
had no means of insisting that such claims be made. 
(7) Benefiting from the allowances. The husband had 
first call on the allowances, except for the wife's 
earned income allowance which was available only 
against the wife's earned income. The husband was, 
and is, entitled to the relief in respect of any 
mortgage interest paid by his wife (even if the 
house is solely owned by her) and where the joint 
income was liable to higher rate tax the husband 
had the benefit of the whole of the lower bands. 
Since 1914 it has been possible for the spouses to 
overcome these difficulties by opting for separate assessment 
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under what is now section 38 Taxes Act 1970, but that 
procedure has a number of disadvantages more fully des- 
cribed in Chapter 2. These include (1) the need for an 
election - the provisions are not automatic; (2) the 
election cannot be retrospective; (3) the calculations 
required are extremely complicated; (4) neither spouse 
individually can check that the calculations are correct; 
(5) complete privacy cannot be preserved as it is always 
possible to guess at the other spouse's income and reliefs; 
(6) the apportionment of reliefs under the statutory rules 
may not produce an equitable result in practice and (7) 
the option is not widely published and spouses may well be 
ignorant of its availability. 
In addition to the provisions of section 38, there 
are also provisions which enable the Inland Revenue to 
ignore the principle of husband's accountability when it 
suits them to do so : these are referred to in Chapter 2 
above and are now found in section 40 Taxes Act 1970. 
Finally, there are a number of administrative 
departures from the principle of accountability which have 
not been mentioned previously but to which reference will 
be made in this Chapter. 
Once again, a historical treatment has been 
adopted as it is thought that this is the only way in which 
the enactment or adoption of the various provisions can be 
adequately explained, and, as with the aggregation rule, 
the first voices dissenting from the principle are heard 
in 1894. 
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2.1894 - Limited Disaggregation of Wife's Earnings. 
It will be recalledI that the first debates after 
the enactment of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, on 
the subject of the tax treatment of husband and wife, , took 
place in 1894. During those debates attention was focused 
mainly on the injustices of the aggregation rule but 
attention was also drawn to the anomalies resulting from the 
continued retention of the principle of accountability when 
the basis upon which it had been enacted no longer existed. 
So - 
"It would astonish a good many members 
to know that... the assessment was on the 
husband notwithstanding that the wife had 
power to dispose of her own income as she 
thought proper"-2 
and - 
"Women now had powers concerning their 
property which were undreamed of when the 
Act of 1842 was passed... it was perfectly 
sensible to impose the tax on the husband 
in those days as he had the spending of 
the wife's money; but the Married Women's 
Property Act had altered that". 3 
Although the Finance Act 1894 introduced a. limited 
disaggregation for wife's earnings by permitting an 
additional 'low income exemption' in certain circumstances, 
such exemption was given to the husband as a relief against 
the total joint income and no alteration in the principle 
of accountability was then made. It may be interesting at 
this stage to consider why the principle of accountability 
1. See Chapter 7. 
2. Mr. Darling. Hansard 28th June 1894 col. 492. 
3. Mr. Darling. Hansard 28th June 1894 col. 493. 
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did not give rise to more concern in view of the fact 
that the husband's liabilities were retained after the 
control of his wife's property had passed from him; and it 
is thought that the answer lies in the fact that at that 
time almost all tax was suffered by deduction at source 
and very little by direct assessment; even the 'small 
income exemption' had to be applied for and was given by 
way of repayment. When tax is levied on a proportional 
basis, deduction at source can be almost universal and no 
additional assessments need be required. Accordingly, 
although the theory of husband's accountability remained, 
in practice very few husbands would have received tax bills 
in respect of their wives' income - the wife would suffer 
the tax by deduction at source. 
3.1909 - The Introduction of Supertax 
In 1909, however, supertax was imposed and the 
machinery for collecting the tax relied upon a return of 
total income from each taxpayer followed by direct assess- 
ment by the Inland Revenue : under such a system it became 
clear that husbands would first need to find out what their 
wives' incomes amounted to and, secondly, could actually 
receive tax bills in respect of their wives' income. This 
virtual increase in the husband's liability gave rise to 
considerable disquiet. So - 
"I do not look on this as a question of the 
rights of women. -It 
is really a question 
of the rights of man. The husband does not 
receive his wife's income yet he may be 
called upon to pay supertax in respect of it. 
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He may never touch that income and yet 
he is to pay the tax upon it? He may 
be unable to recover a farthing. from 
his wife ... surely it would be far better to make the incomes separate for all pur- 
poses? "1 
and - 
"You may get cases where possibly a man's 
whole income will be absorbed in paying 
the supertax on his wife's income". 2 
During the same debate it was pointed out that 
although a husband was obliged to make a return of the 
total income of himself and his wife he had no way of 
insisting that the wife tell him of her income and there 
was, of course, no comparable obligation on the husband 
to tell the wife of his income. 
No amendment was made during the debates on the 
Finance Act 1909 to deal with these problems and subsequent 
events proved that real practical difficulties did result. 
At first, the Inland Revenue 'turned a blind eye' when 
problems occurred, hoping no doubt that the deficiencies 
of the system would-not become widely known and exploited; 
so, in November 1910, Mr. Walter Guinness was able to 
refer to the fact that it was known that if a husband told 
the Inland Revenue that his wife would not tell him what 
her income was, no action to recover the tax was taken: - 
"There was one case in the daily Press where 
a husband was called upon to make a return 
of his wife's profits in her business. He 
refused saying that he had no means of 
ascertaining his wife's income and the wife 
refused to send in a return on the ground 
that the law did not treat the income as hers 
1. Mr. Cave Hansard 20th September 1909 Col-95. 
2. Mr. Walter Guinness. Hansard 20th September 1909 Col-95. 
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and I understand that the Inh 
have. dropped the case. It is 
that money should be extorted 
ignorant while those who have 
knowledge of the law are able 
and are not proceeded against 
Inland Revenue". 1 
and Revenue 
most unfair 
from the 
a special 
to escape 
by the 
And later Mr. Stuart Wortley expressed the view 
that it was wrong to have a principle and to pursue it 
against people of small means and fail to pursue people 
"who may be able to fight". 
One of those who was able to fight and was not pursued 
was the eminent author Mr. George Bernard Shaw who, in 1910, 
wrote to the Inland Revenue in the following terms: - 
"I have absolutely no means of ascertaining my 
wife's income except by asking her for the 
information. Her property is a separate 
property. She keeps a separate banking account 
at a separate bank. Her solicitor is not my 
solicitor. I can make a guess at her means 
from her style of living exactly as the 
Surveyor of Income Tax does when he makes a 
shot at an assessment in the absence of exact 
information : but beyond that I have no more 
knowledge of her income than I have of yours. 
I have therefore asked her to give me a state- 
ment. She refuses on principle. As far as I 
know I have no legal means of compelling her 
to make any such disclosure and if I had it 
does not follow that I am bound to incur law 
costs to obtain information which is required 
not by myself but by the State. Clearly how- 
ever it is within the power of the Commissioners 
to compel my wife to make a full disclosure of 
her income for the purpose of taxation; but 
equally clearly they must not communicate that 
disclosure to me or to any other person. It 
seems to me that under these circumstances 
that all I can do for you is to tell you who 
my wife is and leave it to you to ascertain her 
income and make me pay the tax on it. Even 
this you cannot do without a violation of 
secrecy as it will be possible for me by a 
simple calculation to ascertain my wife's income 
from your demand". 
1. Mr. Walter Guinness. Hansard 23rd November 1920. Col-330. 
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In fact, Mr. Shaw was wrong in thinking that it 
was "within the power of the Commissioners to compel my 
wife to make a full disclosure of her income for tax 
purposes". The Commissioners had no such power. In the 
event, the Inland Revenue did accept separate returns from 
Mr. & Mrs. Shaw and assessed Mr. Shaw for any tax under- 
paid" .l 
The main difficulties encountered at this time 
therefore involved the first and third facets of 
accountability referred to above, namely, making the return 
and paying the tax. But difficulties were also arising from 
the fourth facet, i. e. repayments : on 6th July 1910 Mr. 
Bottomley asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether he 
was aware: - 
"that where a married woman claimed or 
obtained a rebate or return of income tax 
the authorities insisted on making out 
the order for repayment in the name of the 
husband". 
The Financial Secretary replied that he was aware of the 
practice: 
"A married woman living with her husband is 
not entitled to prefer a separate claim 
for repayment on her own behalf. The claim 
must be made by the husband and consequently 
the repayment is made to him". 
The procedure for repayments caused no problems 
gor the Inland Revenue but the publicity given to their 
failure to pursue claims against husbands must have-caused 
some embarrassment as steps were hastily taken to-provide 
a remedy : their practice of taking no action in difficult 
1. See Sunday Times, May 7th 1978 page 43. 
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cases was mentioned in the House of Commons on 23rd November 
1910 and a clause designed to overcome these difficulties 
was included in the Revenue Bill which was introduced in 
March 1911. 
4.1911 - Inland Revenue's Power to Charge Wife 
Clause 10 of the Revenue Bill 1911 provided for 
the "assessment and recovery of part of supertax from the 
wife in certain cases". If the Special Commissioners con- 
sidered that a husband's return of total income for the 
purposes of supertax was unsatisfactory as regards his 
wife's income they could ask a wife to make such a return 
"as if she were not married"; a proportion of the supertax 
due was then to be assessed and recovered from the wife the 
not the husband; the provisions were backdated to the date 
of the introduction of supertax (6th April 1909) and were 
enacted without debate as section 11 Revenue Act 1911. This 
section was the forerunner of the somewhat differing 
provisions which are now found in section 40 Taxes Act 1970. 
Here, then, is another example of the Inland 
Revenue's ignoring the aggregation and accountability 
principles when it suits them to do so : as soon as it can 
be shown that these principles could possibly be disadvant- 
ageous to the Inland Revenue in practice, steps are taken 
to remedy the matter at the earliest opportunity; such 
speed can be compared with the tardiness of any improve- 
ment which might benefit husband and wife. Again, when 
the Inland Revenue introduce a new provision for their own 
protection this rarely has the result of making the 
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situation any better for the married couple and frequently 
makes it worse. For example, section 11 Revenue Act 1911, 
while imposing an additional obligation on a wife did not 
give the wife the right to make a separate return - the 
operation of the section was left to the discretion of the 
Special Commissioners; and even where the section was 
applied the husband's obligations did not altogether cease. 
During 1911 further questions were asked about 
the right of married women to receive their own repayments. 
Mr. Weir1 asked why a married woman had to get her rebate 
through her husband and was referred to section 42 Income 
Tax Act 1842; and later2 Mr. Weir asked specifically if a 
married woman could be enabled to recover her own rebate 
without relying on her husband and Mr. Lloyd George 
answered in the negative. The matter was pursued in 1912 
when Mr. Walter Guinness3 referred to the fact that rebates 
for married women were sent to their husbands and asked the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer if he would consider an amend- 
ment to the law to enable married women to recover on their 
own behalf. Mr. Lloyd George replied that: 
"Such an amendment... would involve very con- 
siderable changes and adjustments in the 
income tax law and I cannot at present 
undertake to propose it". 
In reply Mr. Walter Guinness referred to the fact that - 
"many letters had been received from married 
women to the effect that they can only get 
their income tax back by forging their 
husband's signatures and opening their 
letters. as otherwise the husband will keep 
the money". 
1. Hansard 1911 Vol. 23, Col. 782. 
2. Hansard 1911 Vol. 23, Col. 1948. 
3. Hansard 1912 Vol. 43, Col. 840. 
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The Chancellor of the Exchequer did not consider 
that this merited any reply. 
It is possible that no amendment would have been 
introduced to assist married women to obtain their own 
repayments if it had not been for what came to be known 
as "the case of Mr. Wilksn. 
5.1912. The Case of Mr. Wilks 
Although the Inland Revenue had taken power in 
section 11 Revenue Act 1911 to obtain direct from a wife 
details as to her income for supertax purposes, and had 
also taken power to assess and recover from a wife a 
proportion of such supertax, no comparable amendment had 
been made to the income tax provisions and this was at the 
root of what became known as "the case of Mr. Wilks". Let 
the facts of the case be narrated by Earl Russell: -1 
"Mr. Wilks is a schoolmaster in which capacity 
he earns a comparatively humble income. His 
wife, Elizabeth Wilks, practises as a doctor 
in which capacity she earns an income... con- 
siderably superior to his. The exact amount 
I do not know because Mr. Wilks was unable to 
inform me any more than he was unable to 
inform the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. 
He has no means of ascertaining the amount of 
his wife's income but it is admitted to be 
considerably larger than his own... Dr. Elizabeth 
Wilks was asked for payment of her income tax 
... and she refused to pay... Naturally the Inland Revenue were not going to be done out of their 
taxes... they therefore adopted the ordinary 
methods and finally the method of distraint. 
The distraint was made upon the separate goods 
of Dr. Elizabeth Wilks. 
"Mrs. Wilks then decided to assert the rights 
which it appeared to her the Income Tax Acts 
gave her. She pointed out that under those 
1. Hansard H. L. 14 October 1912 Col. 823. 
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Acts she was not liable either to make 
a return or to pay the taxes; that under 
those Acts the income of a married woman 
living with her husband was deemed to be 
his income and that therefore the obligation 
was on Mr. Wilks to make the return and, 
when the assessment had been made, to pay the 
taxes. The Treasury accepted that view and 
applied to Mr. Mark Wilks for the return. Mr. 
Wilks replied that he was not in a position to 
make a return of his wife's income because she 
had no idea how much it was and she did not 
choose to tell him. That is a position which, 
under the Married Women's Property Act, she is 
perfectly justified in taking up. Her husband 
has no concern with her income and can receive 
no information about it except by her courtesy. 
He has no more right to demand any particulars 
of her income, or to handle her income, than I 
have to handle the income of any of your Lord- 
ships. Mr. Wilks therefore informed the 
Treasury that he could not make the return". 
The Treasury then made an estimated assessment on 
Mr. Wilks and refused him the reduced rate to which he was 
clearly entitled on his own income; subsequently they took 
proceedings against him for the sum of £33.12.10d. 
"Mr. Wilks replied that he did not receive 
his wife's income; that he had not got it 
to pay with; that his own income - £150 a 
year - was barely sufficient for his main- 
tenance, and that it was impossible for him 
to raise such a sum of money". 
After lengthy correspondence - 
"a writ was issued and Mr. Wilks was taken 
up and lodged in Brixton Goal". 
He sent a petition for his release to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and to the Inland Revenue but they replied - 
"Your attitude has thoughout been one of 
refusal to recognise the liability which 
the law clearly imposes on you". 
No move to release Mr. Wilks was made until the day before 
Parliament reassembled when - 
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"without having made any arrangement to 
pay the money or any proposal for the 
liquidation of the debt due to the Crown, 
and most decidely without his having paid 
for it, he was released from Brixton 
Prison". 
Two years later the release was described in the following 
1 
way : 
"They let Mr. Wilks out of prison the day 
before the House reassembled because they 
could not face the criticism to which they 
would be subjected in this House". 
Such criticism was, nevertheless, fully voiced in 
a debate on a resolution moved in the House of Lords on the 
14th October 1912, which resolution said: - 
"That in the opinion of this House the present 
state of the law which renders a man liable 
to indefinite terms of imprisonment for matters 
over which he is by statute deprived of any con- 
trol is undesirable and should be amended". 
In support of his resolution Earl Russell said: - 
"The law is an absurd law; it is contrary to 
the Married Women's Property Act and should 
therefore at the earliest possible date be 
amended. I in no way challenge the legality 
of what has been done but I do challenge its 
natural justice and its common sense... The 
provision is such that in the case of a man 
totally impecunious married to ä wife with a 
considerable separate income it would be 
absolutely in the wife's power to have him 
detained in prison whenever she chose not to 
make a return and not to pay her income tax. 
We are told sometimes that legislation is 
unduly favourable to men but this particular 
legislation might hit us very hardly if our 
wives were inclined to take advantage of it... 
when a wife's income was in effect her hus- 
band's income, when he had control of it and 
was able to use it, it was extremely reasonable 
to require him to make a return of it and to 
let the obligation for any taxes imposed upon 
it fall upon him. But the whole circumstances 
1.15th May 1914, Col. 1332. 
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have been altered by the passing of the 
Married Women's Property Act and the provision 
is no longer justifiable". 
Lord Ashby St. Ledgers, replying for the Government, 
sought to justify the arrest of Mr. Wilks because his non- 
payment - 
"was not a normal case exemplifying the hard- 
ship of the present system. This is something 
in the nature of a political demonstration". 
This was a reference to the fact that Dr. Elizabeth 
Wilks was a suffragette and believed in the principle of "no 
taxation without representation". Later, Dr. Elizabeth 
Wilks 
"stated, very fairly, that since she incurred 
the penalty by refusing to pay, she expected 
to pay the penalty"; 
she felt it a grievance that her husband had to pay the 
penalty instead. 
' 
Whether Lord Ashby St. Ledgers was convinced by 
this argument is difficult to say but he did admit that - 
"there is a certain substratum of hardship 
in the fact that a husband should be 
imprisoned for failure to pay the income 
tax on his wife's income... It is true that 
the Treasury regulations on this subject 
were framed many years before the Married 
Women's Property Act of 1882 and therefore 
there is a certain anachronism in maintaining 
the present Treasury regulations. In view of 
that Act... I am very glad that my"Rt. Hon. 
Friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has 
promised to take the matter into consideration". 
And the Lord Chancellor had this to say: 
1. Hansard 15th July 1914, Col. 2020. 
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"Today we treat the income of a married 
-woman as 
nearly as possible as though it 
were the income of an unmarried person and 
yet the machinery for enforcing the income 
tax laws remains in a large measure what it 
was half a century ago. The result of that 
is, of course, hardship. I entirely agree 
that the case of Mr. Wilks is one where there 
is an anomalous state of the law which cannot 
be defended and my Rt. Hon. Friend the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer has undertaken to 
consider it". 
This promise had been given by Mr. Lloyd George 
on 9th October 19121 and, in reliance on it, Earl Russell 
withdrew his motion. The promise was not, however, 
immediately implemented and on 11th June 1913 the 
deputation from the Women's Tax Resistance League attended 
upon Mr. Lloyd George "to lay before him what they con- 
sidered to be grievances in connection with the taxation of 
married women". The deputation was described in Chapter 7 
but here it may be noted that Dr. Elizabeth Wilks was a 
member of that deputation and pointed out that her husband 
had been sent to prison for refusing to pay her tax and she 
expected that she should pay such penalty. In replying to 
the submissions made on behalf of the deputation Mr. Lloyd 
George said: - 
"Her husband was liable for the tax and they 
(i. e. the Inland Revenue)'could not distrain 
on the wife's goods although the distraint 
was in respect of her income tax. That was 
an injustice to the Revenue which he, wanted 
to put right". 
Now this is a somewhat illogical statement : if 
the Inland Revenue wished to retain husband's accountability 
they should have accepted that that meant that distraint 
could only be on the husband's goods : if they wanted to 
1. Hansard Vol. 42, Col. 340. 
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distrain on the wife's goods then the wife should be made 
accountable for her own tax. Be that as it may, the com- 
bination of the hardship to husbands mentioned by the 
Lord Chancellor, and the injustice to the Revenue mentioned 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, pointed irresistibly 
the direction of some reform : but this would be difficult 
to achieve without conferring some benefit on married 
women. Mr. Lloyd George and the Treasury thought the 
problem over long and hard and the results were comprised 
in the new clause introduced on 15th July 1914. 
6.1914. The Option for Separate Assessment 
The new clause was not introduced without many 
prior reminders and enquiries : in Chapter 7 details are 
given of the number of occasions in 1914 when enquiries 
were made in the House of Commons as to the time when the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer intended to introduce the 
amendments which he had promised. The clause, as 
ultimately introduced on 15th July 1914, comprised many of 
the provisions now found in section 38 Taxes Act 1970; 
these are fully described in Chapter 2 and the basic 
features included the fact that the provisions only 
applied after the exercise of an option and that the 
'separate assessment' under the clause only applied to the 
'assessment charging and recovery' of the tax; the total 
incomes were still to be aggregated for the purposes of 
the exemptions and the supertax. 
Mr. Cassel summarised the deficiencies which the 
clause was designed to cure: - 
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"I do not think that the income tax law 
has ever been brought into conformity 
with these changes in the law relating 
to the powers of married women in 
connection with the ownership of property 
... The wife is treated as a mere nonentity by the law as far as income tax is concerned. 
It is true that she pays but for the purpose 
of assessment, collection and fixing the 
amount of the abatement or exemption or the 
rate of tax it is treated as if the wife did 
not exist and it was all the husband's 
property notwithstanding the fact that it is 
not the case under the Married Women's 
Property Act. 
"That system is unjust to the husband and to 
the wife. It is unjust to the husband because 
the husband can be actually put in prison 
because his wife does not disclose to him what 
her income is. He is supposed to return her 
income but has no power of compelling her to 
tell him what it is and he is bound to pay the 
tax upon her income but has no right of 
recovering the amount of the tax from her... 
"It is also unjust to the wife because although 
she may be earning an' income in a business or 
profession she is given no opportunity whatever 
in the making of the return. The return is made 
through the husband and she has no voice in the 
matter at all. And so far as claims to exemptions 
or abatement are concerned she cannot do it her- 
self but it is left to the husband to claim it or 
not as he pleases and if he does claim it she has 
no right of recovering from him the amount which 
he recovered by way of abatement or exemption". 
It was accepted that, if an option under the clause 
were exercised, these difficulties would disappear but the 
clause had a number of deficiencies which were mentioned in 
the debate. 
First, the administrative complexities of the 
clause, which even today act as a deterrent to its utilisation, 
were noted with regret - 
"Every possible obstacle has been placed in 
the way of their getting the benefit... 
(there are) extraordinary difficulties in 
administration in making apportionments 
between husband and wife. It also involves 
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the result that you must in every case where 
this clause applies tell the wife what the 
husband's income is and tell the husband what 
the wife's income is". 
Comments were made on the difficulties of com- 
plying with the time limits for the notice but these were 
based upon a misunderstanding. 
Next, objection was taken to the fact that, were 
an option under the clause was in force, the right to a 
limited disaggregation of wife's earnings, introduced by 
the Finance Act 1894, was withdrawn. 
"Husband and wife have to purchase their 
exemption from humiliation at the expense 
of having to incur higher taxation". 
This provision was amended on Report stage when 
an amendment was agreed to allow the relief under Finance 
Act 1894 even if an election under the clause was in force. 
Finally, the clause as introduced gave the Inland 
Revenue unusually severe-powers of distraint against both 
spouses, and these were not limited to cases where an 
option under the clause was in force. 
The clause for the first time gives the 
right to distrain on the wife's goods for 
the tax for which the husband 
_ 
is liable and 
vice versa to distrain on the husband's goods 
in respect of the tax for which the wife is 
liable". 
And - 
"The clause greatly increases the power to 
distrain on the goods of the husband or 
wife in respect of the tax due from the 
other person. That certainly seems to be 
a very strange way of remedying the injustice 
which resulted in Mr. Wilks being sent to 
prison". 
The clause was the subject of considerable discussion 
and, as enacted, the clause provided that where an election 
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under the section was in force, and the wife did not pay 
her tax, the Revenue could distrain on her goods-and-on 
her husband's goods, but not vice versa. Although these 
provisions would have assisted the Inland Revenue in the 
Wilks case, if Mr. or Mrs. Wilks had claimed separate 
assessment under the clause (as distraint could have been 
originally levied against the goods of Mrs. Wilks) it would 
not have assisted Mr. Wilks if his wife had no goods upon 
which distraint could be levied; even in the emasculated 
form in which the clause was enacted, therefore, the 
Inland Revenue retained powers of restraint in the case of 
husband and wife which were superior to those enjoyed in 
respect of two single individuals. 
Finally, the clause repealed the provisions of 
section 11 Revenue Act 1911, which it will be recalled gave 
the Inland Revenue power to seek a return from a wife for 
supertax purposes-if they were not satisfied with the 
husband's return. The historical reasons for the introduction 
of separate assessment are enlightening : the provisions are 
sometimes referred to as indicating a willingness to give 
married women the same accounting rights as single women, 
overlooking the fact that they were only introduced to avoid 
hardship to husbands and give greater rights to the Inland 
Revenue; the completely unnecessary inclusion of the 
withdrawal of limited disaggregation if an option were 
exercised is an indication of the 'Treasury hostility to 
married women' which has been mentioned previously. 
A further interesting facet of the reasons leading 
up to the enactment of these provisions is the fact that 
once the tax laws and the property laws diverge anomalies 
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and injustices are bound to result;. provisions which are 
perfectly acceptable under one property regime can become 
quite unworkable under another. 
7.1920 - The Colwyn Report. 
There is no doubt, however, that in theory the 
option for separate assessment should have solved the 
problems arising from the principle of husband's accountability, 
although it was not a perfect solution. One of its 
deficiencies was, and still is, the administrative com- 
plications resulting from an exercise of the option and the 
impression is sometimes gained that the provisions were 
enacted in order to provide an answer to criticism but in 
the hope that they would not be widely adopted in practice. 
So, in referring to the option for separate assessment the 
Colwyn Commission, reporting. only six years after its 
introduction, said: - 
"It does not appear to be very widely known. 
Indeed some of the witnesses seem to have 
been unaware of the existence of any such 
provision. The option is rarely taken 
advantage of". 1 
No further discussion of the principle of 
accountability takes place in the report, which does however 
include three suggestions with regard to "minor details". 
2 
The first such suggestion is that "the Revenue 
should have power of assessment apportionment and recovery 
1. Colwyn Report : paragraph 250. 
2'.. Colwyn Report : paragraph 262. 
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of the tax against the spouses in respect of their 
separate incomes where necessary to the collection of 
the tax". It will be recalled that a similar power had 
been given under section 11 Revenue Act 1911 for the wife 
to be assessed and charged with her own supertax : this 
power had been repealed in 1914 but clearly the Inland 
Revenue had regrets: of course, if qn option for separate 
assessment were in force recovery could be from both hus- 
band and wife but if the spouses refused to exercise the 
option, the Inland Revenue could only recover from the 
husband : if all the couples' assets were in the name of 
the wife, this right of recovery could prove illusory. 
The right to recover from the wife, therefore, was re- 
enacted following the Colwyn Report and now appears in 
section 40 Taxes Act. Again, the existence of this 
provision points to illogicality of thought in the mind 
of the Treasury : at the same time as"they were persuading 
the House of Commons and the Colwyn Commission that 'the 
income of husband and wife is a joint one" and that there- 
fore aggregation should be retained, they were also arguing 
that the incomes were separate where it suited the Revenue 
for the purposes of recovery. 
The other two "minor" suggestions made by the 
Colwyn Commission on the subject of accountability con- 
cerned the timing of notices requiring separate assessment 
and the apportionment of unearned income-when an option 
was in force. Both suggestions were subsequently enacted. 
Of course the attention of the Commission would 
have been drawn to these three "minor details" by the 
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Inland Revenue; it is difficult not to compare the 
unqualified support given to these suggestions with the 
consideration given in the Report to the aggregation 
rule : there all the previous Treasury arguments are used 
to support the status quo and in spite of considerable, 
pressure from the taxpaying public, the Treasury view 
triumphs in the end. 
8.1955 - The Radcliffe Reports 
The Radcliffe Commission gave a certain amount 
of attention to the principle of aggregation but very little 
indeed to the principle of husband's accountability. How- 
ever,, in the third and final Report the Commission 
recommended that a wife should be required to sign. her 
husband's tax return "for the purpose of verifying those 
statements in it that relate to her income". The 
following extrac' from the Report explains the thinking 
behind the recommendation: - 
"It is one of the necessities of the present 
system that a husband is required to make and 
sign a return of the income of himself and his 
wife : but he has no means of knowing precisely 
what his wife's income is and no return or 
verification of her husband's income is required 
of her. Yet if she is a woman of any independent 
income she will have her separate bank account. 
If she has a- business or employment of 
her own her husband has no certain check on what 
her income is. We make no assumption either way 
how far this system has led to evasion. But we 
think that it is, in any view, unfair to the 
husband since it exposes him to the making of 
incorrect statements without any real power of 
safeguarding himself : and the defect is easily 
curable. For these is no difficulty in requiring 
that the wife should put her signature to her 
1. Paragraph 1060; Final Report, June 1955 Cmd 9474. 
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husband's return for the purpose of verifying 
those statements in it that relate to her 
income, whether assigning a figure to it or 
declaring that she has none... We do not 
recommend that the husband himself should be 
exempt from responsibility for that part of 
the return that relates to the wife's income 
merely that he should have the security of her 
signature and joint liability. If he wants to 
go further he must apply for separate assess- 
ment. " 
Now this recommendation was never implemented 
and the reason may be the unpopularity of the proposal : 
if a wife were obliged to sign the tax return she would, 
for the first time, be given a right to have details of 
the husband's income. Although such a right was no doubt 
given in fact to many wives by their husbands, there is 
always a substantial number of husbands who keep their 
incomes a secret from their wives; a 
. 
survey conducted by 
the Evening Standard in March 1982 indicated that this was 
the practice with one-fifth of married couples surveyed. 
And it is interesting to note that even where an option 
for separate assessment is in force, a wife does not have 
details of her husband's income. 
9.1956-78. The Tax Reform Papers 
None of the tax reform papers published in the 
decade commencing with 19701 were concerned with the 
principle of accountability; insofar as they affected the 
income tax treatment of husband and wife they were con- 
cerned only with aggregation (Chapter 7) and allowances- _. 
(Chapter 9). Perhaps this is not surprising in view of the 
1. Inheritance Tax (Cand. 4930 - March 1972); Tax Credit 
System (Cmnd 5116 - October 1972); Wealth Tax (August 
1974) and Report of a Select Committee on Wealth Tax 
(November 1975). 
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subject matter of these papers but more surprising is 
the fact that neither Macdonald' nor Meade2 make any 
reference to the principle. However the extent of the 
dissatisfaction felt by taxpayers with the principle of 
accountability was highlighted by the campaign for reform 
which was initiated in December 1977 by the publication of 
a consultation document by the Equal Opportunities 
Commission. 
10.1977-1979 - The Eaual Opportunities Commission's 
Campaign for Reform 
(1) 1977 - Publication of consultation document* 
by EOC. 
2 1978 - The Press Campaign. 
3 1978 - Statutory and administrative changes. 4 1979 -A response to-the consultation document. 
5 1979 - Further administrative changes. 6 1979 -A review of the altered position. 
(1) 1977 - Publication of the consultation document 
by EOC. 
The Equal Opportunities Commission was established 
by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975; now that Act only 
applied to discrimination in certain specified areas and 
section 51 specifically provided that the 'non-discrimination 
provisions in the statute did not apply to existing legis- 
lation. It was clear, therefore, that tax legislation was 
outside the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction. How- 
ever, the Commission clearly received a large number of 
complaints about the discriminatory nature of the income 
1. "Taxation and the Family Unit"Graeme MacDonald. The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies 1975. 
2. The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation, op. cit. 
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tax system. The Commissioners therefore corresponded 
with the Treasury; pointing out areas for reform and a 
delegation of Commissioners met the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in May 1977. In December the same year the 
Commission published a consultative document entitled 
"Income Tax and Sex Discrimination". Now it is a most 
interesting feature of that document that it was clearly 
published in response to a number of complaints from tax- 
payers all of which concerned accountability and none of 
which concerned aggregation. So: - 
"Women form the large group of persons 
who have written to complain about the 
humiliation involved in the assumption, 
at all stages of their dealing with the 
Inland Revenue, that the joint income is 
the property of the husband... men have 
also written to complain of the burden of 
having to take responsibility for their wive's 
financial affairs, and to complain of the 
unfairness involved, for example, in situations 
where the wife has a larger (unearned) income 
than the husband's earned income". 1 
And again: - 
"The most important source of complaints about 
sex discrimination is the provision that, for 
tax purposes, a married woman's income belongs 
to her husband. He is assessed for income tax 
on the joint income (which, technically, belongs 
only to him); he is responsible for making the 
declaration of income to the Inland Revenue ; 
he is legally responsible for paying any tax 
due; and he will usually receive any tax rebate 
owing" .2 
The complaints received are more fully analysed in 
Chapter 4 where the following six sources of dissatisfaction 
are identified: - 
1. Page 5. 
2. Page 10. 
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(1) Correspondence 
"Perhaps the most common complaint made by 
. married 
women about their tax position 
concerns the Inland Revenue's practice of 
conducting correspondence with the hus- 
band only... It may be suggested that such 
complaints are trivial. But what many 
married women object to is the assumption 
that they do not exist as far as the Inland 
Revenue is concerned". 
The Commission suggests that this complaint could 
be cured by providing a joint responsibility to provide 
information with correspondence being addressed to 
husband and wife jointly. 
(2) Privacy 
"Because the husband is responsible for com- 
pleting the tax declaration, the wife is 
asked to give her husband details of her 
income. But the reverse does not apply if 
there is no legal obligation on the husband 
to tell his wife what his income is and many 
wives do not in fact know how much their 
husbands receive". 
The Commission point out that separate assessment 
does not completely solve the problem as "it is still 
possible to calculate, from the division of the allowances 
between the partners, how much income the other receives". 
(3) Claiming and allocating the allowances 
"The married man's allowance and the wife's 
earned income allowance are both claimed 
by the man". 
Although the benefit of the wife's earned income 
allowance will be given against her earnings it has to be 
claimed by the husband, as must any other allowance or 
expense to which the wife is entitled. The consultation 
document also discussed an administrative practice whereby, 
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if either husband or wife is assessed to tax at the higher 
rates, the husband is given first claim on the lower rates, 
the wife's income bearing the higher rate tax. This was 
known as the "excess basic rate adjustment" and was des- 
cribed as follows: - 
"If the couple's joint taxable income is 
high enough for tax to be paid at higher 
rates on part of it (without being 
sufficiently high to make a wife's earned 
income election worth while) the husband has 
first claim on the lower rate of tax. In 
other words his taxable income (up to £6,000) 
will be taxed at 34%; a proportion of his, 
wife's earnings will be taxed at a higher 
rate". 
Now this administrative practice had no basis in 
law and was most inequitable in practice.: in most cases 
husbands have higher incomes than wives and there must 
have been many cases, where the small (possibly part-time) 
earnings of a wife were depleted by the deduction of higher 
rate tax due on her husband's high earnings. However, the 
practice received no publicity and as no doubt many of the 
adjustments were made through the PAYE codings of married 
women, without explanation, the ground for complaint was 
not widely known. 
(4) Mortgage interest relief 
"Since the man, for tax purposes, owned the, 
couple's income, this also means that he 
owns the couple's tax allowance - including 
relief given on the interest paid on a 
mortgage. This applies where the house is 
in a man's name; where it is in joint names, 
and even where it is owned by the woman alone. 
The relief on the mortgage interest payments 
will only be set against the woman's income 
when the husband gives his written consent". 
(5) Tax rebates 
"Many of the complaints received by the 
Commission arise from the fact that the 
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husband often receives a rebate payable 
on the wife's income. Where the couple 
are jointly taxed, the husband receives 
any tax rebate due on "his" income - even 
where the income is in fact earned by the 
wife - unless the income is being taxed 
through the PAYE system when the rebate 
will normally be paid through an adjust- 
ment in coding". 
(6) Responsibility for payment 
"Where the couple are jointly taxed, the 
husband is legally responsible for the tax 
on their joint incomes. Nevertheless, the 
Inland Revenue may claim the tax from the 
woman ... in a situation where the woman is the richer partner and is not providing her 
husband with sufficient funds to pay the 
Inland Revenue". 
Now, as has been noted earlier in this Chapter, 
all the above complaints, with the exception of lack of 
privacy, could be solved very easily under the existing, 
law - namely by the wife's exercising the option for 
separate assessment, and, even as far as privacy is con- 
cerned, the exercise of such option would go a long way 
towards solving many of the problems outlined. Why, then, 
is this option not more widely used? The answer may be in 
two directions. First, in 
"The Inland Revenue's reluctance to advertise 
certain benefits which might be advantageous 
to many women (such as separate assessment)", 
and also the fact that if separate assessment were more 
widely advertised: - 
"This would create many problems: the system 
is complicated and expensive to administer: 
there would possibly be delays in finalising 
tax bills at the end of each year". 
Now, apart from putting forward the suggestion 
that a system of joint responsibility for income tax would 
solve the problem of correspondence (although it would, 
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incidentally, destroy all privacy for husband and wife) 
the Commission make no recommendations for solving the 
dissatisfaction shown with the principle of accountability : 
they do discuss a number of options for change but these 
are almost solely concerned with the system of allowances 
discussed in Chapter 9. No concrete suggestions for reform 
were made and it is problematical if any would have resulted 
had it not been for the Press Campaign which followed the 
publication of the consultation document. 
(2) 1978 - The Press Campaign. 
The consultation document received a considerable 
amount of press publicity and during 1978 the impetus for 
change accelerated. On March 5th the Sunday Times reported 
the launch of a 'why be a wife' campaign. 
1 This was con- 
cerned with both the social security and tax disadvantages 
of married women and as far as income tax was concerned the 
disabilities complained of all related to the principle of 
accountability i. e. the husband's responsibility for com- 
pleting the tax declaration of the wife's income, the 
necessity for the wife to give details of her income to 
her husband and the fact that the reverse did not apply - 
there was no legal obligation on the husband to tell his 
wife what his income was. 
On March 25th Woman's Own Magazine launched a 
campaign urging reform "so that women are treated as 
individuals in their own right". A coupon was included 
and 6,500 replies were received. Of the additional comments 
1. See also The Times March 8th Column 4F. 
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received the vast majority concerned accountability, 
specifically, correspondence, repayments, privacy, claiming 
of allowances, and mortgage interest. 
I 
On 16th April the Sunday Times launched its own 
campaign. This. did not mention the subject of aggregation 
but referred to the complaints about correspondence relating 
to a married woman's tax affairs being conducted with her 
husband, the rebates being paid to the husband, and the 
husband's responsibility for tax on his wife's income. 
Again, a coupon was included for return; 5,000 replies were 
received within a week and by May 7th 310,000 signatures had 
been received. On June 11th the Sunday Times reported that 
Mr. Joel Barnett, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, had 
said that the Government would "look at the problems 
surrounding the completion of the tax forms and the payment 
of rebates" and there was also a promise to look at the 
subject of aggregation in the longer term. 
(3) 1978 - Statutory and administrative changes 
Having once again been subjected to pressure for 
change the Treasury responded in its usual way - by making 
a few peripheral changes leaving the main source of com- 
plaint untouched. ' No reference is made to the advantages 
of an option for separate assessment but a Press Release 
was issued on 29th June 1978 indicating that legislation 
could be brought forward at the Report Stage of the Finance 
Bill dealing with entitlement to repayments and certain 
minor allowances; three changes in practice were also 
1. See Appendix B Table 5 "With all my worldly goods I 
thee endow". Equal Opportunities Commission February 
1979. 
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announced. First, the Inland Revenue would, in future, 
reply to a letter written by a'-married woman (but would 
not initiate correspondence with her); secondly, the 
wording on some of the forms would be changed; and finally 
two new leaflets would be issued about the tax treatment 
of married couples and the option for separate assessment 
"to ensure that those who wish to opt for separate assess- 
ment are aware of the relevant provisions". 
The new clause dealing with repayments was 
introduced on 11th July 1978.1 Previously, a wife had 
received a repayment in respect of tax overpaid in that 
year but the clause extended this right to repayments due 
in respect of overpayments in a previous year. Further, 
repayments due when the wife was the only earner, and 
therefore where all the allowances were claimed'against her 
income, were to be paid to the wife (instead of to the 
husband as previously). -However, the new clause did not 
apply where either husband or wife was assessed under 
schedule D, or where the wife had investment income, or 
where the joint income was liable to tax at the higher 
rates. 
In introducing the clause the Chief Secretary to 
the Treasury (Mr. Joel Barnett) said: 
"This clause extends the rights of married 
women to receive their own repayments of 
pay as you earn tax by statutory right. 
The new clause will give this statutory right 
to about 6 million earning wives at present 
within the PAYE system. Frankly, it is 
incredible that this has not been done before". 2 
1. Cols. 1256-1283. 
2. Col. 1260. 
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And - 
r"I believe that this new clause does put 
-right 
a very serious wrong that many 
married women have suffered. They have 
waited far too long to have it remedied. 
I look forward to being able to do much 
more in the years ahead... "1 
In reply, Sir Geoffrey Howe drew attention to the 
fact that the clause was 
"a less than adequate response to the 
growing chorus of complaints about the 
way in which the present income tax 
system operated as between the sexes. "2 
He pointed out that the clause did not apply 
where the joint income was taxed at the higher rates or 
where the wife was assessed otherwise than under schedule E. 
Further, the other grounds for complaint remained; under- 
payments of tax were still the husband's responsibility; 
the wife still had to disclose her income to her husband 
who was alone responsible for declaring it to the Inland 
Revenuer the wife had no privacy as far as her savings 
were concerned; she still could not get relief for 
mortgage interest paid by her without her husband's con- 
sent; and the Inland Revenue had not undertaken to 
initiate correspondence with her about her income tax 
affairs - only to reply to her if she wrote to them. 
However, with all its deficiencies the new clause was 
clearly a step in the right direction and was subsequently 
enacted as section'. 22 Finance Act 1978. 
(4) 1979 -A response to the consultation document 
Perhaps the Inland Revenue and the Treasury thought 
1. Col. 1264. 
2. Col. 1265. 
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that these statutory and administrative changes would 
bring the campaign for reform to an end and in one 
respect they were right because the Press Campaign 
died down. But in February 1979 the Equal Opportunities 
Commission returned to the attack and published the 
response it had received to the 1977 consultation document 
under the title-"With all my worldly goods I thee endow 
... except my tax allowances". 
The response analysed the 
replies received to the consultative document and it is 
interesting to note that whereas the consultative document 
itself had concentrated on the principle of accountability 
many of the replies complained of the aggregation rule. 
The response noted the changes which had been introduced 
in 1978 and summarised the deficiencies which remained which 
had been outlined by Sir Geoffrey Howe during the debates 
in 1978. The "major areas for consideration" outlined in 
the response, however, concerned aggregation - (investment 
income and the tax unit) and allowances; no specific 
recommendation is made to solve the remaining injustices 
of the principle of accountability but the document 
clearly points towards the need for an individual basis 
of assessment which would also bring with it the 
advantages of completely separate accounting. 
(5) 1979 - Further administrative changes 
It will be recalled that a major inequity of 
the principle of accountability, namely, the "excess 
basic rate adjustment"' had been described in the 1977 
1. Described on page 444 above. 
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consultation document; this discrimination was altered 
by a change in administrative practice announced in 
December 1979.1 and the change was described by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer as follows: - 
"The tax tables give each employee the 
benefit of the full band of income 
chargeable at the basic rate. Married 
couples, like other taxpayers, are 
entitled to only one basic rate band, 
unless a wife's earnings election has 
been made. Consequently a reduction has 
to be made in the PAYE code number where 
husband and wife are both employed and 
their joint earnings are sufficient to 
attract liability to higher rate tax. 
This is to ensure that the right amount 
of tax is deducted during the year. This 
reduction, known as the excessive basic 
rate adjustment, has normally been made 
in the wife's coding. In future it will 
be made in the husband's coding unless the 
wife's earnings are expected to be greater 
than her husband's or the couple notify 
the tax office that they would prefer the 
reduction to be made in the wife's coding". 
The same Press Release announced a change in 
practice regarding correspondence: - 
"Hitherto [the Inland Revenue] have written 
only in response to letters from married 
women. Henceforth tax offices will normally 
write direct to a married woman about her 
own tax affairs whether or not she has first 
written to the Revenue". 
(6) 1979 -A review of the altered position 
As no changes in the principle of accountability 
have taken place since 1979 it might be helpful to compare 
the position then reached with that described in the 
Introduction to this Chapter under the same seven headings, 
namely: - 
1. Inland Revenue Press Release 4th December 1979. 
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(1) Making the return. The option for separate assess- 
ment introduced in 1914 permitted a husband to 
disclaim responsibility for making a return of 
his wife's income and a wife to make her own return. 
Legislation enacted first in 1911 and again in 1950 
, 
gave the Inland Revenue an additional right to 
require a return from a wife where no option was 
in force. 
(2) Privacy. A husband has complete privacy under the 
present system, a wife has none. A system of joint 
responsibility would remove the husband's privacy 
without benefiting the wife. The option for 
separate assessment gives a wife some privacy but 
this is not complete; as both spouses can guess 
each other's income and allowances the husband has 
less privacy than before. 
(3) The husband's responsibility for paying the tax. An 
option for separate assessment will enable a hus- 
band to disclaim responsibility for his wife's 
tax and will create a new responsibility for the 
wife. By virtue of legislation enacted in 1950 the 
Inland Revenue can, in any event, make a wife 
responsible for her own tax. 
(4) Repayments. An option for separate assessment 
will enable a wife to receive her own repayments. 
Otherwise section 22 Finance Act 1978 provides 
that she will receive them only if she is taxed 
under schedule E and only if the joint income is 
not liable to higher rate tax. 
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(5) Correspondence. In 1978 the Inland Revenue 
decided to reply to married women and in 1979 said 
they would initiate correspondence with her. 
(6) Claiming the allowances. Only an option for 
separate assessment will enable a 'married woman 
to claim her own allowances, expenses and reliefs. 
(7) Allocation of allowances. Since 1979 the 'excess 
basic rate adjustment' is made against the hus- 
band's income rather than the wife's and certain 
minor allowances may be claimed against her income. 
But only an option for separate assessment will 
give her any entitlement to other allowances, 
including mortgage interest relief paid by her. Even 
the option may not allocate the allowances on an 
'individual' basis as the system (explained in 
Chapter 2) operates by reference to a proportion 
of income rather than entitlement. 
This, then, is the present position against which 
the proposals in the Green Paper fall to be considered. 
11.11 80 - The Green Paper 
The Green Paper recognises that privacy is a factor 
for judging any system for taxing married couples but des- 
pite the considerable evidence of a demand for more privacy 
contained in the documents issued by the Equal Opportunities 
Commission, the Green Paper does not find the factor con- 
clusive. So :- 
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"Wives should be able to keep particulars 
of their income and their tax affairs con- 
fidential from their husbands (and husbands 
from their wives). Some would attach more 
importance to this than others as a 
necessary feature of a system; and there are 
those who would argue that it would be more 
desirable to have a system of joint taxation 
under which there is no privacy between hus- 
band and wife but both are jointly responsible 
for declaring the combined incomes and paying 
the total tax". l 
Nevertheless, the criticisms of the principle of 
accountability are mentioned as giving rise to discrimin- 
ation within the family; 
2 
"A number of people feel particularly 
strongly about the issue of the married 
woman's privacy. Because a husband is 
liable for tax on his wife's investment 
income it follows that he must get to 
know about any savings or investments she 
has. Criticism of our tax system as 
discriminating unfairly between husband 
and wife does not come. exclusively from 
women : some even object to having to go 
through the process of obtaining details 
of their wife's income, dealing with all 
correspondence relating to it, and being 
liable for any tax due on it". 
On the other hand, the solution to these 
difficulties, which lies in independent taxation, is said 
to have3 
"obligations as well as rights; every man 
and woman, married as well as single, would 
be responsible for filling in his or her 
own tax return, dealing direct with tax 
authorities and paying his or her own tax 
bill". 
In fact, the only persons affected by the change 
would be married women as all these obligations fall on 
other taxpayers in any event. 
1. Paragraph 7. 
2. Paragraph 32. 
3. Paragraph 40. 
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The Green Paper puts forward a number of 
suggestions for reform, each of which would have a 
" different effect on accountability and a reference is now 
made to each. 
(1) Joint taxation (paragraph 43). 
"This would involve substituting for the 
present aggregation rule a rule under 
which the income of husband and wife 
would be jointly returnable by them and 
jointly assessable on them and there would 
be a joint responsibility for payment of 
the tax". 
This system would have two major disadvantages; 
the husband would lose his present right to privacy and a 
wife, who may have little or no income, would become liable 
for her husband's income tax. 
(2) Rewording the aggregation rule (paragraph 44). 
"The aggregation rule could be re-worded 
simply to treat the income of husband and 
wife as if it were one income, the tax 
remaining assessable etc. on the husband". 
This alteration has cosmetic significance 
only - although the wife's income will no longer be 
specifically stated to be deemed her husband's income, it 
will remain so in fact. The change would remove none of 
the disadvantages of accountability. 
(3) Option for individual taxation (paragraph 46). 
"The extension of the wife's earnings election 
to investment income would remove the dis- 
crimination against married couples with 
investment income... a wife would get a single 
person's allowance against her investment 
income... (but) the husband would lose (the 
married man's allowance). 
Although this option would give complete privacy 
once exercised, it has two major disadvantages. First, it 
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will not always be beneficial and spouses therefore will 
require details of each other's income in order to decide 
whether it should be exercised; and secondly, it is 
proposed that the election should have to be made jointly 
(paragraph 53). So, although the election could give 
some degree of independent accounting, it has to be 
exercised and does nothing to help those couples who do 
not exercise it either because it is not beneficial to do 
so or otherwise. 
(4) Option for independent taxation with equal split 
(paragraph 51). 
"It would be relatively simple to alter the 
rules for separate assessment in such a 
way that, for cases where it would not be 
beneficial for the couple to choose to be 
taxed as two sin le individuals (i. e. under 
Option (3) above) they could nevertheless 
opt for separate responsibility with an 
equal split of the available allowances and 
rate bands". 
The existing disadvantages' of the options for 
separate assessment are recognised - the allocation of 
allowances is not always fair; the arrangements are complex 
and infrequently used; and the calculations mean 'that 
privacy is not preserved. The "equal split" would solve 
these problems to some extent - 
"in many cases the privacy would be complete; 
even where it was not only the spouse with 
the higher income could calculate the 
amount (although not the source) of the other 
spouse's income". 
However, the exercise of the option could affect 
the allocation of the allowances between the couple and 
does not preserve complete privacy. 
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(5) Mandatory independent taxation (paragraph 73). 
"A mandatory system of independent taxation 
would mean ... that all married women would become taxpayers in their own right... 
They would complete their own tax returns, 
conduct their own dealings with tax offices, 
and be ultimately responsible for paying any 
tax due on their own incomes". 
This would clearly answer all the criticisms of 
the principle of accountability but almost immediately a 
new complication is introduced - the transferable allowance. 
This will be discussed in Chapter 9 but here it may be 
noted that a system of transferable allowances could re- 
introduce the difficulties of husband's accountability. 
12. Summary 
The option for separate assessment introduced in 
1914 goes some way 
from the principle 
to administer; it 
as the allocation 
are not considered 
widely known. 
to 
of 
is 
of 
to 
reducing the disadvantages flowing 
accountability; but it is complex 
not a complete answer to the problems 
allowances and the question of privacy 
be satisfactory; and it is not 
The alterations since that date have benefited 
both the Inland Revenue and the taxpayer but there are still 
considerable areas of dissatisfaction. None of the proposals 
in the Green Paper provides a complete answer, either, 
except for that of mandatory independent taxation but even 
there problems could arise if a system of transferable 
allowances was adopted. 
The whole subject of the allowances for husband and 
wife is now considered in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 9-A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE 
ALLOWANCES 
Section 1- Introductory. 
Section 2- 1918 - Introduction of a Wife Allowance. 
Section 3- 1920 - The Colwyn Report. 
(1) The basis of the personal allowance generally. 
(2) The basis of the higher married man's personal 
allowance. 
(3) The basis' of the additional allowance for wife's 
earnings. 
Section 4- 1942 - Increase of Wife's Earned Income 
Allowance. 
Section 5- 1954 - The Radcliffe Report. 
(1 The basis of the personal allowances generally. 
(2 The married man's allowance. 
(3 The wife's earnings allowance. 
Section 6- 1971 - Separate Taxation of Wife's Earnings. 
Section 7- 1972 - Proposals for a Tax Credit System. 
(1) The single person's tax credit. 
(2) The married man's tax credit. 
a Relative gain for wife at home. 
b Disincentive for married women to seek work. 
c Recognition of extra expenses of wife working. 
(3) Wife's earnings allowance. 
Section 8- 1975 and 1978 - MacDonald and Meade. 
Section 9- 1977-79 - The Campaign for Reform. 
1 The individual basis. 
2 The quotient basis. 
3 The cash payments basis. 
Section 10.1980 - The Green Paper. 
Section 11. Conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 9 
A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING 
THE ALLOWANCES 
Section 
1. Introductory. 
2.1918 - Introduction of a Wife Allowance. 
3.1920 - The Colwyn Report. 
4.1942 - Increase of Wife's Earned Income Allowance. 
5.1954 - The Radcliffe Report. 
6.1971 - Separate Taxation of Wife's Earnings. 
7.1972. - Proposals for a Tax Credit System. 
8.1975 and 1978 - MacDonald and Meade. 
9.1977-79 - The Campaign for Reform. 
10.1980 - The Green Paper. 
11. Conclusions. 
1. Introductory 
Part II of this thesis reviews the studies and 
criticisms of the present rules concerning the tax treatment 
of the family unit. The three main principles of aggregation, 
accountability and the allowances are considered separately 
as each is independent of the other and each has a separate 
historical development. This Chapter considers the 
principles underlying the allowances and these, in particular, 
repay close scrutiny as without an understanding of their 
historical development the present arrangements would be 
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difficult to comprehend. From the first, the allowances 
given to married couples have created anomalies and it is 
thought that it is the existence of these anomalies which 
are now one of the largest obstacles in the way of reform. 
2.1918 - Introduction of a Wife Allowance 
It will be recalled that a child allowance had 
been introduced at an extremely early date in the history 
of income tax although it was in abeyance for a number of 
years. Although there was no system of personal allowances 
as such there was always an exemption. limit below which no 
tax was charged; this limit applied to each individual 
and for these purposes, as for all others, husband and 
wife together constituted one individual. However, 
provisions were enacted in 1894 giving a husband whose 
wife had earnings an additional exemption where the joint 
income did not exceed £500. 
It is doubtful whether these arrangements would 
have been altered had it not been for the lengthy debate 
during the passing of the Finance Bill in 1914 when the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Lloyd George) had replied 
to the mounting criticism of the aggregation rule by 
indicating that he saw the solution to the problems of 
aggregation in a review of the system of personal allowances. 
Such was the background to the proposal made in 
the Budget statement on 22nd April 1918 that the Government 
intended for the first time to introduce an allowance for 
a wife. Mr. Bonar Law's words are most enlightening: - 
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"I propose to make the children allowance 
-apply 
to a wife also, and so far, much to 
my surprise, I have had no representations 
from any women's suffrage societies 
suggesting the_impropriety of proceeding on 
that basis. I also propose to extend a 
similar allowance to real dependants who 
are incapacitated". l 
Thus, were wives placed on the same basis as 
children and other incapacitated dependants. It is clear 
that this relief was seen in the nature of a housekeeper 
relief for a married man and the question was immediately 
raised as to why a widower or unmarried man should not have 
a housekeeper, too. So, Mr. Thomas: -2 
"I am delighted to know that the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer proposes to make some 
allowance in regard to wives... that is 
a very necessary and wise provision but I 
would like to ask whether that includes 
provision in respect of a housekeeper? 
Otherwise you are going to have this anomaly, 
that a man is to have an allowance in respect 
of his wife but if he is left a widower he is 
to be placed at a great disadvantage. He will 
have to employ and pay a housekeeper and 
experience shows the difficulty and expense of 
that". 
So the same allowance was also given to a widower 
who had a female relative to look after his child. When 
the wife allowance was introduced, by section 27 Finance 
Act 1918, it was the same amount as the child allowance i. e. 
£25. (The single person's exemption limit was then £130). 
This figure was doubled to £50 by section 27 Finance Act 
1919 which extended the relief to any widower with a house- 
keeper, whether he had a child or not. Section 21 of the 
same Act gave the same relief of £50 to an unmarried 
individual who maintained a female relative to look after 
1. Hansard, 22nd April 1918 col. 708. 
2. Hansard, 22nd April 1918 col. 729. 
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his young sister or brother. The relief 
was not conditional upon his maintaining 
at his own expense (i. e. the housekeeper 
income. of her ovm) but the relief to the 
was only available where the housekeeper 
Now the minor personal allowaný 
to the widower 
the housekeeper 
could have an 
unmarried person 
had no other income. 
yes (including the 
housekeeper allowance) are outside the scope of this thesis 
but are mentioned here in order to illustrate the context 
in which the first wife allowance was introduced. The wife 
allowänce had originally been suggested as an alternative to 
disaggregation but when it was introduced it was given to 
the husband and was seen as an extension of the child 
allowance. Further, the extension of the same allowance to 
"housekeepers" imported two further anomalies into the 
system : first, the incomes of husband and wife remained 
aggregated but a widower could get an allowance for a 
housekeeper who could have a separate (disaggregated) 
income, although it is appreciated that in most cases the 
widower would in fact be paying the housekeeper in which 
case there would not really be two separate incomes. 
Secondly, the allowance was given only to men - husbands 
and widowers; there was no equivalent allowance for widows. 
The wife allowance (and the housekeeper allowance) 
were available only to taxpayers whose income did not exceed 
a specified limit which was F800 in 1919. Here was the 
cause of yet another anomaly -a wife who earned her own 
income, and thereby increased her husband's deemed income 
could, in that way, deprive him of the additional exemption 
limit under Finance Act 1894 and also of the wife allowance 
under Finance Act 1918. 
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Finally, it will be noted that where a husband 
was entitled to the additional exemption for wife's earnings 
his new entitlement to the wife allowance resulted in the 
total allowances available to a married couple being in 
excess of the total allowances available to two single per- 
sons. The root of this anomaly is that the earnings 
exemption, being only available against a wife's earnings, 
is of no assistance to a couple where the wife has no 
earnings, even if she has investment income. Although the 
assistance given by means of the wife allowance does assist 
where a wife has no earnings, or has investment income, it 
was given in addition to, and not ±n substitution for, the 
earnings exemption limit. Accordingly, where a wife did 
have earnings, both the earnings exemption and the wife 
allowance were available, thus giving a two-earner couple 
an advantage over two single individuals, whereas a, one- 
earner couple was at a disadvantage as against two single 
individuals. 
3. The Colwyn Report 1920 
The Colwyn Report' laid the basis for the'present 
system of personal allowances and its recommendations, there- 
fore, repay scrutiny. Before the Commission was appointed 
the allowances were: - 
(1) an exemption limit of 2130 available to all 
single taxpayers and to all married men; 
1.. Crid 615. 
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(2) an additional exemption limit of £130 available to 
married men whose wives had earnings, where the 
joint income did not exceed £500, and 
(3) a wife allowance of £50 available to married men 
whose income did not exceed £800. 
The Colwyn Report recommended the abolition of 
all these arrangements and the introduction instead of a 
new "personal allowance" of which the amount for a married 
man would be higher than that for a single person, and also 
of an additional exemption limit for a married man whose 
wife had earnings. Now it is possible that if the Colwyn 
Commission had not been influenced by the history of the 
previous exemptions and allowances they might have con- 
cluded that husband and wife should be entitled to a 
personal allowance each, the wife's to be available against 
her earnings if she had any failing which it should be 
available against the rest of the joint income. And, in 
fact, this is almost what resulted because when the 
recommendations of the Commission were enacted in section 18 
Finance Act 1920 a single person was given an allowance of 
£135 and a married man an allowance of 0225 plus £45 if 
his wife had earnings : the total available to a married 
man (E270) was exactly twice that available to a single 
person but only if his wife had earnings. The previous 
advantage given to some married men was thus withdrawn. 
' 
However, this summary anticipates the discussion 
in the Report which can be considered under the following 
heads: - 
1. See page 463 above. 
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(1) the basis of the personal allowance generally. 
(2) the basis of the higher married mans personal 
allowance and 
(3) the basis of the additional allowance for wife's 
earnings. 
(1) The basis of the personal allowance generally. 
The personal allowance was to succeed the previous 
exemption limit but it was clear that that limit had not 
been fixed by reference to any identifiable criteria. 
Clearly the philosophical justification of such a limit was 
to remove very low incomes from the tax net altogether 
and to allow all taxpayers a measure of tax-free income, but 
the amount had not been arrived at with any approach at 
precision. There were "different ideas in the minds of 
witnesses as to when real taxable capacity begins". The 
Commission proposed three possible tests for taxable 
capacity, namely after provision of: -' 
"(a) an actual minimum income, i. e. an income 
sufficient for bare subsistence or 
(b) an income not merely sufficient for bare 
subsistence but large enough to equip 
and sustain a healthy and efficient 
citizen or 
(c) an income sufficient not only for a healthy 
existence but for the provision of con- 
ventional comforts and luxuries usually 
enjoyed by what are commonly called the 
"working classes". " 
The Commission were clearly of the view that all 
of these suggestions were too generous, so: - 
"The truth is that the exemption limit has 
never in this country been based on. a 
figure consciously related to any kind of 
minimum of subsistence... "2 
i. Paragraph 242. 
2. Paragraph 244. 
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Clearly the limit was, and is, fixed with some 
regard to the required yield of taxation but the link 
with taxable capacity is acknowledged: - 
"While the limits we have suggested have 
not been arrived at merely as representing 
the minimum of subsistence for the persons 
to be maintained out of the income we 
recognise that in some measure the cost of 
living has a practical connection with the 
possible taxable capacity". l 
The amount of personal allowance recommended for 
a single person was £135, an increase of £5 on the existing 
exemption limit, and this amount was enacted in section 18 
Finance Act 1920. 
(2) The basis of the higher married man's personal 
allowance 
The absolute amount of the personal allowances is 
not relevant to this thesis but the relative amount of the 
married man's allowance to the single person's allowance 
is. The higher married man's allowance was meant to 
replace the wife allowance introduced in 1918. At the date 
of the appointment of the Commission a married man whose 
wife had no earnings enjoyed an exemption limit of £130 
and a wife allowance of £50. The Colwyn Commission thought 
that this was insufficient : 
"the relation that now exists between the 
exemption limit for the bachelor and the 
effective exemption limit for a married 
couple is not consonant with justice". 2 
and recommended that the married man's allowance should be 
1. Paragraph 247. 
2. Paragraph 275. 
467 
£225 (compared with a single person's allowance of £135). 
However, this recommendation was conditional upon there 
being no change in the basis of assessment. So: - 
"it would be illogical to allow both a 
separate assessment of husband and wife 
and also a wife allowance". 
This must be right, as separate assessment would 
automatically have given a wife an allowance of her own. 
In fixing the figures of the allowances, and the 
ratio of the married man's allowance to the single person's 
allowance the Commission said 
"In recommending these figures we have had 
regard to the ability to pay... " 
It will be recalled that when the subject of 
aggregation was under consideration the 
"taxable capacity" and "ability to pay" 
support the retention of the treatment 
husband and wife as one person : in the 
allowances, however, a non-earning wife 
additional J of a person. 
principles of 
were used to 
of the incomes of 
context of the 
is treated as an 
The amended allowances recommended by the Colwyn 
Commission were incorporated in legislation and the 
proportions remain very similar today: the ratio of the 
single person's allowance to the married man's allowance 
was then 1: 1.6 and it is now 1: 1.56. 
(2) The basis of the additional allowance for wife's 
earnings 
The increase in the amount of the wife allowance 
would have exaggerated the advantages of a husband with a 
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working wife' if no adjustment had been made to the 
allowance for a wife's earnings. Since 1894 a husband 
had been entitled to a full additional abatement of F130 
for his wife's earnings if the joint income did not exceed 
£500. This was withdrawn and replaced by an additional 
allowance equal to nine-tenths of a wife's earned income 
with a maximum of £45 and the proposal was enacted in 
section 18(2) Finance Act 1920. No reason was given by 
the Commission as to why such a drastic reduction was 
made in the relief for wife's earnings :a reference was 
made to the 1894 provisions and to the fact that: - 
"The limit of £500 has been represented to 
us as too low in present conditions. We 
agree with this point of view... 112 
However, instead of raising the limit the 
Commission immediately recommends that it be discontinued 
and replaced by the wife's earnings allowance mentioned 
above. None of the allowances recommended by the Commission 
was restricted by reference to the amount of the husband's 
income, although of course, the wife's earnings allowance 
was restricted by reference to the wife's earnings. 
It has been noted that when the recommendations 
of the Colwyn Commission had been enacted a married man 
with a working wife received the equivalent of two single 
person's allowances : but the amount available in respect 
of wife's earnings was only E45 which compared unfavourably 
with the E135 available to single women. This inequity was 
the subject of discussion in a White Paper. published in 1942 
on "The Taxation of Weekly Wage Earners". 
1. See page 463 above. 
2. Paragraph 261. 
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4.1942 - Increase of Wife's Earned Income Allowance 
In 1942 the allowance for wife's earnings remained 
at the maximum of £45 fixed in 1920 but the other personal 
allowances had been reduced to E80 (single) and £140 
(married). The inequity of the allowances made to a 
married woman and to a, single woman were discussed in the 
White Paper on "the Taxation of Weekly Wage Earners" 
1 
published in April 1942. 
"Linked up with the general question of 
the deduction of tax from wages -is, 
the 
special problem of the taxation of 
married women in employment. There is 
a good deal of misunderstanding on this 
subject... It has, for instance, been 
. repeatedly alleged 
that a single woman 
in industrial employment is in a more 
favourable position than a married woman 
but this is only true where the earnings 
are large. Where a married woman is in 
employment an additional personal 
allowance of 9/10ths of her wages, sub- 
ject to a maximum of £45 is given. This 
£45, added to the married allowance of 
4140 gives a total personal allowance of 
£185 for the husband and wife together 
which is more than twice the single 
allowance of £80 given to a single 
person"-2 
This extract shows the confusion between the 
'allowances given to each single person against all income, 
and the allowances given to a husband for his wife, - part 
being available for all income and part available only 
against earnings. In attempting to preserve equity as 
between married men and single persons, the equity between 
working married women and working single women had been 
overlooked. The remedy proposed was to raise the allowance 
1. Cmnd 6348. 
2. Paragraph 43. 
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for wife's earnings to the -level of a single person's 
allowance (then £80) leaving-the married man with the 
full higher allowance. So, once again, the allowances 
given to a two-earner couple were greater-than-those given 
to two single persons. A clause to give effect to the 
recommendation was-included in the 1942 Finance Bill 
(clause 22) and in commenting on its provisions-Sir John 
Mellor said: - 
"The 'clause has not touched the root of 
, 
the problem. The real trouble lies with 
the joint assessment of husband and wife. 
The clause has merely added another patch, 
although in itself a good patch, to an 
existing patchwork system of allowances". 
And: - 
"The fact is that a couple gain financially 
by being married only if the woman has a 
modest earned income and no unearned income. 
Otherwise they lose. Is this fair or 
desirable... I submit that until the whole 
system of allowances and the incidence of 
taxation upon married persons are changed 
so that there is separate assessment of 
husband and wife, the allowances being re- 
cast, we shall not get a satisfactory 
position"-2 
The provisions were enacted as section 23 Finance 
Act 1942 and thus was the principle established, which 
remains today, that the allowance for a wife's earnings 
should be the same as the single person's allowance. 
The reason for equating the wife's earned income 
allowance is sometimes said to be to provide an incentive 
for a married woman to work and at other times it is said 
to be a recognition of the additional expenses thrown upon 
a household with a working wife. These arguments will be 
1. Hansard 13th May 1942 col. 1792. 
2. Col. 1793. 
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considered later in this Chapter. 
But from the Report mentioned above it is clear 
that the real reason was to meet the justifiable com- 
plaint that where two women worked side by side at the 
same employment for the same remuneration a single woman 
only paid income tax on earnings in excess of £80 whereas 
a married woman paid tax on earnings in excess of £45; it 
is no answer to a married woman in this situation to state 
that her husband has an additional allowance resulting 
from marriage. 
5.1954 - The Radcliffe Report 
The Radcliffe Report gave detailed consideration 
to the subject of the personal allowances and recommended 
some rather complex adjustments which were not subsequently 
incorporated in legislation. However, the Report does 
merit a brief reference as it contains comments on the 
historical basis of the allowances and also on the philosophy 
underlying the allowances generally. As with the Colwyn 
Report a reference will be made first to the basis of the 
personal allowances, then to the married man's allowance 
and finally to the allowance for wife's earnings. 
(1) The basis of the personal allowances generally 
The Report appreciates the impossibility of 
finding any absolute answers to the question of the amount 
of the personal allowances: - 
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"We were forced to the conclusion... that 
we should be wasting our time if we tried 
to find agreement among ourselves as to 
... the precise figures that ought to be 
allotted to the various personal allowances, 
both absolutely and in relation to one 
another. These things must remain 'a, matter 
of individual judgment". 1 
The basis of the allowances appear to rest on 
capacity to pay.. So: - 
"The personal allowances carry this con- 
ception of varying capacities to pay into 
another field and recognise that, if equal 
relative sacrifice is what it is sought to 
achieve, the same tax bill may represent 
very different sacrifices for two persons 
with equal incomes according to differences 
in their respective personal situations. A 
man with 2800 a year and a wife and two 
children to support out of it is less able 
to bear a given amount of taxation than a 
single man with the same amount of income". 2 
The Commission concludes that the existing system 
of lump sum allowances "does not produce a very satisfactory 
distribution between taxpayers in the middle and upper levels 
of income"3 because the allowance "becomes proportionately 
smaller as the income increases". 
4 
A radical change proposed by the Commission was 
the introduction of an exemption limit which would replace 
the earned income relief but would be in addition to the 
personal allowances : the Commission thought that the 
function of the personal allowance was primarily to ensure 
"progressiveness in the effective rates of 
taxation as well as a method of differentiating 
between people with the same income but 
different family circumstances". 5 
1. Paragraph 109. 
2. Paragraph, 151. 
3. Paragraph 155. 
4. Paragraph 156. 
5. Paragraph 160. 
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whereas a minimum exemption limit had a completely different 
function, namely "to prevent the tax impinging upon what is 
required for subsistence". One reason why the personal 
allowances could not be used as a minimum exemption limit 
was, that if they were set at the appropriate subsistence 
figure, the cost would be too high. Ultimately the Report 
recommended a rather complicated system of graduated 
minimum relief. 
(2) The married man's allowances 
Following its conclusion that the lump sum 
allowances were disproportionately disadvantageous to those 
with higher incomes the Commission recommended a proportional 
allowance for married men of : 
1110 per cent of income up to E1,000 and 
£100 plus 6 per cent for the excess over 
£1,000 with a minimum of £90 and a 
maximum of £160". 1 
This recommendation was made within the context 
of existing allowances of £120 for a single person and 2210 
for a married man. In addition, the Report recommended a 
higher starting point for surtax liability for a taxpayer 
with a wife and children. 
(3) The wife's earning allowance 
By the date of the Report the special treatment 
for wife's earnings amounted to the equivalent of an 
additional single person's allowance (2120). The Report 
traces the special treatment of wife's earnings but only 
1. Paragraph 180. 
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as far back as 1920; it is not clear-whether the Commission 
were aware of the earlier history or the reasons why the 
Colwyn Commission recommended the change which was enacted 
in section 18(2) Finance Act 1920, because the Report 
states that those provisions 
"were intended as a recognition of the fact 
that the taxable capacity of the married 
couple where the wife is earning is 
generally speaking less than the taxable 
capacity of a couple where the wife has no 
employment; for the mere circumstance of 
her employment tends to throw upon the house- 
hold some expenses that would otherwise have 
been avoided". 
Now it is extremely difficult to see how the 
taxable capacity of a household with two members who are 
both earning, so that the ratio of incomes to persons is 
1: 1 is less than the taxable capacity of a household with 
two members of which only one is earning, so that the ratio 
of incomes to persons is 1: 2. It is appreciated that the 
"circumstances of employment" do involve "expenses which 
would otherwise have been avoided"e. g. travel, meals, etc. 
but this is the same for any person, husband, wife or other- 
wise and is meant to be accounted for in the special 
treatment afforded to earned income. This artificial 
justification of the anomalies of the personal allowances 
given to married couples, by reference to some untenable 
notion of "decreased taxable capacity" is not borne out by 
an examination of the historical genesis of the provisions. 
The Report also refers to two more probable 
reasons for the relief namely: 
"a desire to offer to the married woman an 
inducement to undertake or to retain 
employment and by the great administrative 
advantage, for the purposes of PAYE, of 
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equating the quantum of her reliefs with 
those of an independent single person". 
After considering the arguments for modifying or 
ending the relief the Report concludes: - 
11We have come to the conclusion that we 
ought not to recommend the abandonment 
of the present system... in our opinion 
there is a valid difference between the 
taxable capacity of a married couple where 
the wife is at work and the married couple 
where the wife is at home ... the special treatment of wives' earnings is... ä device 
for securing a measure of distinction bet- 
ween two different kinds of taxable unit". 
However, the Report concludes that the existing 
distinction was excessive: - 
"The married couple of two earners is... 
treated move favourably than two single 
-persons ... the-most natural course would be to withhold the net marriage allowance of 
the husband.., progressively in proportion 
to the size of the wife's tax free earnings. 
But enquiry satisfied us that any such 
scheme... is ruled out owing to its adminis- 
trative complications. The alternative 
method is to reduce the existing relief on 
the wife's earnings... by lowering the amount 
of her special personal allowance... " 
LaterI such a reduction is recommended combined 
with the recommendation that the proposed new "minimum relief" 
proposed for all taxpayers should also be available to a wife 
for use against her separate earnings. 
These recommendations were not, of course, 
implemented. 
(6) 1971 - Separate taxation of wife's earnings 
It will be recalled that one result of an exercise 
of the option for separate taxation of wife's earnings, 
1. Paragraph 65. 
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introduced by section 23 Finance Act 1971, was the-loss of 
the additional married man's allowance; the married couple 
obtained two single personal allowances instead. In the 
subsequent discussion in this Chapter, therefore, references 
to the advantages enjoyed by a two-earner couple refer only 
to couples where this election has not been exercised. 
(7) 1972 - Proposals for a tax credit system 
The main proposals in the Green Paper on the tax- 
credit system, 
' 
published in October 1972, have not been 
implemented but a brief reference to these may be helpful 
as the subject of the allowances available to a married 
couple are considered and discussed; also, it is possible 
that the proposals may be implemented at a later date. 
The publication of the Green Paper could have 
presented an ideal opportunity for re-casting the system of 
allowances available to a married couple, with a view to 
removing the anomalies which had crept into the system : 
unfortunately once again the Report preferred to retain the 
status quo and the opportunity for some radical re-thinking 
was lost. 
"The tax credit system is a reform which 
embodies the socially valuable device 
of paying tax credits to the extent that 
they are not used up against the tax due, 
positively as benefit". 
In this way the Foreword to the Green Paper 
summarises the basis of the proposals; "tax credits" were 
to take the place of the main personal allowances; 
2 
when 
1. Cmnd 5116. 
2. Paragraph-9. 
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paying wages the employer would always deduct tax at the 
standard rate and then add back the credit to which the 
individual was entitled; if credit exceeded tax the.. 
difference would be paid out to the taxpayer each week - 
there was to be no carry forward of unused credits. 
As far as they affect married couples the proposals 
can be considered from the same three directions as 
previously, namely, the basis of the single person's tax 
credit, the basis of the married man's tax credit and the 
proposals for treatment of wife's earnings. 
(1) The single person's tax credit 
In 1972 the single personal allowance was E4601 
2 
and the standard rate of tax was 38.75 per cent. If the 
single person's credit was to replace exactly the 
corresponding income tax allowance it would have had to 
be set at £3.43 a week; the Green Paper however proposed 
a limit of £4 per week so as to "improve the position of 
people of limited means" and to reduce "the dependence of 
pensioners on supplementary benefit". 
(2) The married man's tax credit 
In 1972 the married man's personal allowance was 
£600. Now this was low in proportion to the single person's 
allowance (E460); it will be recalled that the Colwyn 
Commission had recommended a differential of 1: 1.6 but this 
represented a differential of only 1: 1.3" If a married 
mans credit was to replace exactly his corresponding income 
1. Finance Act 1972, section 65. 
2. Finance Act 1972, section 62. 
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tax allowance it would have had to be set at £4.46 a week, 
but the Green Paper proposed a limit of £6 which was 
clearly an improvement, not only on the existing amount 
but also on the existing differential (from 1: 1.3 to 1: 1.5) 
although the differential was not raised quite as high as 
had been recommended by the Colwyn Commission (1: 1.6). At 
one stage it looked as if the Report would take the 
opportunity of re-thinking the basis of the married man's 
allowance. So 
"It can be argued that two people should 
not be treated differently for tax pur- 
poses because they are married... In the 
context of a tax credit system this 
argument would point to fixing the 
married credit at twice the single credit. 
It would follow from this that the wife's 
earned income relief would disappear". l 
The Report concludes that this would not be 
desirable for three reasons; first, the married couple 
where the wife is at home would show a large relative gain; 
secondly, the withdrawal of the wife's earned income relief 
would be a disincentive to married women to seek work; and 
finally, the withdrawal of the wife's earned income relief 
would not recognise the decreased taxable capacity, of two- 
earner couples. 
It may be useful at this stage to analyse these 
three stated reasons for not giving a wife a full personal 
allowance. 
(a) Relative gain for wife at home. It is agreed that the 
doubling of the single person's tax credit (or tax allowance) 
for a married couple would give a large relative gain for 
the wife-at home but, as is stated in the Green Paper: - 
1. Paragraph 77. 
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"Married couples when the wife is unable 
to work because of young children... 
tend to be less affluent than married 
couples both of whom are able to work". l 
The same would, of course, apply to a married couple 
without children if the wife was unable to work because of 
ill-health, say, or because caring for a disabled relative. 
(b) Disincentive for married women to seek work. The Green 
Paper anticipates that the double tax credit would always be 
given to the husband and that a working wife would receive 
no credit at all : such an arrangement would be a disin- 
centive to married women to seek work. But it would be 
fairer to give a tax credit each to both husband and wife 
so that if a wife had earnings she could utilise her own 
tax credit and if she had no earnings it would be utilised 
by her husband. There would then be no disincentive to the 
acceptance of employment by a wife; although the husband 
would then lose his use of her credit, her income would 
strengthen the family's finances. 
(c) Recognition of extra expenses of wife working. The Green 
Paper says that the withdrawal of the wife's earned income 
relief would not recognise that: - 
n 
"where both husband and wife work additional 
expense is often incurred e. g. on domestic 
duties otherwise undertaken by the wife and 
it is fair to regard their taxable capacity 
as less than that of a couple with the same 
total income which is earned entirely by the 
husband". 
It has been noted above2 that the argument of 
the decreased taxable capacity of a two-earner couple is 
not considered to be well founded : in particular the 
1. Paragraph 81. 
2. Page 474. 
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reference here to the fact that the taxable capacity of a 
two-earner couple is less than that of a couple with the 
same total income which is earned entirely by the husband 
fails to consider the taxable capacity of a two-earner 
couple with twice the total income of a couple where all 
the income is earned by the husband. However, these three 
arguments were used in the Green Paper to maintain the 
"less than twice" rule for the personal allowances of a 
married couple with a non-earning wife. 
(3) Wife's earnings allowance 
The Green Paper recommended the retention of the 
wife's earnings allowance, not as a tax credit, but 
anomalously, as a continuing tax allowance, "in order to 
recognise the two arguments of incentives and additional 
expenses". The allowance in 1972 would have been worth 
£3.43 a week which was less than the proposed single 
person's credit of £4. 
Thus was the opportunity for rationalising the 
allowances lost but the Report is of interest as it does 
consider the possibility of a married couple being entitled 
to twice the credits of a single person, even though the 
suggestion is not adopted. 
8.1975 and 1978 - MacDonald and Meade 
The future of the personal allowances under an 
individual basis of taxation was discussed by Mr. Graeme 
MacDonald at the lecture given to the Institute for Fiscal 
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Studies on 10th December 1975.1 Mr. MacDonald's lecture 
is of interest as he subsequently became a member of the 
Meade Committee and no doubt contributed to the 
recommendations in that Committee's Report. 
MacDonald viewed the additional allowance given 
to a married man as "representing in some degree the loss 
in discretionary income occasioned by the need to support 
two individuals". He agreed that under an individual basis 
of taxation the married man's allowance would be abolished 
but appears to assume that this would be replaced by one 
single person's allowance only with the 'retention of the 
wife's earnings allowance if the wife has earnings. This 
raises the question of how relief is to be given where a 
spouse cares for children and the conclusion is reached 
that, because of the difficulty of defining deserving 
cases, the married allowance would have to be retained but 
only where the wife has no earnings; it is "over generous" 
to give. the married allowance in addition to the wifets 
earnings allowance. 
Now these conclusions fail to appreciate that, on 
an individual basis, a wife would be entitled to a single 
person's allowance in her own right, to set against earned 
or unearned income or income transferred to her by her 
husband; 2 but by the time the Meade Committee3 had reported 
these possibilities had been appreciated and discussed. 
The only point upon which the Meade Committee 
1. Taxation and the Family Unit - Institute for Fiscal 
Studies. 
2. For a discussion of transferred income see page 614 post. 
3. The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation 1978. 
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made a firm recommendation was that of the abolition of 
the married man's allowance where the wife has-earnings: - 
"The fact that with this system the great 
majority of married couples in which both 
partners are working enjoy a married 
allowance plus a single personal allowance 
is open to a number of objections. It 
means that by marriage two wage earners 
can reduce their total tax liability... 
It is also costly in revenue". 
The Committee concludes that: - 
"We all agree that the present arrangement 
by which, when both husband and wife are 
earning, the couple can enjoy both the 
married man's allowance and a single per- 
son's 'allowance against the wife's earnings 
is unsatisfactory and that where a personal 
allowance is claimed against the wife's- 
earnings the husband should enjoy only a 
single person's allowance". 
The Report then discusses no less than seven 
different proposals for reform, all based on the disappearance 
of the married mans allowance. 
The first modification proposed is simply to remove 
the married man's allowance where the wife has earnings. The 
second (radical) modification proposes the removal of the 
married man's allowance in all cases, whether the wife has 
earnings or not, coupled with a new "home responsibility 
payment" where a : spouse stays at home to care for children 
or dependants. But immediately this raises the problem of 
older spouses who have cared for children for a number of 
years but not returned to work; here again is the difficulty 
of defining deserving cases raised by MacDonald' and the 
conclusion is reached that "some form of married allowance" 
would have to be retained, possibly depending on age and/ 
or past home responsibilities. 
1. See page 481 above. 
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Meade justifies the retention of the wife's 
earnings allowance by reference to the "additional expenses" 
argument originally mentioned in the Radcliffe Report, and 
again in the Green Paper on the Tax Credit System; 
2 Meade 
says: - 
"Thus, between two families with the same 
total of earned income the family in which 
the income was due to the earnings of both 
partners would be more leniently treated 
than the family in which the same total 
income was earned by only one of the partners. 
But this might be regarded as a suitable 
recognition of the fact that there could be 
more expenses... in the case of the former 
family". 
The Report fails, however, to appreciate that the 
retention of a wife ts earnings allowance, coupled with the 
abolition of the married man's allowance, would also result 
in more lenient treatment being given to a two earner 
family with twice the income of a one-earner family. 
The third proposal for reform suggested by the 
Meade-Committee is the adoption of an individual basis; 
here the proposal is that each spouse would have a single 
personal allowance and'a spouse at home caring for children 
would have a "home responsibility payment"; the problem of 
the no-income spouse who has completed the years of child 
care is raised but not answered. Although, in theory, 
under an individual basis each spouse should have a personal 
allowance to set against all income, earned, unearned or 
transferred, 3 Meade thinks this is too generous; although 
1. See page 474 above. 
2. See page 479 above. 
3. For a discussion of transferred income see page 614-post. 
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the concept is acceptable in the context of earned income - 
"in the case of investment income it may 
seem anomalous that the tax burden of a 
family which does in fact share the use 
of the joint income should depend upon 
the accident of the division of its 
ownership within the family". 
It is also pointed out that - 
"if the individual basis were adopted for 
the tax unit the transfer of unearned 
income from the partner with income to 
the partner without income would, up to 
the limit of a second full personal 
allowance, attract complete relief from 
tax"' 
In order to counteract this, the suggestion is 
made that all personal allowances should be available only 
against earned income, or at least for taxpayers under 45. 
But this solution would affect all taxpayers and would 
deprive married women from using their personal allowances 
against their own investment income; if transfers of income 
are to be discouraged, a better method would be to enact 
specific anti-avoidance provisions. 
The fourth proposal (partial income splitting) 
would involve the application of the individual basis to 
earned income but that - 
"the joint investment income of a married 
couple should, for tax purposes, be treated 
as if it accrued in equal halves to each 
partner". 
However, it is clear that such an arrangement 
would immediately benefit a non-income wife who would 
then be able to utilise her single personal allowance against 
her half of accrued investment income, so once again the 
suggestion is made that personal allowances for all persons 
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be available only against earned income, at least for 
taxpayers under 45 years of age. 
The fifth system proposed (the unrestricted 
quotient system) would divide all the joint income, earned 
and unearned, between the spouses. 
"with this system... one half of the total 
joint income (whether earned income or 
investment income) of the two partners is 
allotted to each partner who enjoys a single 
person's tax allowance and is subject to a 
single person's progressive tax schedule". 
However, this system is said to have "very serious 
objections". It gives to every married couple two personal 
allowances - this is very expensive in revenue and 
"it makes no allowance at all for the fact 
that by sharing household expenses a 
married couple can probably live more 
cheaply than two single adults". 
The fact is, of course, that a married couple 
sharing household expenses cannot live more cheaply than 
two single adults sharing household expenses and, further, 
that two single adults sharing household expenses can live 
more cheaply than a married couple living in separate house- 
holds. This logical fallacy has been discussed more fully 
in Chapter 7.1 A more persuasive objection to complete 
income splitting is that it can blunt the incentives for' 
a married woman to seek work: - 
"If a man is earning more than enough to 
account for two personal tax allowances 
the splitting of his earnings between 
himself and his wife will exhaust the 
wife's personal allowance so that, if she 
goes out to work, she will be taxed on 
the whole of her earnings". 
1. See page 321 ante. 
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This disincentive effect is discussed at page 
above - there is no disincentive for a married woman in 
such a case as she gets a full personal allowance but the 
husband does lose his additional allowance; on the other 
hand the wife's income then strengthens the family's 
finances. 
The sixth proposal (the restrictive quotient 
system) suggests the aggregation of all the joint income 
against which only one single personal allowance is given 
with another allowance only against the wife's earnings : 
the remainder of the income is taxed on a progressive scale 
one and a half times as broad as that-for a single person : 
although such a proposal would alieviate the disadvantages 
of-aggregation for high income couples, it would still not 
produce equity for moderate income couples where'the wife 
has her own'investment income. 
The final proposal (a partial quotient system) is 
to permit separate assessment for earnings but joint assess- 
ment with a quotient of 1.5 for investment income. 
Apart, therefore, from recommending the removal 
of the married man's allowance where a wife has earnings 
the Meade Report reaches no conclusion as to the correct 
way of allocating allowances for a non-earning wife. How- 
ever, underlying all of the alternatives proposed is the 
view that a full personal allowance for a non-earning wife 
would be "open to serious objections". 
The Report appears to favour the replacement of 
the married man's allowance with a "home responsibility 
payment" but recognises the difficulty of defining the 
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circumstances in which this should be paid and concludes 
that-some married relief should be retained. The Report 
is also. clear that a wife should not be permitted to use 
a full single person's allowance against her unearned 
income and, to avoid this, goes as far as to suggest 
that all personal allowances should be available only 
against earned income, at least for taxpayers under 45 
years of age. 
9.1977-79. The Campaign for Reform, 
_ 
It has been mentioned in Chapter 8 that, although 
the consultative document published by the Equal Opportunities 
Commission1 mentioned a number of complaints which had been 
received, most concerned the principle. of accountability. 
One complaint did concern allowances and that referred to 
the fact that it was in practice very difficult to. persuade 
the tax office to give a wife the full benefit of allowances 
due - 
"where the woman is employed and the man is not". 
In this case 
"the woman can set against her income not 
only the wif ets earned income allowance 
but also the married man's allowance" 
but "it is not always easy to ensure that the wife receives 
the full benefit of the husband's tax allowances". 
Although, therefore, the subject of allowances 
had given rise to little complaint, the consultative 
document acknowledged that these would have to be considered 
1. Income Tax and Sex Discrimination - December 1977. 
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if each spouse was to be treated as an individual. The 
document does not specifically recommend the abolition 
of the aggregation and accountability rules but this can 
be implied in some of the options for change discussed. 
Before looking at the options proposed it is 
interesting to note that the simplest solution of all is 
not mentioned. It is not appreciated that if the aggregation 
rule were abolished every wife would become automatically 
entitled to a single person's allowance in her own right 
to use against any income earned, unearned or transferred. 
l 
The only reason why this cannot be done at the moment is 
that under the provisions of section 8 Taxes Act 1970 the 
personal allowances are only given to a "claimant" and 
because of section 37 a married woman cannot be a "claimant", 
unless she exercises the option for separate assessment 
under section 38 in which case the allowances are allocated 
as mentioned in that section. If section 37 were repealed 
all married women would become "claimants" in their own 
right; nil or low income claimants (most usually students 
or old persons) can utilise their personal allowances against 
transferredl income and this procedure would automatically 
become available to married women also. 
The consultative document proceeds on the basis 
that the higher married man's allowance would be abolished 
and discusses three ways (the options for change) in which 
the resulting revenue yield would be distributed, namely, 
the individual basis, the quotient basis, and the cash 
payments basis. 
1. The concept of transferred income is considered more 
fully in Part IV. See page 614 post. 
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(1) The individual basis 
This first option anticipates that husband and 
wife would each have a single personal allowance for use 
against either earned or unearned income. But the with- 
drawal of the married man's allowance would mean that the 
majority of married couples (i. e. two-earner couples) would 
pay more tax. This saving could be utilised in one of three 
ways. First, by raising the single person's allowance; the 
disadvantage of this proposal is that it would benefit two- 
earner couples (especially high earner couples who would no 
longer lose allowances by opting for separate taxation of 
wife's earnings) and give no assistance for a wife at home. 
So the second suggestion would be to introduce a new tax 
allowance for a spouse with home responsibilities. But 
again the definition of "home responsibilities" creates 
the difficulties previously outlined by MacDonald and' 
Meadel so the suggestion is made that this allowance might 
also be available to spouses over a certain age. But this 
second alternative would be of no assistance to a two- 
earner couple with dependant children so the third 
suggestion proposes a new additional allowance for two- 
earner couples with children in addition to their two single 
personal allowances. 
These three alternatives to the individual basis 
illustrate the complexities which arise when a personal 
allowance is given not for being a person but for per- 
forming "home responsibilities"; immediately the phrase 
itself is difficult to define but then it becomes--necessary 
1. See page 483 above. 
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also to consider a two-earner couple with 'home respon- 
sibilitie s" . 
The inapplicability of the requirement of 
"home responsibilities" is illustrated by the dilemma of 
the treatment of a wife with unearned income : if such a 
wife is permitted to use her single person's allowance 
against her unearned income without any home responsibilities 
then she is given an unfair advantage over a wife with no 
unearned income; on the other hand if she is not per- 
mitted to use her own allowance against her own unearned 
income if she has no home responsibilities she is 
immediately placed at a disadvantage compared with all 
other taxpayers who are not married women. The importation 
of a requirement of "home responsibilities" as a condition 
for a personal allowance for married women only, and not 
for any other taxpayer, is bound to produce inequitable 
results. 
(Z) The quotient basis 
The second option proposed in the consultative 
document adopts the quotient basis for the personal allowances 
this gives each spouse a personal allowance to offset against 
either his own or his spouse's income. Although this 
solution solves the problem of the nil-income wife it does 
so at the expense of a system of joint accounting. However 
the proposal has much in common with the suggestions which 
will be considered in Part IV of this thesis. 
1. See page 585 post. 
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(3) The cash payment basis 
The advantages of the individual basis and the 
quotient basis can only be enjoyed when the spouses have 
sufficient income to support the allowances given : the 
third option therefore proposes that the revenue saved 
from the abolition of: the married man's allowance should 
be paid 
_in 
the form of a cash payment either as an increase 
in child benefit or as a home responsibility payment. But - 
"The disadvantages of a cash payment to the 
partner at home is that, in most cases, it 
reduces a married man's take-home pay and 
transfers money to the wife... The political 
repercussions of having married men pay more 
tax, at a time when Government was trying to 
hold down wages, led to the modification in 
1976 of the child benefit scheme". 
So an alternative suggestion, which would minimise these 
political repercussions, is to: - 
"combine a tax allowance to a married person 
who is the sole breadwinner with a cash 
payment... (thus) some of the cash made 
available by withdrawing the married man's 
allowance could go towards the poorest 
families who would benefit from a cash 
payment but not a tax allowance". 
The response received to the consultative documentl 
appears to indicate. that of 78 persons and organisations 
expressing an opinion on the three options, 35 preferred the 
individual basis, 20 the quotient basis and 23 the cash 
payment basis. 
2 On the other hand the document itself 
states that "there was a narrow majority in favour of cash 
benefits" although "this was an issue on which opinion was 
deeply divided" and "the evidence... is not conclusive and 
1. "With all my worldly goods... " 
2. Table 3 Appendix A. 
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this area ... will require much detailed investigation". 
The advantages of cash benefits were seen as the 
improved status of a person caring for dependants, the 
benefit to families without taxable income, and the fact 
that the benefit was enjoyed by the spouse with home res- 
ponsibilities (whereas the benefit of a tax allowance is 
of course enjoyed by the spouse with the income). 
Although there was no clear cut preference, 
therefore, for any of the options proposed, on one point 
a decisive view was expressed: - 
"The response indicated very decisively that 
there was little or no support for retaining 
the married man's allowance on the present 
basis". 
The method of dealing with the allowances under 
a reformed system was next discussed in the Green Paper 
on the Taxation of Husband and Wife. 
l 
10.1980 - The Green Paper 
Before looking at methods for the reform of the 
present system the Green Paper helpfully summarised the 
basis of the existing allowances. On the subject of the 
basis of the personal allowances generally it said that: - 
"Their purpose is to recognise that, because 
of varying circumstances and family respon- 
sibilities, people whose incomes are the same 
may not be equally able to pay tax on them. 
They are not intended to reflect actual 
expenditure; as that can vary widely between 
households of the same size, but serve to 
graduate the personal tax burden broadly 
according to family circumstances". 2 
1. C=d 8053. 
2. Paragraph 13. 
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The basis of the married man's allowance is dis- 
cussed and it is appreciated that this raises the question 
as to whether the present differential of between 50 and 60 
per cent is about right. 
I This is justified, however, on 
the grounds that although: - 
"the married man's allowance is essentially an 
allowance for two people... it has always been 
less than twice the single allowance, since the 
expenses of two married people sharing one 
household are considered less than those of two 
single people sharing the same household". 2 
Now the logical fallacy of the 'household' test 
has been discussed in Chapter 7,3 but in any event this has 
never been used to explain the basis of the married man's 
allowance. Initially the allowance was introduced to 
equate a wife with a child and was later increased following 
the Colwyn Report with "regard to the ability to pay". 
The Green Paper gives details of the gaps between 
the single and married allowances over the years since their 
introduction : the gap has ranged from 1: 1.3 to 1: 1.8 but 
recently stabilised at about 1: 1.6. The Report recognises 
however that 
"in recent years there have been suggestions 
that the married allowance for one-earner 
couples should be increased to the equivalent 
of the allowances given to two single persons"-4 
But the grounds for this proposal are not the recognition 
of a married woman as a person but the encouragement of a 
mother to stay at home with her children and that then raises 
1. Paragraph 4a. 
2. Paragraph 14. 
3. See page 321 ante. 
4. Paragraph 36. 
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the question of what treatment is appropriate for women 
without children who do not work. So - 
"The obvious answer to those who want more 
encouragement for family life in its 
traditional form would be to award the 
equivalent of two single allowances to all 
one-earner couples. But this would be 
objectionable to those who maintain that 
only families where the non-working wife 
has specific home responsibilities should 
qualify for additional tax relief". 1 
The basis of the wife's earnings allowance is discussed in 
this way: -2 
"During the last war it was increased to 
the same level as the single allowance 
specifically to encourage married women 
to remain in employment in the public 
interest. It has remained at that level 
ever since partly because it has not been 
felt appropriate to remove the incentive 
for married women to work, and partly 
because it is administratively convenient 
for the wife's earned income allowance to 
be the same amount". 
The main criticism of the wife's earned income allowance is 
noted to be: - 
"As long ago as 1954 the Royal Commission on 
the Taxation of Profits and Income concluded 
that the present arrangements were over- 
generous to two-earner couples because they 
gave them greater relief than two single 
earners. Their proposed solution was to 
restrict the wife's earned income allowance 
but it is now commonly argued that it is the 
continued entitlement of the husband to a 
full married mants allowance, while his wife 
is enjoying the equivalent of a full single 
allowance, which creates the imbalance bet- 
ween two-earner couples and others. 11 
The Green Paper discusses the future of the per- 
sonal allowances for married couples and these can be 
I. Paragraph 39. 
2. Paragraph 15. 
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considered within the context of its five different 
proposals for reform mentioned in Chapters 7 and 8.1 The 
first two suggestions for reform (joint taxation and a re- 
wording of the aggregation rule) make no mention of the 
future of the allowances. The third proposal is that of 
an option for independent taxation as an alternative to 
the existing system; if such an option were exercised a 
wife would obtain her own single person's allowance for 
use against her earned or unearned income and the husband 
would lose the married man's allowance; the disadvantages 
of this system are that it requires the exercise of an 
option by both spouses and whereas a wife with unearned 
income would gain from its exercise her husband would lose 
and may not therefore be inclined to join in the election; 
further, such an option is of no assistance at all to low 
or nil income wives. The fourth proposal (for independent 
taxation with equal split of allowances) is similar to the 
present option for separate assessment but with all the 
allowances split equally and not in proportion to income. 
Again, this is put forward as an option, albeit exercise- 
able by either spouse, as it would not assist all tax- 
payers : in particular it would not assist a nil - or low- 
earning wife to obtain a personal allowance of her own; 
although it would give her a proportion of her husband's 
married man's allowance this would be of no value if sl)e 
had insufficient income against which it could be set; 
and even where she did have sufficient income her husband 
might not be pleased to lose a part of his personal 
allowance in this way. 
1. See pages 411 and 415 ante. 
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The fifth proposal for reform in the Green Paper 
is for mandatory independent taxation. Here: - 
"Proponents of a system of independent 
taxation must face the question of 
providing for the case where one spouse 
has little or no income so that he or 
she cannot use, or fully use, the single 
allowance". 
The solution proposed in the Green Paper is not 
to give a supported spouse an allowance in her own right 
to use against income transferred to her but to provide 
a machinery for the supported spouse to transfer her or 
his allowance to her husband or wife. This is another way 
of proposing the extension of the concept of the existing 
married man's allowance in those cases where the wife or 
husband has little or no income, as is clear from the 
reasoning underlying the proposal, namely: - 
"There is clearly a strong case for such a 
provision (i. e. an allowance higher than 
the single allowance) on grounds of equity. 
In the present system the married allowance 
recognises the special legal and moral 
obligations on a husband to support his wife. 
In recent years the tendency has been for 
these obligations to become reciprocal. All 
this suggests that with the abolition of the 
married allowance, some allowance in excess 
of the single allowance is needed in 
recognition of the support the one spouse 
gives to the other out of his or her own 
income... In so far as the need to support 
the dependant spouse, reduces taxable capacity, 
then tax relief should be increased to take 
account of it". 
Although the Green Paper appears to accept the 
principle of a married couple's entitlement to two single 
allowances this could only be achieved if the allowance of 
the supported spouse was fully transferable. A fully 
transferable allowance would, of course-, bring advantages 
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to the husband of a wife at home as instead of the-present 
married man's allowance of 1.6 of a single allowance he 
would receive two single allowances but the Green Paper 
appears to think that this would then operate as a disin- 
centive to wives to enter paid employment. The disincentive 
argument is discussed' at page 479 above - such a system is 
no disincentive to wives who lose nothing by taking up 
employment although their husbands do. A stronger 
objection to a fully transferable allowance is the fact 
that it means that privacy cannot be maintained as the 
transferee spouse requires details of the transferor spouse's 
income and the present objections of wives to disclosing 
small amounts of income on savings to husbands will not be 
met. 
l 
To meet these difficulties a partially transferable 
allowance is suggested; although no fixed limit is suggested 
for the part of the supported spouse's allowance which can be 
transferred, it is thought that such a limit could be 
flexible and varied 
"according to the view taken of the reduction 
in taxable capacity arising from the need to 
support two married persons on one income". 
The arguments in favour of a partially trans- 
ferable allowance are that it would reduce the disincentive 
to married women to work2 and would mean less invasion of 
privacy so that a married woman with a small unearned income 
would not be required to declare this_. to, her husband if it 
fell within the non-transferable part of her allowance. The 
1. See Chapter 8 above. 
2. The 'disincentive' argument is discussed at page 479 above. 
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Green Paper discusses the question previously raised by 
MacDonald, Meade, and the Tax Credit Green Paper, namely 
as to whether the transferable allowance (either full or 
partial) should be conditional on the transferring spouse 
carrying out "home responsibilities" :- 
"It could be argued that the circumstances 
where one partner has no family respon- 
sibilities but does not work should not 
be reflected in the tax bill of the 
partner with the income and that there 
should be no allowance unless the non- 
working spouse had specific home 
responsibilities". l 
But once again there are problems of definition and - 
"one would be likely to find that on the 
merits few cases would fall into the 
'restricted (i. e. no home responsibilities) 
category". 
So the conclusion is reached that 
"On fiscal grounds, the case for an 
unrestricted allowance is strong. 
Likewise administrative considerations 
would point this way since restrictions 
would inevitably introduce complexity. 
And, if on the merits the majority of 
supported spouses would fall outside the 
restriction it seems doubtful whether, 
even on social grounds,. there is a good 
case for it". 
Finally, the Green Paper discusses the alternative 
of a cash payment to a supported spouse, to take the place 
of the tax allowance to the supporting spouse; this proposal 
2 
was originally raised in the Meade Report and developed as 
Option 3 in the Consultative Document issued by the 
1. Paragraph 76. 
2. See page 483 above. 
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Equal Opportunities Commission in December 1977.1 The 
two advantages mentioned in the latter document are 
repeated in the Green Paper, namely that the money goes 
directly to the person undertaking the home responsibilities 
and such benefits are available to families below the level 
of the tax threshold. But once again the political 
difficulties mentioned by the Equal Opportunities Commission 
are noted namely that: - 
"with the abolition of the married allowance 
married men might be even more inclined to 
regard themselves as "losers". 1 
The Green Paper concludes that the arguments 
against cash payments are "very weighty" :- 
"and it follows from this that, if the 
married man's tax allowance is to be, 
abolished, there is a very strong case 
for replacing it with a transferable 
tax allowance along the lines examined 
... above". 
11. Conclusions 
A review of the allowances available to a married 
couple shows that they consist of a patchwork of anomalies 
resulting from the continuation of the historical fiction 
that a married woman is not a person in her own right. The 
first anomaly (that of the additional exemption for wife's 
earnings enacted in 1894) had its roots in the injustice 
caused by the aggregation rule but its limitation to the 
case where the wife had earnings created an imbalance 
between those cases where a wife had no earnings or had 
1. See page 491 above. Paragraph 84. 
500 
investment income. This was corrected by the "wife 
allowance" in 1918 which was again introduced to remedy 
the injustice of the aggregation rule but which immediately 
created the anomaly that some two-earner couples had better 
tax treatment than two single persons. This imbalance was 
corrected by the Colwyn Commission which restored the total 
allowances available to a married couple to the equivalent 
of two single allowances but, by restricting the amount 
available against a wife's earnings, immediately created 
another imbalance namely between the earnings of a married 
woman on the one hand and the earnings of 'a single woman 
on the other. This was corrected in 1942 when all women 
who had earnings were treated in the same way but as no 
adjustment was made to the married man's allowance the old 
anomaly of the better treatment of two-earner married 
couple was revived. (Throughout this time, it will be borne 
in mind, that all the allowances, including those for wives' 
earnings, were given-to the husband). 
Although both Colwyn and Radcliffe saw the source 
of the anomalous treatment of married couples' allowances 
as the special allowance for wives' earnings recent opinion 
sees it in the retention of the married man's allowance and 
there appears to be some support for its abolition 
accompanied by a number of proposals for a new treatment for 
a nil- or low-earning wife : these fall into three broad 
categories, namely an additional allowance for the 
supporting spouse, or a cash payment to the supported spouse, 
or some system of sharing allowances between the spouses. 
However, it does not appear to be generally appreciated that 
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if the aggregation rule were to be abolished each married 
woman would become a taxpayer in her own right and so 
entitled to use her personal allowance against trans- 
ferred income. ' 
The history of the allowances points to the 
inevitable conclusion that it is not possible to preserve 
equity between couples and equity between individuals 
unless each spouse is treated as an individual taxpayer in 
all respects but here it may be noted that this would 
necessarily involve the abolition of the married man's 
allowance and there appears to be considerable "political 
difficulties" involved in such a step as, in 1982-83, such 
a reform would mean that a married man paying tax at the 
standard rate would have his take home pay reduced by 
£5.07 per week. And it is thought that it is this simple 
fact which is now delaying the complete reform of the 
taxation of husband and wife. 
1. See further discussion in Chapter 16 page 614 post. 
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CHAPTER 10 
A COMPARISON OF MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAWS 
Part III of this thesis examines the way in which 
the family is taxed in a. number of overseas jurisdictions. 
There are at least twol most helpful modern studies which 
contain a factual analysis of the tax treatment of the 
family unit in specified foreign countries but these studies 
are of the contemporary position only and they do not shed 
any light on the reasons why different countries have 
established different systems for dealing with the same 
social phenomena. 
It is true that the actual tax paid by a family 
unit will not depend solely on the system under which it 
is assessed but will depend upon a combination of rates 
allowances and credits : in other words the mere presence 
or absence of an aggregation rule is not conclusive in 
1. See "The treatment of family units in OECD member 
countries under tax and transfer systems" OECD Paris 
1977 and Background Paper 4 to the Green Paper on 
Taxation of Husband and Wife - International Comparisons 
1981. 
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determining whether a particular system is or is not 
advantageous to the family as the negative effects of 
aggregation can be neutralised by favourable rate 
schedules (the quotient system) or by favourable allowances 
or credits. However, the objective of this thesis is to 
determine a method of taxing the family unit in the United 
Kingdom and it is thought that this must commence by 
ascertaining the correct structure of the tax before 
imposing on that structure a system of rates and allowances; 
accordingly, this examination of the tax systems in over- 
seas jurisdictions will concentrate on the structure of the 
tax although a reference will be made in each case to the 
method of dealing with the allowances. 
It is hoped that the preceding Chapters of this 
thesis have demonstrated that the tax treatment of the 
family unit in the United Kingdom is closely bound up with 
the development of the law concerning the proprietary 
rights and the contractual capacity of married women and 
that many of the unsatisfactory aspects of the present tax 
laws arise from the fact that they have failed to keep pace 
with developments in property law and in the law of con- 
tractual capacity. This consideration of the tax treatment 
of the family unit in foreign jurisdictions will, therefore, 
be undertaken against a background of the development of 
the laws of property and contractual capacity as they 
affect married women. - 
Before undertaking these comparisons, however, it 
may be helpful to summarise very briefly the ancient legal 
sources which have led to the development of these systems 
as they exist today. Unfortunately, this must be a very 
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abbreviated summary of a fascinating area of law as - 
"A first glance at the province of law 
which English lawyers know as that of 
Husband and Wife ... will, if we do not 
confine our view within the limits of 
our own system, amaze and bewilder us". l 
and - 
"The status of the married woman is one 
of the most difficult of all the prob- 
lems of private law and to it legal 
systems have given, and still give, the 
most diverse answers... It is obvious that 
the answer will be coloured by prevailing 
views as to the constitution of the family 
... It is not surprising that to a problem 
so delicate, so many, sided, and com- 
plicated by so many varying ideas, new 
and old, as to the nature of the family 
and the conception of marriage, there 
should have been many different answers". 2 
From these "many different answers" three major 
strands have predominated; first, the supremacy of the 
husband; second a system of joint, or community,, property; 
and finally the individual system. As Maine has said, 
the history of developing societies shows a move from 
3 
status to contract and this is illustrated by the treat- 
ment of married women where the more primitive systems of 
supremacy of husband and community of property have given 
way to the treatment of a woman as an individual. A 
similar development took place in Roman law. 
Originally, in Roman law4 -marriage was a 
patriarchal system and a wife stood ii manu mariti when 
1. Pollock and Maitland :A History of English Law : 2nd 
Edition 1898 Vol-II P. 399. 
2. W. S. Holdsworth 
_: 
A History, of English Law :, Vol. II 
p. 387. 
3. Sir Henry Maine; Ancient Law. 
4. Schulz: Principles of Roman Law. 
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"she was incapable of having any property 
of her own; all property which she 
possessed during marriage, and that which 
she acquired later, was automatically 
acquired by her husband". 
However, in the second century BC leading Roman 
society refused to conclude marriages with manu and 
"the humanistic aim of putting husband 
and wife on a par was radically carried 
th=ough. Wife and husband alike remained 
the owners of their respective property... 
in short, it is the system of separation 
of goods, which is, since 1882, the English 
system". 1 
The Roman lawyers at no time adopted a system of community 
of property - 
"The keen individualism of the Roman 
lawyers had no sympathy with matri- 
monial community of any kind". 
The development of Roman Law from a patriarchal 
to an individual system has been assessed in this way: - 
"The classical law of marriage is an 
imposing, perhaps the most imposing 
achievement of the Roman legal genius 
For the first time in the history of 
civilisation there appeared a purely 
humanistic law of marriage, ... as being 
... of two equal partners"., 
Unfortunately, Roman Law was abandoned in Western 
Europe in the Middle Ages and it took the law of England 
nearly two millennia to arrive at the same stage of develop- 
ment; the fact that such development has not yet been 
finally completed is the reason for this thesis. 
However, if we return to the Middle Ages - 
1. Schulz; Classical Roman Law. 
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"we see a perplexed variety of customs 
. 
(concerning husband and wife) for which 
it is very difficult to account... For 
the most part we shall be able to trace 
them back to ancient Germanic usages 
since the Roman Law of husband and wife 
has kept itself aloof and refused to mix 
with alien customs. However, the number 
of schemes of marital property law seems 
almost infinite... "1 
From this "infinite number" two schemes soon dominate. In 
the Middle Ages - 
"the idea of a community of goods between 
husband and wife springs up in many parts 
of Europe from Ireland to Portugal" 
but - 
"our own law at an early time took a 
decisive step - it rejected the idea 
of community". 
Two reasons are given for this preference by the 
English legal system of the doctrine of the supremacy of 
the husband. First, about the year 1200 all jurisdiction 
over movables passed to the church and 
"the canonists' conception of marriage as 
a sacrament... makes the husband and wife 
one flesh and gives the husband dominion 
over the wife". 
Secondly, the system of community of goods was 
a custom of the lower orders and the merchants; in France 
this custom spread upwards to the nobility but in England 
the reverse occurred; in England - 
"The common law made the law of the nobles 
the law of all : community was the law of 
merchants not nobles. This lived on in 
some borough customs which treated the 
woman who carried on a trade apart from her 
husband as, in some aspects, independent but 
otherwise the system of community is abandoned" .2 
1. Pollock and Maitland. 
2. Holdsworth. 
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So, taking a broad view of the systems in 
Western Europe two main regimes dominate namely regimes 
which recognise a system of community of ownership between 
husband and wife and those which do not. It will not come 
as a surprise to find that the income tax treatment of 
husband and wife also differs in a similar way. 
Chapter 11 will consider developments in some 
common law jurisdictions where there is no community of 
property and Chapter 12 will consider developments in the 
civil law jurisdictions where community of property still 
exists. 
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1. Introductory 
A study of the common law jurisdictions is most 
illuminating : each imported English common law but each 
has developed along a separate path to the state where each 
now treats husband and wife as separate individuals for 
income tax purposes. The position at common law in 1765 
can be summarised in the words of Blackstone1 :- 
"By marriage the husband and wife are one 
person in law. That is, the very being or 
legal existence of the woman is suspended 
during marriage or at least is incorporated 
or consolidated into that of the husband, 
under whose wing, protection or cover she 
performs everything, and is therefore called 
in our law - french a feme-covert ... and her 
condition during her marriage is called her 
coverture. Upon this principle of union of 
person in husband and wife depend almost all 
the legal rights duties and disabilities 
that either of them acquire by the marriage". 
1. Commentaries on the Laws of England 1765. William 
Blackstone, Book 1, page 430. 
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Among these disabilities are the fact that all 
the wife's personal property vests absolutely in the hus- 
band on marriage and in real estate he gains title to the 
rents and profits during coverture. Also - 
"During the marriage the husband is, in 
effect, liable to the whole extent of his 
property for debts incurred... by his wife 
... 
(and) 
... During 'the marriage the wife 
cannot contract on her own behalf". 1 
This, then, is the basis of the law exported to 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Republic of Ireland. 
It is most interesting to see how each country developed it 
in a different way. 
2. Australia 
(1) Constitutional development 
(2) Matrimonial property 
(3) 1901 Constitution 
(4) 1915 Income Tax Act 
5) Tax Avoidance 
6) Capital Taxes 
(7) Children 
(1) Constitutional development 
The first Australian state to be settled was New 
South Wales in 1788,2 the others being settled later. 
Although it was generally assumed that the law of England 
applied, this was specifically enacted in 1828 in this way3: - 
"All laws in force within the realm of 
England on July 25th 1828 should be 
applied in the administration of justice 
in the courts of New South Wales and VanDiemen's 
land respectively". 
1. Pollock & Maitland p. 405. 
2. The British Commonwealth : General Editor G. W. Paton. 
3.9 Geo 4 C. 83 section 24. Statutes at Large, Volume 68, 
page 569. 
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Each state was, however, an independent sovereignty 
subject only to the overriding powers of the Imperial 
Parliament and to the doctrine that there was no power to 
pass laws which were repugnant to the laws of England. The 
fact that there are six independent states makes it 
difficult to generalise about Australian law : in spite of 
a desire that the statute law of each state should be as 
uniform with that of England as local policy allows, there 
has been little deliberate attempt to keep statutes uniform 
as between different states and even in following English 
law there is sometimes a considerable time lag. 
(2) Matrimonial property 
These discrepancies are very well illustrated by 
the law of real property and, in particular, by the Married 
Womens' Property legislation; there is no federal 
Australian real property law - each of the six states has 
passed its own legislation. Nevertheless, starting from 
the same basis of English common law, each state has passed 
similar legislation to the English statutes and it is not 
therefore surprising that there are many similarities. So, 
following the English Married Womens' Property Act of 1882 
the states enacted similar legislation in: 1890 
(Queensland), 1892 (Western Australia), 1884 (Tasmania) s 
1893 (New South Wales), and (1898) Southern Australia. 
The lack of complete uniformity is however illustrated by 
the fact that the restraint on-anticipation, which was 
abolished in England in 1949, is still in force in New 
South Wales. 
513 
(3) 1901 Constitution 
The Commonwealth of Australia was established in 
1901 by the Commonwealth of Australia Constitutions Act 
and by that time, of course, the principle of separate 
property was well established in all the states. In the 
Commonwealth Act the legislative powers of the Commonwealth 
were specifically enumerated, the remainder being. left with 
the individual states. So whereas real property law was 
left to the individual states, section 81(2) of the Con- 
stitution Act gave the Commonwealth power to make laws- 
with respect to taxationI and, as a practical matter, the 
Commonwealth has acquired exclusive powers to impose income 
taxes and duties of customs and excise leaving other taxes 
(stamp duties, death duties, gift taxes) to be levied by 
the individual states. 
(4) 1915 - Income Tax Act 
Although income tax had been levied by the states 
some years previously the first Commonwealth Income Tax 
Act was passed in 1915 and from the very beginning husband 
and wife have been treated as two completely independent 
persons for income tax purposes with the result that they 
are separately assessed to tax on their respective incomes. 
This principle was reviewed as recently as 1975 by the 
Taxation Review Committee (The Asprey Committee) in its 
Report published on 31st February 1975 page 134 as follows: - 
1. Australian Federal Constitutional Law : Howard : 
2nd Edition. 
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"The adoption of a compulsory family unit 
basis must be rejected on grounds of 
general social principle. The right to 
be taxed as an individual has always been 
accorded in Australia". 
As far as the allowances are concerned there are 
no personal allowances as such but a rebate is available 
to any person who contributes towards the maintenance of 
a spouse, daughter, housekeeper, or parent. 
1 
(5) Tax avoidance 
It may be thought that, with a system of cöm- 
pletely separate taxation, some tax avoidance provisions 
would have been introduced in order to prevent income- 
splitting. Although, as we shall see, quite detailed rules 
have been enacted about children's income and tax avoidance, 
there are no general tax avoidance prohibitions concerning 
transfers between husband and wife. In general, alienation 
of income is permitted under rules corresponding to the 
covenant provisions familiar in the United Kingdom. 
The Australian tax legislation does contain a 
rather wide tax avoidance section2 which reads: - 
"Every contract, agreement, or arrangement 
entered into, orally or in writing, ... 
shall so far as it has or purports to have 
the purpose or effect of, in any way 
directly or indirectly 
(a), altering the incidence of any income tax. 
(b) relieving any person from liability to 
pay any income tax or make any return. 
(c) defeating, evading or avoiding any 
duty or liability imposed on any per- 
son by this Act or 
1. Australian Income Tax Guide 1981. E. F. Mannix & J. E. 
Mannix. 
2. Section 260 Uniform Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. 
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(d) preventing the operation of this Act 
in any respect 
be absolutely void". 
At first sight it might appear that such wide 
provisions would nullify any property or income transfers 
between spouses designed to effect income-splitting for 
tax saving and, although a number of cases' have re- 
inforced the application of the Section in a wide variety 
of cases, nevertheless in one case the taxpayer was 
successful in challenging the application of the Section 
and that case concerned transfers to a spouse and child. 
In DFLT v. Purcell2 the taxpayer owned certain 
grazing property and declared himself a trustee of it for 
himself, his wife and his daughter, reserving to himself 
wide and unusual powers of management control and invest- 
ment. He was assessed to income tax on all the income but 
objected on the ground that the income was received by him 
as trustee for himself, his wife and his daughter in equal 
shares. The court held that the appellant had intended 
that his wife and daughter should become the beneficial 
owners of two-thirds of the property and although in 
forming this intention, he was influenced to some extent 
by a desire to lessen the burden of taxation the predecessor 
of section 260 was inapplicable. The court said: - 
! 'It would be unreasonable to construe the 
section so as to include a genuine gift 
which had the incidental effect of dimin- 
ishing the donor's assets and income... 
If a person actually disposed of income- 
producing property to another so as to 
1. See Manual of The Law of Income Tax in Australia 
Ryan p. 261. 
2. (1921) 29 CLR 464. 
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reduce the burden of taxation the Act 
contemplates that the new owner should 
pay the tax". 
(6) Capital taxes 
It has been noted that whereas under statute 
the Commonwealth has exclusive power to impose duties of 
customs and excise and, as a practical matter, the 
Commonwealth has acquired exclusive power to impose 
income tax, the individual states have retained the power 
to impose other taxes, including stamp duties, and death, 
estate and gift duties. 
' There is also Commonwealth 
estate duty enacted in the Estate Duty Assessment Act 
1914-1967. The only provisions which specifically affect 
spouses are those found in section 18A which gives a number 
of statutory exemptions : estates left to a widow, children 
or grandchildren are exempt up to 20,000 dollars but the 
exemption reduces for higher estates and is nil at 100,000 
dollars; estates left to other persons are exempt up to 
10,000 dollars. 
There is also a gift duty levied under the Gift 
Duty Assessment Act 1941-67. Again, there are very few 
special provisions for spouses but section 14 gives 
exemption for premiums within a stated limit on a policy 
for the benefit of a wife and children and also reasonable 
gifts for the maintenance, education or apprenticeship of 
any person. 0 
(7) Children 
Both the property laws and the tax laws 
1. Australian Federal Constitutional Law: Howard: 2nd Ed. 
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concerning children are in an advanced state in Australia. 
The general rule is that an infant may hold a proprietary 
interest of any kind but may disclaim it during infancy or 
within a reasonable time of coming of age; any contract is 
therefore voidable. 
' However, statutory rules in all 
states have provided machinery whereby an interest in land 
held by an infant may be transferred without the threat of 
later disclaimer by the infant. For example, section 22 of 
the Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 of New South 
Wales provides that if a minor makes a disposition of 
property pursuant to a contractual duty binding on him the 
disposition will itself be presumptively binding. 
2 
This acknowledgement of a child as. a separate 
person continues into the tax field. There are no tax 
allowances (rebates) for dependant children,, although-there 
are cash benefits. However, a unique feature of the 
Australian system is the discriminatory tax treatment of 
children's income. 
3 This was introduced in 1979 by the 
Income Tax Law Amendment Act (Act No. 19) of 1980; the 
effect is to tax the income of children at a rate higher 
than that of adults. The reason for the introduction of 
this legislation is said to be: - 
"Tax rate progressivity had led to the 
creation of many devices and plans for 
making income in high-income families 
taxable to family members other than the 
head of the family - income-splitting". 
Accordingly, although the adult rate of tax provides 
1. David C. Jackson : Principle of Property Law p. 211. 
2. The law of minors in relation to contracts and property. 
David J. Harland. 
3. Taxation of Children's Income in Australia : Bernard 
Marks. 
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for a nil rate band (4041 dollars), a band taxed at the 
rate of 32 per cent (up to 17,239*dollars), a further 
band taxed at 46 per cent (up to 34,479), and the remainder 
taxed at 60 per cent, unmarried children below the age of 
18 pay 46 per cent on income in the band 1040-34,479 
and 60 per cent thereafter. Income from employment and 
income of married infants is excluded. 
This represents a novel way of counteracting 
tax avoidance: rather than providing that transfers shall 
be deemed to be ineffective, which is the United Kingdom 
approach, the transfer itself is recognised but a heavier 
rate of tax is levied; on the other hand the'Australian 
system cannot be selective - all the income of a child, 
transferred or not, is taxed at the higher rate. 
However, where infants are entitled to Trust 
income, the position is somewhat different : usually the 
Trust is not assessed to tax, but the beneficiary entitled 
is; if there is no beneficiary the Trust estate is liable 
at the rate of 60 per cent. 
3. New ZE 
is 
3` 
4s 
5 
6, 
? aland 
Constitutional development 
Matrimonial property 
First Income Tax Act 
I Tax avoidance 
Capital taxes 
Children 
(1) Constitutional development 
In 1769 Captain Cook took possession of New 
Zealand in the name of George III; although New South Wales 
subsequently tried to annex the territory, British 
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sovereignty was declared in 1840.1 The Imperial statute 
was enacted in 18522 to "grant a Representative Constitution 
to the Colony of New Zealdnd". When British Sovereignty was 
claimed New Zealand became subject to the laws-of England 
but in 1858 the New Zealand Parliament removed any doubts 
by providing, in the English Laws Act, "that'the laws of 
England, so far as they were applicable to the circumstances 
of the Colony should be deemed to have been in force in the 
Colony since January 14th 1840". 
(2) Matrimonial property 
As New Zealand therefore absorbed the common law 
of England, the property law of New Zealand is based on, 
and is in the main the same as, English law. However, 
"although New Zealand was well to the fore- 
front in the movement to give women 
enhanced political and social status, being 
the second country in the world to grant 
them the franchise, the legislature of the 
country displayed no similar initiative in 
removing the many disabilities which married 
women suffered at common law, but merely 
contented itself with adopting the various 
measures of law reform which have from time 
to time been instituted in England on this 
subject". 
So'the legislation which was passed in 1882 in 
England was enacted in 1884 in New Zealand and the English 
1935 legislation was enacted in New Zealand in 1936. 
(3) The First Income Tax Act 1891 
Although an ad valorem property tax was introduced in 1879, 
this was abolished by the Land and Income Assessment Act of 1891 which sub- 
stituted a land tax and a progressive income tax. The statutory provisions 
1. The British Commonwealth: The development of its laws and 
constitutions. 4. New Zealand. J. L. Robson. 2nd Ed. 
2.15 and 16 Vict. c 72. 
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are now found in the consolidated Income Tax Act of 1976. Husband 
and wife have always been treated as separate individuals 
for income tax purposes. The New Zealand tax system used 
to allow each taxpayer a personal rebate but this was 
abolished on Ist April 1979. (The rebate is a deduction 
from the actual tax assessed and can be distinguished from 
an allowance which is a deduction from assessable income). 
However, a dependent spouse rebate has been retained and, 
in practice (although not in law) this is allowed for a 
de facto spouse' The rebate is a maximum -of 156 dollars 
reduced by 20 cents for each dollar by which the spouse's 
income exceeds 520 dollars; thus where the spouse's 
income exceeds 1,300 dollars there is no rebate available. 
2 
This arrangement-is a variant of the partially trans- 
ferable allowance proposed by the Green Paper. 
(4) Tax avoidance 
Section 99 Income Tax Act 1976 is a very wide tax 
avoidance section on lines very similar to the Australian 
section 206 but among transfers not intended to be caught 
by the section are those where the purpose is a genuine 
transfer and not merely tax avoidance. The ambit of 
the section has given rise to much comment in the legal 
journals3 but the better view appears to be that the section 
does not avoid normal transfers between spouses; the 
1. Sections 51 and 52 Income Tax Act 1956. 
2. New Zealand Income Tax Law and Practice : Simcock & 
Rooke, Vol. 1 Para. 26.020. 
3. Article by Wilfrid J. Sim Q. C. N. Z. Law Journal 1967 
p. 396 entitled "Land and Income Tax Act 1954 - Family 
and Commercial Arrangements". 
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following dicta from the Australian case of DFLT v. 
Purcell' are also applied to section 99 - 
"Its office is to avoid contracts etc. 
which place the incidence of tax or 
the burden of tax upon some person or 
body other than the person or body con- 
templated in the Act. If a person 
actually disposed of income-producing 
property to another, so as to reduce the 
burden of taxation, the Act contemplates 
that the new owner should pay the tax. 
The incidence of the tax and the burden 
of the tax fall precisely as the Act 
intends, namely upon the new owner". 
So any transfers of assets between spouses, and 
any alienation of the right to receive income, do not 
appear to be ineffective for income-splitting purposes, so 
long as they are bona fide genuine transfers. 
New Zealand law does contain a special provision 
in section 106(1)(d) which prohibits the deduction of any 
expenditure represented by payments of any kind by one 
spouse to another unless the Commissioners are satisfied 
that the payment is bona fide or for services rendered (not 
being domestic services). 
2 
(5) Capital taxes 
An estate duty and a gift duty were both 
introduced in New Zealand in 1909, in the Death Duties 
Act 1909.3 The provisions were similar to the United 
Kingdom legislation, giving originally a surviving spouse 
relief up to 60,000 dollars. However, the Estate and Gift 
Duties Amendment Act 1979 withdrew the relief available in 
1. See page 515 above. 
2. Sircock & Rooke, Vol. 2, para. 40-560. 
3. Richardson & Congreve 5th Edition. 
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respect of succession by a spouse for deaths after 21st 
April 1979. This was explained by the fact that, with 
the lifting of the general minimum level for payment of 
estate duty, there was no longer any need for a specific 
surviving spouse relief. However, there are special reliefs 
available for a "Joint Family Home". 
' For these provisions 
to apply a house must be registered as a "Joint Family Home" 
by both husband and wife : irrespective of the proportions 
of contribution, each is deemed to have an equal beneficial 
interest. When the first spouse dies, his share passes to 
the survivor free of estate and gift duty. 
The settlement of a joint family home is not a 
gift for the purposes of the gift tax : in addition there 
are exemptions from the gift tax for small gifts and gifts 
for the maintenance and education of a family. 
(6) Children 
Although the personal rebate was abolished in 
19792 three rebates concerning children were retained. First, 
a child taxpayer rebate of 78 dollars is available for a 
child below 15 who has a small income of either earned or 
unearned income (section 50A); next, a young family rebate 
of 468 dollars is available where the claimant has a child 
under 5 and where the claimant's income is less than 
13,700 dollars; there is a sliding scale which reduces the 
rebate where the claimant has income in excess of this 
figure so that no rebate is available where his income 
1. See Joint Family Homes Act 1964 as amended. 
2. See page 520 above. 
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exceeds 17,600 dollars. Only one rebate is available for 
each family, 'irrespective-of the number of children, but 
a sole parent may be a claimant. Finally. -there is a low 
income family rebate of 468 dollars, where a claimant 
has a child of any age so long as the claimant's income 
does not exceed 13,700 dollars; again,, only one such 
rebate can be claimed for each family. 
There used to be an infant child relief for 
estate duty purposes which exempted transfers of up to 
1,000 dollars but this was withdrawn In 1979 : the duty 
excludes all small gifts and also gifts made for the 
maintenance and education of the family. 
4. Canada 
1) Constitutional development 
2) Matrimonial property 
(3) First Income Tax Act 
(4) Tax avoidance 
(5) Capital taxes 
(6) Children 
(1) Constitutional development 
Just as it is not possible to consider an 
'Australian' law without reference to the separate states, 
so no consideration of Canadian law can ignore the fact 
that Canada is also a confederation of Provinces and in 
Canada particular regard must be paid to the special 
position of the province of Quebec; the other provinces 
inherited a common law jurisprudence whereas Quebec 
inherited a jurisprudence derived from the civil code. The 
close proximity of the province of Quebec in Canadian 
jurisprudence makes Canada a most interesting study for 
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the purposes of this thesis as the interaction of the 
two legal systems has had interesting repercussions on 
the discussion surrounding the tax treatment of the family 
unit. 
As far as real property is concerned, it is 
perhaps surprising that the law in Quebec and that in the 
common law provinces developed separately but it appears 
to be accepted that: - 
"there has been very little mutual inter- 
action or interchange over the years, in 
spite of the obvious opportunities for 
cross-fertilization between the Quebec civil 
law and the jurisprudence of the common law 
provinces". 1 
Prior to the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982 
the Canadian constitution was a statute of the United 
Kingdom Parliament, namely the British North America Act 
1867. The common law of the English speaking provinces 
was, in its historical roots, "received" English common law 
brought over (according to the conventional legal fiction) 
to North America by the first English settlers to the 
extent that its substantive provisions were applicable to 
conditions in the new colonies. 
2 
(2) Matrimonial Property 
Although, therefore, the English speaking 
provinces of Canada adopted the English common law of hus- 
band and wife, they also subsequently adopted some of the 
statutory amendments to the law -of real property. made by 
1. Canadian Jurisprudence : The civil law and common law 
in Canada : edited by Edward McWhinney. 
2. Per Griffiths, C. J. in R. V. Kidman (1915) 20 CLR 
432,435. 
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the English Parliament. Such adoption has, however, not 
been comprehensive and, for example, the 1925 property 
legislation has not yet been enacted in Canada. However, 
statute has modernised the rights of married women and 
generally speaking the capacity of a married woman to 
acquire, 'hold and dispose of land has, by statute, been 
equated to that of a ferne sole. 
' On the other hand the 
influence of the civil code can perhaps explain the-enact- 
ment in the common law provinces of special "homestead" 
provisions which are unknown in English common law. 
Although there are different rules in force in the different 
provinces the basic principle is that neither spouse can 
dispose of the "homestead" without the other's consent and 
such a disposition without consent gives rise to a remedy 
in damages. 
In Quebec the law of property follows the French 
code of 'community property'; all property owned before 
marriage by either spouse is the separate property of that 
spouse and property acquired after marriage by gift or 
inheritance-is separate property. All other property is 
owned jointly by the spouses who must both consent to any 
transfer. On divorce, each spouse is entitled to his- 
separate property but the community property is divided 
equally. The husband is designated the 'manager of the 
community" for administrative purposes. 
In a recent comprehensive survey of the law of 
real property in New Brunswick the authors of the Report2 
1. Law of Vendor and Purchaser : Di Castri. Second Edition. 
And see section 233 Married Women's Property Act RSBC 
1960 and section 262 RSO 1970. 
2. By Alan M. Sinclair and Douglas C. Rouse Q. C. 
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compared the regime of separate property inherited from 
English common law and statute with the community property 
regime applied in the province of Quebec; the problems of 
community property (identifying the assets, disputes between 
spouses, rights of creditors etc), were fully discussed but 
the authors concluded that: - 
"the adoption of community of property, in 
the context of a jurisdiction that has 
always had a separation of property, 
would be a radical alteration of existing 
customs, practices and traditions involving 
the necessity of new complex rules being 
learned and employed in daily affairs, not 
only by married couples but also by those 
dealing with them". 
(3) The income tax regime 
Before confederation in 1867 80 per cent of 
revenues arose from customs and excise. The first personal 
income tax was imposed in British Columbia in 1876 and the 
first federal income tax was imposed in 1917; the provinces 
have now abandoned the rights to levy income and inheritance 
taxes to the federation. ' 
In Canadian Federal Income Tax the individual has 
always been the taxpaying unit but whereas this causes no 
difficulty under an English. system of separate property 
difficulties can arise when the principle is applied to a 
community property system. The question as to whether 
married persons domiciled in Quebec, who had not excluded 
the provisions of the civil code governing community 
property, could split their matrimonial income for income 
1. Tax rental agreements 1941-62. See also Constitutional 
Law of Canada : Hogg. 
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tax purposes1 was considered in the case of Surat. On 
appeal the court held that, for income tax purposes, the 
property was to be treated as that of the husband. 
It may have been difficulties such as these which 
led a Royal Commission on Taxation in 1966 to suggest that 
a more appropriate base for taxation might be the family. 
The main argument in favour of such a change was that "an 
individual's well-being is more closely indicated by the 
income of the family to which he belongs than by his own 
income. Family income is in some sense "shared" among 
individuals of a family and is partly used for expenditures 
which are jointly consumed by all members, e. g. housing, 
furniture, auto etc. The latter is sometimes referred to 
as "the economies of living together". 
3 The Royal Commission 
suggested that the treatment of single individual versus 
family should accord with the following principles of 
equity - 
- Two persons earning a given amount of income 
should pay less total tax if living singly 
than if living as a family; 
- The tax paid by two persons living together 
should be independent Of the proportion in 
which the income is earned by the two (or more). 
- An individual earning a given income should pay 
more tax than a family of two or more members 
earning the same income. 
These concepts will by now be familiar to the 
readers of this thesis and they are fully discussed°in 
1. As is done in France - See Chapter 11. 
2.62 DTL 1005 [1962] CTC 1. 
3. Canadian Tax Policy : Robin W. Broadway and Harry M. 
Kit chener . 
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Chapter 7. The Royal Commission concluded that the family 
should be adopted as the taxpaying unit with a separate 
rate schedule from individuals: this would mean the 
introduction of a type of the quotient system familiar in 
civil code countries. 
' Perhaps it is not surprising that 
the recommendation met with considerable controvesy and 
disfavour. 
Difficulties of defining the family unit, the 
dissolving of family units and the "incentive to live 
common law" in order to avoid high marginal tax rates 
were only a few of the criticisms levied against this 
proposal. The recommendation has, so far, not been enacted 
and the difficulty of finding a tax unit which will reconcile 
both the common law and civil law concepts of ownership in 
marriage can be summarised in these words: - 
"The essential choice of a taxpaying unit 
involves more than pure economical 
analysis; it is entwined in the socio- 
economic objectives of any society". 
Personal allowances have been part of the 
Canadian income tax structure since its inception in 1917 : 
for very many years the married allowance was exactly 
double the single allowance but since 1972 it has been 
slightly less than double. The married allowance is only 
given to a husband whose wife's income does not exceed the 
amount of the single personal allowance. This is, in effect, 
the system of the fully transferable allowance discussed in 
the Green Paper. In Canada, if a husband wishes to claim 
his wife's unused allowance the spouses file a Joint return. 
1. See Chapter 11. - See also "The Individual and Tax Reform 
in Canada": Gordon Bale. 1971 Canadian Bar Review p. 24. 
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(4) Tax avoidance 
The Canadian income tax legislation contains 
general anti-avoidance provisions of wide application and 
there are special rules (the attribution rules) dealing 
with tax avoidance by transfers between spouses. The 
latter rules were enacted in order to prevent tax mini- 
misation through the device of income-splitting arrange- 
ments and this is achieved by attributing income to persons 
who do not in fact receive it. 
1 Section 74 of the Income Tax 
Act, originally enacted in 1917 at the commencement of income 
tax, provides that the income of any property transferred by 
a spouse to a spouse, and any income earned from any property 
substituted therefor, is the income of the transferring 
spouse for so long as the marriage continues. There are, 
however, a number of transactions not covered by these rules; 
for example, a "transfer" includes a sale for value but not 
a loan. 
2 Again, income derived from investments purchased 
on joint credit is not within section 74. Finally, since 
1971, the attribution rules include in the income of the 
transferring spouse any capittl gain or loss arising on the 
transfer. 3 
(5) Capital taxes 
There are three capital taxes in Canada -a gifts 
tax, a capital gains tax and an estates tax. The gifts tax 
is part of the income tax code and was introduced in 1968; 
4 
1. Canadian Income Tax Revised - Butterworths. 
2. McLaughlin' v. M MR 1952 Ex CR 225. 
3. See also: Income Splitting: The Labyrinth of Attribution: 
Robert L. Katz CA : Arthur Anderem n& Co Vancouver: British 
Columbia Tax Conference 1980. 
4. An Act to amend. the Income Tax Act and the Estate Act, 
SC. 1967-69 c 33 section 1. 
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transfers of property between spouses are tax free. 
Similarly, section 7 of the Estate Tax Act 1958 (as amended 
in 1968) allows for a complete deduction for property 
passing to a spouse. This treatment of husband and wife as 
an economic partnership followed closely on the Report of 
the Royal Commission in 1966 which, it will be recalled, 
recommended the treatment of the family as the tax unit. 
That recommendation was not, however, implemented so far 
as income tax was concerned, nor was it implemented for 
capital gains tax purposes. Capital gains'tax was introduced 
on 6th January 1972 after the publication of the White Paper1 
containing the Government's- proposals on the Report of the 
Royal Commission : the White Paper rejected the adoption of 
the married couple as the tax unit and so the capital gains 
tax provisions treat the spouses as separate individuals. ' 
"The basic scheme for the taxation of 
capital gains and losses is that one 
half of any capital gain or loss is 
included in, or deducted from, the 
income base. In this sense there is no 
separate capital gains tax; rather the 
capital gains provisions have the effect 
of broadening or contracting a taxpayer's 
income base, which then bears tax at the 
normal income tax rates". 2 
There are also provisions to prevent a taxpayer 
from splitting his income by transferring property to 
another person who subsequently receives a capital gain on 
the transferred property; the rules require the trans--, 
feror and not the transferee to include in his income the 
net taxable capital gain or allowable capital loss on the 
1. Proposals for Tax Reform : (Ottawa. Queen's Printer 
1969). 
2. - Butterworths Vol. 217 1.1. 
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transferred property. The exact application of the 
attribution rules depends on the relationship between the 
transferor and the transferee, but complete attribution 
takes place on transfers between spouses. 
(6) Children 
Children are taxed as individuals with 
"attribution" rules similar to those of spouses for income 
tax, but not capital gains tax, purposes. A child allowance 
is given to a parent; the allowance is increased for a child 
over 16 in full-time education but, whatever the age of the 
child, the allowance is reduced if the child has income. 
The Royal Commission recommended that children 
should be included in the tax unit and their income 
aggregated with their parents but there is little likelihood 
of this being accepted. 
I 
5. The Republic of Ireland 
1 Constitutional development 
2 Matrimonial property 
3 Income tax 
4 Tax avoidance 
5 Capital taxes 
6 Children 
(1) Constitutional development 
It has been noted that the English common law was 
exported to Australia, New Zealand and Canada in the first 
half of the nineteenth century and also that each colony 
subsequently enacted provisions similar to those in the 
Married Women's Property Act 1882; as these colonies did 
not import the system öf United Kingdom taxation, the' 
1. See Gordon Bale above. 
532 
treatment of married women as separate persons at law was 
well established before income tax was introduced;, it 
therefore was natural that husband and wife would also be 
treated as separate persons for income tax purposes. 
The constitutional development of the Republic 
of Ireland did not follow the same pattern. Eire achieved 
independence in 1922 and its constitution was enacted in 
the Irish Free State Constitution Act of that year; the 
constitution has been subsequently amended but the principle 
of a written constitution has remained. 
(2) Matrimonial property 
Irish land law is a mixture of English common law, 
English statute law, Irish statute law and Irish common 
law; 1 the English 1925 legislation has not yet been enacted 
in Ireland but there is some-Married Women's Property 
legislation which follows closely on the English model. 
(3) Income tax 
In 1922 the Republic of Ireland adopted the 
United Kingdom tax laws (with a few modifications) up to 
and including the Finance Act 1922, so the two tax codes 
are basically similar but with discrepancies arising from 
subsequent Finance Acts. In 1967. income, tax was consolidated 
in The Income Tax Act 1967 of which sections 192-198 contain 
the "Special Provisions as to Married Persons" which are sub- 
stantially the same as those contained in sections 37-42 
Taxes Act 1970, with some modifications. Because-of the 
I. J. C. Wylie : Land Law in Ireland. 
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secession in 1922, the Republic's provisions contained 
an option for separate assessment as introduced in the 
United Kingdom in 1914, but not the option for separate 
taxation of wife's earnings, introduced in the United 
Kingdom in 1971 and never adopted in Ireland. Now it has 
been mentioned above that, unlike the United Kingdom, the 
Republic of Ireland has a written constitution which con- 
tains the following provisions: -1 
Article 40.1. All citizens shall, as human persons, be 
held equal before the law. 
Article 41.1.1. The state recognises the family as the 
natural primary and fundamental unit 
group of society and as a moral 
institution possessing inalienable and 
imprescriptible rights, antecedent and 
superior to all positive law. 
Article 41.1.2. The state therefore guarantees to protect 
the family in its constitution and 
authority as the necessary basis of social 
order and as indispensable to the welfare 
of the nation and the state. 
Article 41.3.1. The state pledges itself to guard with 
special care the institution of marriage 
in which the family is founded and to 
protect it against attack. 
In 1978, a taxpayer, Mr. Murphy, brought an action 
against the Attorney-General of Ireland alleging that the 
system of taxation of married couples, as it related both 
to the personal allowances and aggregation, was in breach of 
the constitution' At that time the allowances available to 
a married couple were less than those available to two 
single persons, with the addition of a small allowance for 
a working wife of slightly more than one quarter of the " 
1. Constitution of Ireland, Government Publications, 
Dublin. 
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single allowance; full aggregation applied both to earned 
and unearned income. The High Court gave judgment in 
favour of the taxpayer on 12th October 1979 and the Supreme 
Court dismissed the State's appeal against the judgment on 
25th January 1980 holding that, while the provisions of 
the Income Tax Act 1967 on tax free allowances were not a 
discriminatory attack on the family as "there is a 
difference of social function between a husband and wife 
living together to which the legislature was entitled to 
have regard", the provision whereby the wife's income was 
assessed as part of the husband's income (thus tending to 
push their joint income into higher tax bands) was not 
defensible on any such ground and was a discriminatory 
attack on the married state and thus on the family, in 
violation of Article 41 as well as Article 40.1. In the 
Indexlof decisions the point is made that when incomes are 
aggregated under a graduated system the tax burden is less 
on unmarried couples living together and this did not 
accord with the constitutional pledge by the state to "guard 
the institution of marriage with special care". 
While the Murphy case was before the High Court 
the opportunity was taken to raise the married allowance 
to twice that of'a single person (for 1978-79), but 
following the decision of the Supreme Court in January . 1980 
the legislation was radically amended. 
2 Married couples 
now have three choices. First, if no election is made, 
1. The decision has not yet been reported but it is noted 
in the 1979 Index to Supreme Court and High Court written 
judgments compiled by the Law Reporting Council of Ireland. 
2. Income Tax : McAteer & Reddin : The Institute of 
Taxation in Ireland 1981 Chapter 16. 
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spouses will be treated as if they were not married. But 
both spouses can elect to be jointly assessed : in this 
case the husband is assessed on the combined income of 
himself and his wife but can claim double allowances, 
double interest relief and gets double the bands of tax 
available to a single person. This is, in effect, the 
quotient system which is, as has been seen, always favourable 
to a married couple as far as the quantum of tax paid is 
concerned. It has, however, one major drawback, namely, 
the necessity of joint accounting or husband's accountability. 
Because a mandatory quotient system would, therefore, breach 
the provisions of the Irish constitution the application of 
the second choice is governed in a pleasing Irish way : 
although statute provides for it only to come into force on 
the exercise of an election by both spouses, nevertheless 
spouses are deemed to have elected unless they serve a 
notice to the contrary. Because it may be thought that the 
second alternative may not be always acceptable because of 
the retention of the principle of husband's accountability, 
the third option is for "joint assessment with separate 
assessment"; under this system the quantum of tax payable is 
determined as under the "quotient" system mentioned above but 
assessments and returns are dealt with by each spouse 
separately; the personal allowances are divided equally 
between the spouses and other allowances and reliefs are 
generally granted to the spouse who bears the cost. 
(4) Tax avoidance 
Under a system of aggregation, such as was in 
operation in Ireland prior to 1980, no tax avoidance provisions 
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are necessary as income-splitting cannot, by definition, take 
place. Further, under the quotient system, which is now 
available to all married couples, income splitting is in 
fact made statutory. There are, therefore, no tax avoidance 
rules affecting married couples in Ireland. 
(5) Capital taxes 1 
A wealth tax and a capital gains tax were 
introduced in 1975 and a capital acquisitions tax in 1976; 
however, wealth tax was suspended from 5th April 1978 
onwards, but its principles remain of interest. For 
wealth tax purposes, therefore, the taxable wealth of 'a 
husband included that of his wife and of minor children in 
his custody. 
2 Although the tax was a proportional tax 
(1 per cent) and thus did not penalise aggregation, there 
were a number of exemptions, in particular the first slice 
of taxable wealth was exempt; for a single person this was 
£70,000, for a widow or widower £90,000 and for a married 
couple £100,000; there was an additional exemption of 
Z2,500 for each minor child who had aggregable wealth. The 
capital gains tax3 provisions have many similarities to 
those in the United Kingdom : it is a proportional tax so 
aggregation as such does not entail a penalty, but a wife's 
gains are assessed on the husband unless either spouse elects 
for separate assessment. However, following the Murphy 
decision4 the law was amended to provide that the gains of a 
1. Tolley's Taxation in the Republic of Ireland. 
2. Section 4 Wealth Tax Act 1975. 
3. Capital Gains Tax Act 1975. 
4. See above page 
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married woman are to be calculated as if she were a single 
person; previously the married couple obtained only one 
£500 allowance, available to all other individuals; now 
they each obtain a full £500 allowance and, in addition, 
the unused portion of one spouse's allowance may be used by 
the other spouse. Disposals between spouses are on a no 
gain no loss basis and losses of one spouse may be set 
against gains of the other unless either spouse elects 
otherwise. 
However it still appears to be the case that-a 
married couple can have only one principal private residence 
exemption and if more than one residence is involved the 
election as to which is to attract the relief must be made 
by both spouses. The Capital Acquisitions Tax Act 1976 
introduced both a gift tax and an inheritance tax; the 
person chiefly accountable is the recipient of the gift or 
inheritance; the gift tax is imposed on lifetime transfers 
at-75 per cent of the rate of the inheritance tax : the 
rate of the inheritance tax is determined by the relation- 
ship between the disponor and the done. e/successor; there 
are four rate schedules and spouses and children enjoy the 
most favourable of these : cumulative transfers of up to 
£150,000 are completely exempt and there is a maximum rate 
of 55 per cent for cumulative transfers in excess of 
£400,000. 
(6) Children 
Section 141 Income Tax Act 1967 provides for a 
child allowance of £195 for each child reduced ' by the -amount 
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by which the child's income exceeds £80. (Cash benefits 
are payable in addition). There is no aggregation of 
children's income with that of parents for income tax pur- 
poses (as was the case, temporarily, with wealth tax) but 
there are two specific anti-avoidance provisions affecting 
children. First, although in general transfers of income 
under the covenant procedure are recognised in very much 
the same way as in the United Kingdom, in general a covenant 
in favour of a minor child (under 21) is ineffective for tax 
purposes. In 1979 a restriction was placed on the amount a 
person could covenant to his child over 21 and this is now 
limited to 5 per' cent of the covenantor's total income. 
' 
Secondly, settlements are also ineffective as a means of 
splitting income with a-minor child; sections 443 to 448 
Income Tax Act 1967 are very similar to the corresponding 
United Kingdom settlement provisions with similar exemptions 
for trusts where income is accumulated for the benefit of a 
minor child. 
As far as capital gains tax is concerned, there 
are no special provisions for children, but children are in 
the most favoured rate schedule for the purposes of the 
capital acquisitions tax. 
6. Conclusions 
All the four common law systems analysed have a 
system of individual taxation for husband and wife. Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada introduced income tax after the passage 
1. Section 33 Finance Act 1979. 
539 
of their Married Women's Property Acts and they were not, 
therefore, hampered by a previous history of aggregation. 
The Republic of Ireland, on the other hand, imported the 
complete United Kingdom tax system when it attained 
independence in 1922 and this persisted until 1980 when it 
was declared repugnant to the constitution. 
The treatment of the spouse allowance differs 
from state to state; Australia and' New Zealand do not have 
personal allowances as such but both give a rebate for a 
spouse who supports another spouse; in New Zealand the 
rebate reduces where the dependent spouse's income exceeds 
520 dollars. Canada gives personal allowances and gives an 
additional allowance to a supporting spouse when the 
supported spouse's income is less than the personal allowance; 
the spouse allowance is slightly less than a full personal 
allowance, and must be claimed by both spouses filing a 
joint return. In Ireland each spouse gets a full allowance 
and where one spouse has little or no income the allowance 
can be used by the other spouse if both spouses opt for joint 
assessment. 
Attitudes to tax avoidance appear to depend on the 
treatment of the capital taxes. Australia, New Zealand and 
Ireland make no restrictions on income splitting but in each 
country spouses get little more exemption from the capital 
taxes than other individuals; however, Australia does give 
an exemption from estate duty for small estates left to 
spouses; New Zealand exempts the passing of a share in a 
'Joint Family Home' and Ireland gives a spouse and children 
a favourable rate schedule for capital acquisitions tax 
purposes. Canada, on the other hand, has enacted detailed 
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attribution rules to prevent income splitting but 
accompanies this by favourable treatment for capital taxes 
purposes; thus there is no gift tax or estate duty on 
transfers between spouses and the spouses have separate 
exemptions for capital gains tax purposes. 
In-no country is the income of a child aggregated 
with that of its parents, although Australia taxes the 
income of a child at a higher rate than that of an adult. 
Australia gives no child allowance but does give a cash 
benefit; New Zealand gives rebates for low income families 
with children; and Canada and Ireland give a child allowance 
which is reduced if the child has income; finally, Ireland 
has enacted anti-avoidance legislation to prevent income- 
splitting with children by nullifying the tax effectiveness 
of covenants and settlements. 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES 
Section 
1. Introductory. 
2. France. 
3. Luxembourg. 
4. West Germany. 
5. Italy. 
6. Belgium. 
7. The Netherlands. 
8. Conclusions. 
1. Introductory 
The common law originally provided that on 
marriage the personality of a married woman merged with 
that of-her husband; when income tax was introduced in the 
United Kingdom, in 1799, an aggregation rule was therefore 
adopted and it has not yet been completely revoked, even 
one hundred years after the passing of the Married Women's 
Property Act in 1882. However, the introduction of income 
tax in Australia, Canada and New Zealand occurred after 
the amendment of the property legislation with the result 
that the assessment of married couples on an individual 
basis accords with the property'laws in these countries. 
In the civil law countries, however, a completely 
different development has taken place; in general these 
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legal systems have recognised a community of property for 
married persons and the income tax laws have responded to 
this concept by imposing a system of joint taxation. 
However, the systems of joint taxation in the civil law 
countries differ fundamentally from the United Kingdom 
system; the latter treats husband and wife as one person, 
with some exceptions; the former usually treat them as two, 
except that there is usually a responsibility on the husband, 
or a joint responsibility to pay the tax. The married 
couple are not, however, treated as two separate people : 
they are usually given double the allowances and are some- 
times given double the reduced rates available to one 
single person which can result in positive advantages, 
particularly where one spouse has a nil or low income. 
Accordingly, the Table on page 5 of the fourth Background 
Paper to the Green Paper on Taxation of Husband and Wifel 
could be misleading; although it indicates that the unit of 
assessment for France and Belgium is the family, and for 
the United Kingdom, Germany and Luxembourg it is the husband 
and wife, no indication is given that it is only in the 
United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent in Belgium, that 
aggregation still applies and that in the other countries 
mentioned the favourable quotient system ensures that 
married couples have positive tax advantages. 
There is one common feature which is found in 
all the civil law countries and that is the system of 
matrimonial community property. The community has been 
1. International Comparisons of Taxation of Husband and 
Wife : Note by Inland Revenue and Department of Health 
and Social Security : January 1981. 
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defined as a 
"fund, allocated to the couple, but under 
the husband's control during the marriage 
and destined to be shared out afterwards 
between the spouses... "1 
The system of community had much in common with 
the system of matrimonial property in the-United Kingdom 
before 1882 as it combined the concept of the supremacy 
of the husband and the incapacity of the married woman but 
its major distinguishing feature is that it gives a 
married woman a legal right to share in all the property 
acquired by both spouses during the marriage. 
Because of the similarity of this system with 
the, pre-1882 English system it is not surprising that all 
civil code countries adopted the principle of aggregation 
and husband's accountability for income tax, but each 
country differs from the other in the way in which it gives 
allowances for marriage. _ 
The first four countries considered in this Chapter 
all adopt the favourable quotient system or have now moved 
to a system of individual taxation : the last two countries 
mentioned have retained aggregation for investment income. 
2. France 
(1 Constitution 
2 Real property - husband and wife 
3 Income tax 
4) Tax avoidance 
(5)- - Capital taxes. (6) Children 
(1) Constitution 
The constitutions of the civil law countries 
1. Comparative law of matrimonial property : Kiralfy p. 7. 
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differ fundamentally from those of the common law countries. 
"Anglo-American common law is essentially 
the body of legal techniques, concepts 
and procedures established by the English 
in areas of conquest or settlement in which 
the language, rules and methods of the King's 
courts, are an essential component... The 
civil law system is characterised by the 
Roman "idiom of thought" elaborated from 
Justinian texts by scholarly commentators 
and expressed in national codifications". l 
The "national codification" in France was enacted 
on 21st March 1804 but before turning to consider the 
provisions of the code which concern the property rights 
of husband and wife it may be of interest to summarise 
briefly the development of this branch of the law prior to 
codification. France was part of the Roman Empire until 
476 AD during which time Roman law applied to the Gallic- 
Romans and local customary law applied to the indigenous 
inhabitants. 
2 It will be recalled that in the first 
centuries of the Empire at Rome women had gained their 
independence and legal capacity; 
3 however, local customary 
law had always retained the principle that, on marriage, the 
husband became responsible for the administration of the 
wife's property and the wife lost her legal personality. 
In the South of France Roman law was adopted generally4 and 
married women preserved a measure of legal capacity; 
"In the North, however, in continuation of 
Frankish and other Teutonic traditions, 
various forms of community property had 
come to-prevail under practically all of 
1. Civil law and the Anglo-American Lawyer. Henry P de Vries 
2. Droit Francais :. Rene. David : Tome I page I. Translated. 
3. Droit Civil : Precis Dalloz : Translated. 
4. The Code Napoleon : Schwarz. 
546 
which the husband was to be the sole 
manager, not only of the community fund 
but also of the separate assets of the 
wife, and the wife's capacity to trans- 
act legal business was to all practical 
effects extinguished". 
When the Code was introduced in 1804 it dealt 
with those branches of the law which were already "written 
law" promulgated as legislation before the Revolution. The 
most famous of these Codes, the Code Civile, contains 
provisions from the Digest of Justinian reworked over the 
years; in contracts and torts no innovations were made; 
however1 in the case of matrimonial property a choice had 
to be made between Roman law and the customary law of 
community and it was the Northern system of community of 
movables and acquisitions that was established by the Code 
Civile as the common law of France. It has always been 
possible for husband and wife to contract out of the 
statutory system, but only by means of an ante-nuptial 
contract. 
(2) Matrimonial property 
There were two sections in the 1804 code which 
affected husband and wife : the first commenced with 
Article 213 which regulated the relationship of the spouses, 
providing that "the husband must protect the wife and the 
wife must obey the husband". Another section dealt with 
the matrimonial regime; so Article 1388 provided that the 
husband's position as head of the family was not susceptible 
of alteration by contract and by Article 1124 married women 
1. Civil Law and the Anglo-American Lawyer : Henry P. de 
Vries. 
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infants, and persons of unsound mind were expressly, 
declared to be incapable of making contracts. Although the 
system of the Code reflected the social facts of 1804 
"it could not be continued unchanged into 
the twentieth century when women had come to 
new positions of personal independence". 
Since 1804, therefore, a number of significant 
developments have taken place; in 1907 a woman exercising 
a separate profession was given power to dispose of her own 
salary; in 1923 the old community rules were replaced by a 
system of joint ownership of assets acquired during the 
marriage; further amendments were made in 1938,1942,1965, 
1970 and 1975. The present Code therefore represents a 
considerable departure from that enacted in 1804; Articles 
212-226, which regulate the rights--and duties of the spouses, 
now provide for equal responsibilities and joint entitle- 
ment and Articles 1400 onwards provide that, if not excluded 
by a marriage contract, the spouses hold their property 
under the community system. The system, however, only 
applies to acquisitions during marriage and not to assets 
owned at the time of the marriage; further assets acquired 
during the marriage by gift or inheritance are also 
excluded' There are many detailed rules regulating what 
is, and what is not, community property and Article 1421 
provides that the husband administers the community property 
alone but there are detailed rules requiring the consent 
of the wife to a number of transactions. 
Although the system of community property has 
1. Article 1405. 
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always been capable of being excluded by ante-nuptial 
contract it is understood that most French people regard 
the community system as being appropriate for married couples 
and that where an ante-nuptial settlement excludes the 
statutory system it does so in order to impose another 
system of community. 
(3) Income tax 
Income tax law was codified in 1941 by the Code 
Gen6ral des Impots (CGI) which is the major source of income 
tax law. Article 6.1 provides that family income is to be 
taxed to the head of the household; this is compulsory, 
even if the spouses are married under a separate property 
r4gime. The incomes of the spouses are aggregated but are 
then split into two parts for the purpose of assessing the 
amount of tax payable; the tax attributable to a single 
part is multiplied by two to give the total amount payable. 
This statutory income-splitting does not depend on whether 
each spouse actually has any income: 
"the system is based on the assumption that 
the increased financial burden arising from 
the addition of a member to the family unit 
reduces the standard of living of the unit 
... the family quotient system seems 
to take 
into account not only the amount of the 
taxpayer's income but also the number of 
persons who must live on that income". 
It has been noted above that the quotient system 
is always beneficial to a married couple and is particularly 
beneficial where there is a nil or low earning spouse. 
However, these advantages are purchased at the price of the 
requirement of husband's (or at least joint) accountability; 
although such a requirement has caused difficulty in the 
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United Kingdom, 1 where separation of property is the general 
law, it is less likely to cause difficulty in France where 
Article 1421 of the Code Civile provides that the husband 
is responsible for the administration of the community 
property of the spouses. 
No personal allowances are given in France - the 
quotient system adequately recognises the taxpayer's marital 
status and family responsibilities. 
(4) Tax avoidance 
A quotient system of taxation automatically makes 
available all the possible benefits which can flow from 
income splitting and tax avoidance provisions are therefore 
unnecessary. 
(5) Capital taxes 
There are two main capital taxes in France -a 
successions tax on transfers on death and a gift tax on 
gratuitous inter vivos transfers. 
2 These taxes are levied 
on the amount received by each beneficiary; a major tax 
reform in 1959 resulted in a significant reduction of the 
tax on transfers to spouses and children. Such recipients 
now receive a substantial tax-free exemption followed by 
progressive rates from 5 per cent to 20 per cent depending 
on the size of the legacy3 whereas other recipients bear a 
proportional rate of tax varying from 35 per cent to 
60 per cent depending on the degree of their relationship 
1. See Chapter 8. 
2. See World Tax Series - Harvard Law School. 
3. Art. 777 CGI. 
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with the deceased/donor. The gift tax is calculated in the 
same way as the successions tax with cumulation of prior 
gifts from the same donor to the same donee. The favourable 
treatment of transfers to spouses and to children was enacted 
in order to favour the transmission of family assets and to 
encourage savings. 
(6) Children 
France is one of the two countries analysed 
which includes children in the 'quotient' arrangement. If 
no election for a separate assessment of the child's income 
is made, it is aggregated with that of the head of the 
household and the child counts as one additional half- 
part for the application of the quotient. So, in the 
typical case of a married couple with two dependent children 
the family income is aggregated and then divided by three 
and the tax attributable to a one-third part is then 
multiplied by three to give the total amount payable. This 
is a most advantageous system where a child has a nil or 
low income, but although the quotient procedure is 
compulsory for spouses it is possible to elect for a separate 
assessment of a child's income. 
3. Luxembourg 
1 Constitution 
2 Matrimonial property 
3 Income tax 
4 Tax avoidance 
5 Capital taxes 
(6 Children 
(1) Constitution 
The state of Luxembourg has existed, as an 
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autonomous and separate state, since the Treaty of London 
of 19th April 1839; previously there had been connections 
with both the Netherlands and with Belgium. 
' The first 
constitution was enacted in 1831 and there have been many 
subsequent revisions and amendments. The 1971 con- 
stitution2 provides that all citizens are equal before 
the* law (Article 11(2)) and that the state guarantees the 
natural rights of the human person and the family, 
(Article 11(3)). 
(2) Matrimonial property 
The state of Luxembourg adopted a Civil Code on 
the lines very similar to the Code Napoleon adopted in 
France in 1804. As did the French Code, the Luxembourg 
Code regulated the rights and responsibilities of the spouses 
and the laws concerning matrimonial property, but whereas in 
France various revisions and amendments took place over the 
years to reflect the changes in social attitudes to married 
women, such changes were not followed in Luxembourg - 
"so that the Grand Duchy was one of the 
last countries in Europe to have one 
half of its adult population with legal 
capacity and one half without it". 3 
However, when change did take place, it all took 
place at once. Major modifications were made to the Code in 
1972 and 1974 : the' spouses may now make whatever arrange- 
ments they please to govern the ownership of the 
1. L'etat Luxembourgeois, Pierre Majereuse. 
2. Extraft de Annuaire Officiel d'Administration et de 
Legislation 1971 : Ministere D'Etat : Service Central 
de Legislation. 
3. The Reform of Family Law in Europe : Chloros. 
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matrimonial property (Article 1387) but,. in default of 
agreement, a system of community applies (Article 1400). 
The community fund is limited to property acquired after 
the marriage and the Luxembourg Code is now one step ahead 
of the French Code as it has abolished the supremacy of the 
husband as the sole administrator of the community. 
(3) Income tax and allowances 
The incomes of married persons are added together 
for assessment purposesI but tax is charged at twice the 
amount payable on the basic scale on one half of the 
taxable income. In other words, a full income-splitting 
(quotient system) applies. No separate allowances are 
given to individuals and no doubt the view is taken that 
the quotient system adequately allows for the additional 
financial responsibility of marriage. 
(4) Tax avoidance 
As has been noted above, a statutory quotient 
system provides all possible benefits to be derived from 
income splitting and no special tax avoidance provisions 
are required. 
(5) Capital taxes 
There is a capital tax in Luxembourg which is 
charged at the rate of J per cent each year on taxable 
capital.. There is a personal allowance for an individual 
of 100,000 francs with an additional 100,000 for a wife 
1. Income tax outside the United Kingdom. The Board of 
Inland Revenue. 
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and a further 100,000 for each dependent child. Again, 
such an arrangement can never disadvantage a family unit 
but could bring great advantages (where some member, or 
members, has little or no taxable capital his allowance 
can be used by other members). 
There is also a real property tax which is levied 
on the capital value of all real property; personal reliefs 
here are, of course, not appropriate. 
(6) Children 
As with France, the income of minor children is 
aggregated with that of the parent, with the exception of 
wages from employment. Also as in France, a family 
quotient system is adopted for each child but in Luxembourg 
it is much more generous. The principle is, that if 
aggregate taxable-income does not exceed 505,200 francs 
(about £7,000 p. a. ) and there are up to three dependent 
children the aggregate income is divided into parts, the 
tax due on one part is multiplied by the number of parts 
to give the tax liability. The number of parts into which 
the income is divided is 2.6 for one dependent child, 3.4 
for two and 4.6 for three. Where income exceeds 505,200, 
or there are more than three dependent children there are 
credits against tax of varying amounts so that, for example 
where a taxpayer has income not exceeding 1,092,000 francs 
(about £15,000) and six children, the child allowance 
deducted from tax is 50,661.60 (L100) plus 6 per cent of 
taxable income. 
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(7) Conclusion 
Luxembourg has a matrimonial property regime very 
similar to that of France and the tax system, too,, has 
very many similarities. In default of any agreement to the 
contrary, matrimonial property is held in community and for 
tax purposes, the highly beneficial full-family quotient 
system applies. 
4. West Germany 
i) Constitution 
2 Matrimonial property 
3 Income tax 
4 Tax avoidance 
5) Capital taxes 
6) Children 
(1) Constitution' 
The present constitutional law of the Federal 
Republic is contained in the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of 
1949; Article 6(1) of which grants to the marriage and the 
family the special protection of the constitution. This is 
a rule of constitutional law and represents a binding line 
of guidance for the interpretation of all legal provisions 
relating to marriage and the family. As we shall see, the 
present income tax provisions in Germany, which are 
favourable both to the family and to married women, are 
very similar to those in the other country which has a 
constitution which protects the family, namely, Ireland, 
although the historical development in these two countries 
differs widely. 
1. Manual of German Law : E. J. Cohn 2nd Edition Volume 1. 
555 
Ancient Germanic law was a 'customary law but one 
of the major influences on its development was the reception 
of Roman law; by the end of the fifteenth century, Roman 
law, modified in some respects by canon law, had to a large 
extent, superseded customary Germanic law. However, Roman 
law was never revived in Germany in its entirety; ' in'the 
law of domestic relations canon law naturally conquered a 
good deal of ground and in this area native Germanic 
institutions' were never completely ousted. These remnants 
of germanic law were strong enough to secure a strong" 
influence on the codification movement of the nineteenth 
century. 
The German Civil Code (Burgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(BCB)) was promulgated in 1896 and entered into force on 
Ist January 1900; the Code was strongly influenced by the 
twin legal traditions of the Roman and Germanic laws; it 
was largely undertaken as a means of clarification: - 
"It was prepared in the nineteenth century 
by a distinguished and conservative group 
of lawyers and administrators who could, 
by no stretch of imagination, be described 
as radical reformers. The economic and 
political outlook reflected in the Code is 
often described as being that of an 
enlightened patriarchal owner of private 
property. The dominant position of the 
father and the husband in family life was 
reflected in the provisions... on the 
management of the household and the 
bringing up of the children". l 
(2) Matrimonial property 
Since the BGB was promulgated in 1900 a number of 
amendments have been enacted and those with the strongest 
l: The German Civil Code : E. S. - ~Fcrrester. 
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impact have completely changed the rules governing the 
relationship between husband and wife. Formerly, the 
husband had power to make almost all the decisions but 
since 1957 the emphasis has been on joint administration; 
under the old Code the statutory matrimonial property regime 
permitted the husband, within certain limits, to administer 
freely the bulk of his wife's property, and he was entitled 
to the income from it to compensate him for the obligation 
to maintain his wife; since the Equality Act of 1957 the 
statutory regime is a "community of surplus". 
' This does 
not mean that the spouses own their property jointly; it 
means that on the termination of the marriage the "surplus" 
is equally divided. As there is thus now no actual 
community of property the law provides safeguards to ensure 
that the spouses cannot be defrauded of their rights - each 
spouse has a statutory right to demand information from the 
other and may petition for an immediate adjustment in 
certain cases; household goods cannot be transferred 
without the consent of both spouses. 
It has always been possible to exclude the 
statutory regime by contract but it must now be replaced 
either by a regime of separation of goods or of community 
property; it is understood that in practice a regime of 
separation of goods is not infrequently chosen although 
it has no advantages for a wife with nil or low incomes; a 
community property regime is chosen rarely. 
(3) Income tax 
The German tax legislation is contained in a large 
1. Code 1363. 
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number of individual statutes dealing with separate taxes, 
for example, income tax, corporation tax, turnover tax, 
etc. Income tax is contained in the Revenue Code 
(Reichsabgabeordnung) of 1919.1 Husband and wife are 
normally assessed jointly on a quotient basis, when the 
amount of tax applicable to one-half of the combined taxable 
income of the spouses is computed and multiplied by two. 
2 
This very favourable form of statutory income splitting is 
available even if only one spouse has income. Where a 
joint assessment is made the tax returns must be signed 
by both spouses. 
If, however, the spouses so elect, husband and wife 
can be assessed as separate individuals; the election need 
be made by one spouse only. 
In all cases, the personal allowances available to 
a married couple are twice those available to a single 
person. 
(4) Tax avoidance 
As has been mentioned above3 statutory income 
splitting does not require any special tax avoidance 
provisions. In 1962 the Federal Constitutional Court4 
declared any-limitations on the recognition of bona fide 
employment contracts between married individuals, because 
of the fact of marriage, to be unconstitutional and void. 
Such employments are therefore recognised for tax purposes 
1. Cohn p. 27. 
2. World Tax Series - Germany - Income Tax. 
3. Page 549. 
4. B St B1 1962 1 p. 506. 
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if the arrangements are clearly agreed and the spouse has 
the same conditions and remuneration as an unconnected 
employee. 
(5) Capital taxes 
The main capital taxes in Germany are an 
Inheritance/Gift Tax, a net worth tax and a real property 
transfer tax. The inheritance/gift tax was originally 
imposed by the Inheritance Tax Law of 1925, revised in 
1959; like the French succession tax it is imposed on the 
recipient and the rate varies according to the relationahip 
between donor and donee; rates for transfers between spouses 
and children vary from 2 per cent to 15 per cent and for 
transfers between unrelated persons the rates vary from 14 
per cent to 60 per cent. In addition, spouses enjoy an 
exemption for the first DM 250,000 received and a complete 
exemption for any "asset surplus" received under the 
statutory provisions regulating matrimonial property. 
The net worth tax is a tax of 0.5 per cent on 
total property, excluding certain assets; this tax has 
elements of a wealth tax on the one hand and a tax on 
investments on the other. Each taxpayer has a tax-free 
exempt band of 20,000 DM; an additional 20,000 DM is 
available for a wife and each child. Married couples and 
children are always assessed jointly. 
The real property transfer tax, which probably 
equates most closely to the United Kingdom stamp duty, is 
at the rate of 3 per cent; spouses enjoy complete exemption 
for transfers into and out of the community property regime. 
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(6) Children 
Germany used to provide for aggregation of a 
child's income with that of its parents but by ' a' decision 
in 19641 the Federal Constitutional Court declared the. 
provision void for unconstitutionality - the provision was 
repugnant to Articles 3 and 6 of the constitution. 
A child tax allowance is not available t4 a parent 
but a cash benefit is. 
5. Italy 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Constitution 
Matrimonial property 
Income tax and allowances 
Tax avoidance 
Capital taxes 
Children 
(1) Constitution 
"Italy has had two civil codes in its brief history 
as a unified modern nation. The first, adopted in 1805, 
closely imitated the famous French Code Napoleon. The 
second was enacted by Royal Decree No. 262 of October 16th 
2 1942". 
(2) Matrimonial property 
In spite of its completely different constitutional 
development, the law of matrimonial property,, and of the 
application of the income tax laws to married couples, in 
Italy shows a marked similarity to the principles which applied 
in the United Kingdom. The basic matrimonial property regime 
in Italy was derived -from Roman'law and centred round the 
1. B St B1 1964 1 p. 488. 
2. The Italian Civil Code : Mario Beltrarno and others. 
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dowry; the theory was that the wife's property was used 
to support the domestic needs of the household whereas the 
husband's property was utilised for the family's business 
and commercial interests. The wife's property was trans- 
ferred to the husband as dowry and was administered by him; 
a married woman had no legal capacity. The situation was 
one of separation of goods and recalls the system which 
obtained in England before 1882. After the Restoration of 
1815 the codes of the various Italian states introduced a 
system of community property but this concept"was abandoned 
by the authors of the 1865 Code on the grounds that such a 
system "did not correspond to the established customs of the 
country". 
' This was therefore one of the very few occasions 
where the Italian Code differed from the Code Napoleon; in 
other respects similar provisions were enacted; a 'wife was 
subordinate to her husband who was the 'head of the family 
and the wife had no legal capacity without the authorisation 
of the husband. The Italian system of separation of goods 
was thus retained. 
The first reform was enacted on'the 7th July 1919 
(Law No. 1176) when a married woman was given the right to 
dispose of her own property and legal capacity. From 1925 
to 1941 there was a movement towards reform to improve the 
position of married women and a proposal was made once again 
that the system of community property should be introduced 
on the basis that this correspondended to the needs of the 
lower classes where couples entered the married state with 
1. Kiralfy : Comparative Law of Matrimonial Property. 
561 
very few assets indeed but where after a lifetime of work 
a husband could have accumulated some modest savings from 
which it would be unjust to exclude the wife. However, 
when the Code of 1942 was introduced, it contained no such 
reform; spouses could choose a dowry system or a community 
system but in the absence'of agreement to the contrary a 
system of separation of goods applied. Article 144 of the 
1942 Code also reaffirmed the supremacy of the husband and 
the subordinate position of the wife. 
In 1948 a new constitution was enacted in Italy 
which affirmed the equality of the spouses; there was thus 
a disparity between the provisions of the Code and the 
provisions of the constitution but it was not until 19th 
May 1975 that a new r4gime was introduced enacting the 
principle of equality of the spouses in all respects and 
introducing a system of community of property in the absence 
of agreement to the contrary. 
Now whereas the tendency for the other civil code 
countries has been to move away from a system of community 
property towards a system of separation of goods or of 
"community of surplus". Italy has moved in the opposite 
direction but both moves have had the same underlying 
motivation, i. e. to improve the rights of married women. 
The "classic" French system of community property was 
disadvantageous to a wife as it vested all the powers of 
administration of her property, and her legal capacity, in 
her husband but it did have one very positive advantage - 
a wife acquired a legal entitlement to a share in the 
community property, most usually that acquired during marriage, 
and could take steps to prevent its alienation; recent 
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developments have removed the wife's legal incapacity but 
retained her right to share in wealth accumulated by her 
husband during the marriage. In Italy, the previous system 
of separation of goods, coupled with the complete incapacity 
of the married woman, was doubly disadvantageous, and was 
reminiscent of the English system before 1882. Legal 
incapacity was removed, in Italy in 1919, and the introduction 
of a community property system in 1975 enacts in statutory 
form in Italy the rights of a wife to share in the wealth 
accumulated during the marriage which have been recognised 
in the United Kingdom to a lesser extent but not yet fully 
recognised by statute. ' 
(3) Income tax 
Prior to 1974 "the most criticised part of Italian 
tax law" was: - 
"the cumulation of income of husband and wife 
in particular the fact that any earned income 
of the wife is added to her husband's income 
for income tax purposes". 2 
1975 saw the enactment of the principle of equality 
in the property context and relief was also introduced in 
1975 for separate taxation of the incomes of each member of 
the family if the combined family income did not exceed 
5M lire (later increased to 7M lire); in 1976 separate 
assessment of both earned and unearned income, without limit, 
was introduced. 
There are"allowances-(credits against tax) for 
1. See however the provisions of the Matrimonial Homes 
Act 1957 and the Inheritance (Family Provision) Acts 
and recent divorce cases concerning spouses rights. 
2. European Taxation : Volume 15 : 1975 page 283. 
563 
each taxpayer of 36,000 lire with an additional "wife 
allowance" of 72,000 lire if the wife's income does not 
exceed 960,000 lire. 
(4) Children 
Prior to 1974 the income of a child was. assessed 
with its parents, but now it is assessed separately; there 
are child allowances (credits against tax) of 24,000 lire 
for each child. 
6. Belgium 
1 Constitution 
2 Matrimonial property 
3 Income tax 
4 Tax avoidance 
5 Capital taxes 
6 Children 
(1) Constitution' 
The Belgian Constitution was promulgated on 7th 
February 1831 and has since been revised on three occasions - 
in 1893,1921 and 1972. Article 6(2) provides. that all 
Belgians are equal before the law. 
2 
The civil law of Belgium is based on the French 
Civil Code of 18043 and it will be recalled that in its 
original form that Code was characterised by the authority 
of the husband and the incapacity of the married woman; 
the principle of incapacity did not disappear in Belgium 
until 1932. 
1. The Political, Economic and Social structures of 
Belgium : Robert Senelle. 
2. Le Troisieme Revision de la Constitution. Wigny. 1972. 
3. Kiralfy : Comparative Law of Matrimonial Property. 
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(2) Matrimonial property 
The 1932 Code incorporated the principle of the 
marriage contract : the spouses were free to adopt any 
matrimonial property system but if no option was adopted 
the code imposed a system of community of movables and 
acquests under which the husband had power to manage and 
use the common property at his discretion. 
In 1948 a Special Commission was appointed to 
examine the provisions of the Civil Code concerning the 
rights and duties of the spouses and the provisions relating 
to systems of matrimonial property. The Report was not 
submitted until 1956 and was incorporated in legislation 
in 1958; the authority of the husband was then abolished 
together with the legal incapacity of the married woman 
but no amendment was made to the matrimonial property system. 
The husband remains solely responsible for the administration 
of the community property; and the income of a married woman's 
separate property belongs to the community with the result 
that she can only alienate the reversion and not the entitle- 
ment to the income. However, despite the lack of any 
positive reform there is considerable agreement that the 
present position is unsatisfactory and there has been much 
discussion as to the direction which change should take. 
There appears to be substantial agreement that the parties 
should be able to regulate their own matrimonial property 
arrangements but the difficulty has been in identifying 
which system should apply by law in the absence of agree- 
ment to the contrary. No less than five separate proposals 
have been discussed and a common feature of all five is an 
element of joint ownership by the spouses. 
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At present, therefore, Article 1387 of the 
Belgian Civil Code provides that the parties may regulate 
their matrimonial property by means of marriage contract 
but Article 1390 provides that they must be specific in 
their choice of system : they can choose either a community 
system or a dowry system and in the absence of express 
stipulation the community regime applies. 
(3) Income tax 
In view of the fact that the Belgian law of 
matrimonial property is less highly developed than the 
laws of France, Luxembourg and Germany, it is interesting 
to note that Belgium does not operate a "quotient" system 
of family taxation but instead operates a complicated system 
of partial disaggregation and allowances which is somewhat 
reminiscent of the United Kingdom system. There is a 
limited right of separate taxation for two-earner couples 
where the combined earnings do not exceed 600,000 B. Fr. 
(about £8,200); but the deduction of 10,000 B. Fr. 'available 
` to each individual taxpayer is apportioned between husband 
and wife. 
Where there is only one earner in a family whose 
earnings do not exceed 600,000 B. Frs. a 'reduction of 20 per 
cent of earnings is allowed. Where the family's earnings 
exceed 600,000 B. Frs. the tax due may not exceed that of 
a "small earning" family mentioned above plus 35 per cent 
of the excess; as the marginal rate for individual tax- 
payers is 60 per cent this represents a saving. 
Where husband and wife are jointly assessed they 
also receive a credit against tax of 4,618 B. Frs. and the 
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earned income of the wife is reduced by 56,000 B. Frs. The 
total allowances available to a married couple thus exceeds 
the total available to two single individuals. 
(4) Tax avoidance 
No tax avoidance provisions are necessary with 
an aggregation system. 
(5) Capital taxes 
As a rule capital gains are included in earned 
income to which the above rules apply; there are also a 
number of local taxes. 
(6) Children 
A child's income is aggregated with that of its 
parents if the parents have the legal enjoyment of the 
income, but credits against tax are granted for each child 
of 5 per cent + 500 B. Frs. for one child, 15 per cent + 
1250 B. Frs. for two children and 25 per cent and 2,250 B. Frs. 
for three children. 
7. The Netherlands 
1 Constitution 
2 Matrimonial property 
3 Income tax 
4 Tax avoidance 
5 Capital taxes 
6 Children 
(1) Constitution 
Around the beginning of the Christian era the 
Netherlands formed part of the Roman Empire and was then 
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inhabited by Germanic tribes. As in other European countries, 
Roman power was broken in the fifth century; small feudal 
states came into being but-were ultimately united under 
Charles V. Emperor of Germany and King of Spain. However, 
during the eighty years war the northern provinces seceeded 
and pledged-mutual allegiance in the Union of Utrecht 
(1579). From 1810-13 the country was annexed to the French 
Empire but in 1815 a new constitution was drafted and 
William I reigned over the Netherlands and Belgium until* 
1930 when the Belgians seceeded. A further constitution was 
enacted in 1848. 
During the days of Roman rule the law which applied 
in the Netherlands was Germanic law; it was "tribal law, 
popular law, custom". But from the fifteenth century the 
influence of Roman law gradually increased. The French 
codification was imposed on the Netherlands in 1810/11 and 
remained in force until 1838 in which year national codes 
were promulgated; only a few differences were created 
between French and Dutch law, mainly in the area of private 
law. 
(2) Matrimonial property 
Under the 1838 code the husband was the, head of 
the family and administered the property of the wife, if 
the couple were married under the community regime. The 
wife had no legal capacity. By an Act of 14th June 1956 
the spouses were declared equal and the wife . was given full 
legal capacity. A new Family Law came into force on 1st 
January 1970 regulating matrimonial property and the husband's 
responsibility for administering the community property ceased. 
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Spouses are still married in community of goods if they 
have not made any arrangements to the contrary before the 
wedding; the complete community covers all the present 
and future property of both spouses (and also all their 
debts) unless a donor decides that a particular gift 
should not form part of the community. Before the con- 
tractual incapacity of the married woman was abolished in 
1956 the community was administered solely by the husband 
but now each spouse administers his/her own goods subject 
to the rights of the community. When the marriage ends the 
communal property is divided into two and shared. 
The system of community property can be varied by 
marriage settlement but 93 per cent of Dutchmen do not make 
a marriage settlement : of the remainder 73 per cent choose 
to totally exclude the community system and 10 per cent 
choose "community of benefit and income". 
(3) Income tax 
As noted above the matrimonial property regime in 
the Netherlands was amended in 1970 and on November 7th 1972 
the Netherlands overhauled its personal income tax law : 
the new income tax regime came into force on Ist January 
1973. Now a married woman pays her own taxes on earnings 
independently of her husband but the rates of tax on- 
unearned income are still calculated by aggregating the 
the private wealth of both spouses. 
For the purposes of the allowances, taxpayers 
are divided into four groups and the allowances for 1981 
were: - 
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Group 1 Married 'women 2,278 
Group 2 Single persons 
under 35 6,599 
Group 3 Single persons 
over 35 8,871 
Group 4 Married men 11,371 
It will be seen that this system is very similar 
to that in the United Kingdom; there is a right to dis- 
aggregate earnings only and, as far as allowances are 
concerned, a married man is entitled to an allowance which 
is about 14 times that of a single person, with an 
additional allowance being available against a wife's 
earnings bringing the total allowances available to a 
married couple slightly in excess of those available to 
two (young) single persons. 
(4) Tax avoidance 
It has been stated that the reason for the retention 
of the aggregation of investment income was to counteract tax 
avoidance. 
(5) Children 
There are no tax allowances for dependent children but 
child benefits are payable 
8. Conclusion 
The six civil code countries examined in this 
Chapter show a completely different approach both to the 
law of matrimonial property and to income tax law from the 
commonwealth countries described in Chapter 11. Each country 
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promulgated a civil code in the nineteenth century which 
regulated the rights and duties of spouses and the owner- 
ship of matrimonial property and each country has made'a 
number of amendments to those provisions, in four cases 
within the last ten years. Each country'now operates a 
system of community property for spouses, although this. 
has not always been the case in Italy. The extent of the 
community property differs from country to country but 
basically it gives each spouse a right to a one-half share 
in the goods acquired during the marriage. In four cases, 
as a result of recent amendment, the community is adminis- 
tered jointly by the spouses, in the other two cases 
(France and Belgium) the community is administered solely 
by the husband. In all countries except France there is 
a written constitution guaranteeing equality of all persons 
before the law. For income tax purposes, two countries 
(France and Luxembourg) adopt statutory income splitting by 
the operation of the very favourable quotient system; the 
same system also applies in Germany but, in addition, the 
spouses each have the right to elect for individual taxation 
and individual taxation applies mandatorily in Italy. 
Belgium adopts a system of its own. 
Disaggregation applies only to low-earning two- 
income families but where aggregation is retained the 
allowances available to spouses are more than twice those 
available to two single persons; in other words favourable 
treatment is available for a nil or low income spouse but 
the disadvantages of aggregation still apply to high income 
couples, once the benefit of the favourable allowances has 
been offset. The Netherlands system is very similar to 
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that of the United Kingdom although there is separate 
accountability. As far as children are concerned, both 
France and Luxembourg operate the very favourable quotient 
system; aggregation of a child's income with that of its 
parents used to operate in Germany but was declared 
unconstitutional in 1964; it still operates in Belgium 
but there it is accompanied by child allowances : child 
allowances are also available in Italy but there is no 
aggregation. There are no child allowances in the 
Netherlands, but there are child benefits. 
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1. Introductory 
So far in this Part the tax treatment of the 
family unit has been examined in ten countries; in five, 
individual taxation is the rule (Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, Ireland and Italy) ; in three, the favourable 
quotient system operates (France, Luxembourg, Germany). 
The remaining two countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) 
operate a system which has features in common with the 
present system in the United Kingdom but Belgium com- 
pensates for some of the disadvantages of aggregation by 
giving a married couple favourable allowances. 
The picture presented would, it is thought, give 
an unbalanced view of overseas jurisdictions if no reference 
were made to the Scandinavian countries, particularly Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden. These three countries have all 
promulgated laws regulating matrimonial property rights 
under a regime of "community of surplus"; predictably 
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they all operate an aggregation system for income tax pur- 
poses but each has now reached the stage of disaggregating 
a wife's earnings (but not her investment income). To this 
extent these countries reflect the present system in the 
United Kingdom but the identification is not complete as 
in each country some compensatory factor is present; in 
Norway spouses get more than double allowances and-better 
rate bands than single persons, and in Sweden and Denmark 
spouses get double allowances with the right for one spouse 
to utilise the unused portion of the other spouse's 
allowance (similar to the system of "transferable allowances" 
proposed in the Green Paper). 
In Denmark and Sweden there is separate accounting 
but joint liability applies in Norway unless an option for 
separate assessment is made : no country operates a system 
of husband's accountability. 
2. Norwa 
1 Matrimonial Property 
2 Income tax 
3) Children 
(1) Matrimonial property 
In the Scandinavian countries the property relations 
of spouses have, since the Middle Ages, been regulated 
according to variations of the community of property systems. 
In the 1920's the Scandinavian marital property law was 
changed by new uniform legislation; in Sweden this was the 
Marriage Code of 1920; in Denmark the Act of the Legal 
Effects of Marriage in 1925 and in Norway the Act on the 
Property Relations between spouses of 1927. Prior to the 
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1920's-: the community of property system had provided for 
the community to be administered by the husband but after 
the reforms the community became a "community of surplus" 
administered equally by the spouses and divided equally 
between them on the termination of the marriage. 
1 The law, 
in fact, recognises various matrimonial systems but, the 
system of "community of surplus" operates automatically°- 
without the need for any positive act by the spouses. 
2 
(2) Income tax 
A husband is normally taxable on his own income 
together with that of his wife,, but where both spouses are 
in receipt of earned income then either spouse may claim 
that the one with the smaller income be separately assessed 
in respect of such income. Although, therefore, aggregation 
of investment income applies, there are two favourable com- 
pensatory factors for married persons; first a married 
couple obtains twice the personal allowances available to 
twu single persons with the addition of a further smaller 
deduction from the earned income of the taxpayer's wife; 
and secondly the rate bands applicable to spouses are 
approximately li times those applicable to single persons 
at the lower ranges. 
3 
In addition to the right to disaggregate the 
lower earned income there is also an option for separate 
1. Scandinavian Studies in Law 1963 Vol-7. Allocation of 
Taxable Income and net wealth between spouses. Anti Suviranta, p. 153. 
2. Danish and Norwegian Law: A General Survey, edited by 
the Danish Committee on Comparative Law; p. 55. 
3. Income taxes outside the United Kingdom. And see also 
The Taxation Act of 18th August 1911, Chapter II, 
Norwegian Laws etc. Selected for the Foreign Service, 
p. 567. 
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assessment without alteration of total liability, similar 
to that available in the United Kingdom. 
(3) Children 
Where a child allowance is claimed, children are 
assessed with parents; income from earnings is, however, 
always assessed separately. Where the child is in receipt 
of income from assets transferred by a parent, the income 
is assessed on the parent. 
3. Denmark 
1) Matrimonial property 
2 Income tax 
3 Children 
(1) Matrimonial property 
The matrimonial property regime in Denmark is 
regulated by Act No. 56 of March 18th 1925; in the absence 
of contrary agreement a system of community property applies 
which gives each spouse a right to a one-half share in the 
community property at the end of the marriage. 
(2) Income tax 
Married persons are normally taxable on their 
aggregate income with the exception of a wife's income from 
an independent activity. Each individual is entitled to 
a basic deduction from tax (in 1981 16,000 kroner); a 
married man, however, receives twice this (32,000 kroner) 
if his wife has no separately assessed earned income. Where 
the wife does have-separately assessed earned income, the 
unutilised portion of the deductions due to one spouse may 
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be set off in charging the income of the other. 
(3) Children 
Children are separately assessed on their whole 
income except where such income is derived from gifts from 
their parents; there are no tax allowances for dependent 
children but there are cash benefits. 
4. Sweden 
1) Matrimonial property 
2 Income tax 
3 Children 
(1) Matrimonial property 
Sweden's Code of Laws, originally enacted in 1734, 
was revised substantially in the early years of this century 
and is still undergoing revision. 
l 
"The 1920 reform meant that the perogatives 
of the husband as head of the family and sole 
administrator of the community of marital 
property were done away with and both spouses 
were put on an equal footing as regards 
assets and liabilities". 
The Marriage Code of 1920 retained community of 
marital property to the extent of arranging for an 
equalisation of assets on the termination of the marriage. 
"The matrimonial property - or to be more 
precise the net assets of each spouse - is 
pooled and divided into two parts. This 
system is often referred to as a "deferred" 
community system. The spouse holding the 
larger balance has to transfer half of the 
difference to the other spouse". 
As in Norway and Denmark the legal regime of marital 
1. An Introductiän to Swedish'Law : Sig. Stromholm. Vä1.1. `' 
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property may be modified by marriage contract. 
(2) Income tax 
Each spouse is taxed individually on his or her 
earned income; however, for unearned income, separate 
accounting is retained but, in order to determine the rates, 
the joint investment income is, aggregated with. the earnings 
of the higher earner, after each spouse has enjoyed a slice 
of investment income taxed individually. Each individual 
receives an allowance of 6,000 kroner but if one spouse has 
an income (earned or unearned) which is less than that 
amount, then the allowance as- such cannot be transferred 
but a corresponding credit against tax is given to the other 
spouse. In addition, one spouse is also usually entitled to 
any deductions to which the other spouse was entitled but 
unable to claim because of insufficient income. 
Prior to 1971 the tax treatment of married couples 
in Sweden was very similar to that in the United Kingdom but 
the system was criticised 
"on the ground that 
other purposes, th 
treatment to every 
unmarried, male or 
was argued, should 
marital status". l 
for tax, as well as for 
e law should give equal 
individual, married or 
female. Taxation, it 
not depend on sex or 
In 1965 the Government appointed an expert committee 
to consider how joint taxation could be replaced with 
individual taxation; after the committee's report, reforms 
were introduced in 1970 to reflect the new, policy of 
individual taxation. 
1. The Tax System in Sweden, by Martin Norr and others. 
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"But the full change from joint to 
individual taxation could not readily 
be made at one time... Joint taxation 
therefore continues as to the unearned 
incomes of husbands and wives... The aim 
however is gradually to remove the 
remaining elements of joint taxation to 
make the system as nearly individual as 
possible". 
It is interesting to note that in order to effect 
the 1971 reform income tax rates were reduced for lower and 
middle bracket taxpayers and increased for upper bracket 
taxpayers; the loss in revenue was made up by an increase 
in the rate of VAT from 10 per cent to 15 per cent and an 
increase in the upper rates of the net wealth tax and the 
succession and gift taxes. 
(3) Children 
For income tax purposes a child's income, whether 
earned or earned, is not aggregated with the income of his 
parents: if the child's income exceeds his personal allowance 
a separate return must be filed by his parent or guardian on 
his behalf. 
5. Conclusions 
The development of matrimonial property in the 
three Scandinavian countries mentioned has followed a 
uniform course, as has also the development of the income 
tax system as it affects married persons. Although all 
three countries still retain aggregation of investment 
income, no country has a system of husband's accountability 
and all three operate a system of allowances that is more 
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advantageous to the one-earner couple than the system in 
the United Kingdom. 
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CHAPTER 14 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Section 
1. Matrimonial Property. 
2. Income -Tax. 
1. Matrimonial Property 
It is not possible within the scope of this 
thesis to examine each foreign jurisdiction and attention 
has therefore been focused on countries falling within 
three main categories of jurisdiction i. e. common law, 
civil law and Scandinavian law. However, it is thought 
that a short note of the position in the United States 
would not be without interest. The United States combines 
elements of both the common law and civil law jurisdictions; 
in the States of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and the State of Washington the 
community property system applies whereas in the other 
states the common law system of separate property prevails : 
statutes similar to the Married Women's Property Act have 
been enacted which give a wife almost unlimited control 
over her real and personal property. 
' However, even in 
those states which have inherited the principles of the 
common law, special provisions apply to prevent the sale 
or mortgage of the "homestead" without the concurrence of 
1. American Law of Real Property. Little Brown & Co. 
Vol. l. See also Powell on Real Property Vol. 1. P-117. 
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both husband and wife. 
The property laws of each state, therefore, 
reflect the historical provenance of the legal systems 
to which they owe their origin: the states which have 
adopted a community of property system were originally 
governed by French or Spanish laws; the states which have 
adopted a common law system were originally governed by 
English law. Income tax is, however, a federal tax and 
it is interesting to note that the rules adopted to govern 
the taxation of husband and wife owe much to both systems. 
(2) Income tax 
The basic principle is individual taxation but 
married couples may opt to be taxed under a "quotient" 
system; in this case a joint return is filed and statutory 
income splitting is applied; höwever, unlike the other 
jurisdictions which operate a quotient system (Ireland, 
France, Luxembourg and West Germany) the rate bands 
applicable to a married couple are not double those of a 
single person although they are greater; there is a 
personal exemption for each tax payer which can be claimed 
for a spouse also; and there is a minimum exemption limit 
of 2,300 dollars for individual tax payers, 3,400 dollars 
for married couples filing jointly and 1,700 dollars for 
married couples filing separately. 
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CHAPTER 15 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS - CONCLUSIONS 
The international comparisons reviewed in this 
Part of this thesis show that each country differs from 
each other country in at least one respect but that there 
area number of similarities between countries in the same 
type of jurisdiction : the common law countries favour 
individual taxation and the civil code and Scandinavian 
countries favour joint taxation but in the latter case a 
number of countries operate the favourable quotient system 
or at least favourable rate schedules. 
If the three principles of aggregation, 
accountability and allowances are analysed it will be noted 
that no other country is quite like the United Kingdom. 
Even where aggregation is retained only two countries operate 
a system of husband's accountability (France and Belgium); 
the other countries are able to operate a partial aggregation 
rule with either joint or separate accountability; and as 
far as allowances are concerned, most countries give all 
spouses (even one-income couples) two allowances, the only 
exception to this rule being the Netherlands. 
It is thought that these international comparisons 
are of interest for four main reasons; first they 
illustrate the fact that there is no one system which is 
'ideal' in all respects - each system has adapted to the 
circumstances in the country in which it operates; secondly, 
they illustrate the fact that a number of concepts which 
have been rejected in the studies and criticisms of the 
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United Kingdom system, for example, disaggregation, or 
the introduction of the quotient system, or the system 
of transferable allowances, can and do work perfectly well 
in other jurisdictions; thirdly, they illustrate a common 
theme of development and change over the years; and 
finally they illustrate the fact that the tax laws bear 
a close relation to the property laws in each country and 
that developments in matrimonial property law frequently 
lead to developments in income tax law. 
In considering, therefore, a system of taxation 
of husband and wife for operation in the United Kingdom 
the conclusion would appear to be that it is to the common 
law jurisdictions that one must look for guidance rather 
than to the civil law or Scandinavian jurisdictions and, 
as has been noted, all the common law jurisdictions now 
operate a system of individual taxation. 
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1. Introductory 
The objective of this thesis is to determine a 
method for taxation of the family unit, bearing in mind 
changing economic and social conditions. So far, this 
thesis has summarised the existing position in the United 
Kingdom; has traced the historical development of the 
underlying principles; has compared the tax treatment of 
the family during marriage with the tax treatment after 
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the termination of marriage; has analysed the studies 
and criticisms of the present system; and has examined 
the way in which the family is taxed in a number of 
overseas countries. This Part will consider the reforms 
which would be required to bring the tax treatment of the 
family unit into line with current conditions. 
It is considered that the future of the income 
tax rules as they affect husband and wife must consider 
separately the three principles of aggregation, accountability 
and the allowances; a deficiency of some previous studies' 
has been a failure adequately to differentiate between these 
three principles which, although interdependent, are 
separate concepts. The subject of tax avoidance is 
frequently raised when the future of the taxation of hus- 
band and wife is discussed and this will therefore be 
examined in' conjunction with the future of the capital 
taxes. Finally, the position of children will be considered. 
2. The Future of the Aggregation Rule 
1 Introductory 
2 The retention of the rule 
3 Alternatives to the rule 
4 Abolition of the rule - individual taxation 
5 The termination of marriage 
6 Overseas jurisdictions 
(1) Introductory 
Although section 37 Taxes Act 1970 provides for 
a complete aggregation of the incomes of husband and wife, 
the principle was widely breached by the enactment of 
section-23 Finance Act-l971 which provided for an election 
1. cf. The Meade Report; The Green Paper; Macdonald (IFS). 
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for the separate taxation of wife's earnings. However, 
the aggregation rule still retains three major compulsory 
applications, namely : the aggregation of the investment 
incomes of husband and wife; the restriction of the 
reliefs (e. g. mortgage interest relief) available to a 
married couple so that the two persons only receive one 
set of reliefs; and the rendering ineffective of 
inter-spouse transfers of income or assets for tax purposes. 
The future of the aggregation rule could lie in one of 
three directions : either in its retention; or in its 
replacement by an alternative system; or in its complete 
abolition when husband and wife would automatically become 
taxable as two single individuals. Each of these three 
possibilities will now be considered in turn; a reference 
will then be made to the position on the termination of 
marriage and finally the situation in some overseas countries 
will be compared. 
(2) The retention of the aggregation rule 
Fifteen reasons have been advanced over the years 
since the introduction of the aggregation rule to support 
its continued existence. Before reaching any conclusion 
as to whether the rule should or should not be retained each 
of these reasons will be referred to briefly. 
' 
Rl ? Aggregation neutralises proportions of income in 
household. First mentioned in 1894, this reason for 
retaining the aggregation rule has received support from 
1. The reasons are more fully developed in Chapter 7. 
2. The reasons for retention are preceded by the letter 'R' 
to distinquish them from the alternatives to aggregation 
(A) and the fundamental reasons for the repeal of 
Section 37(F). 
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distinguished quarters, including the Colwyn Commission, 
the Radcliffe Commission and the Meade Committee; it does, 
however, ignore the fact that income tax is a tax on 
individuals, not on households, and that it is fallacious 
to introduce the "household" as a comparative base when 
discussing married couples and not when discussing other 
households. The argument has lost much force since the 
general acceptance of the disaggregation of wives earnings, 
especially by the Meade Committee; it is now generally 
accepted that a two-earner couple will, and should, pay 
less tax than a one-earner couple with the same total 
income and if the principle is acceptable for earnings 
it should be equally acceptable for investment income. 
R2'.. Reform of the rule would cost too much. First used in 
1894, this reason for retaining the aggregation rule has 
been used on nine occasions since. The cost of the change 
in 1894 was £500,000 but in 1955 it had risen to £143M. 
However,, this latter figure could also have included the 
Tcostl of replacing the married man's allowance with two 
single persons allowances and the cost of disaggregation 
alone is not given. The current cost of disaggregation 
will depend on the number of wives whose investment income 
will be taxed at a lower rate and the number of wives who 
would take advantage of an additional set of reliefs or of 
transfers of income or assets from their husbands. 
1 
In considering the 'cost' of any change two 
points are of importance : first, the tax base should not be 
1. See "Investment Income of Husbands and Wives". Background 
Paper 3 for the Green Paper on Taxation of Husband and 
Wife: Note by the Inland Revenue. 
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confused with the tax yield : if the base is changed (e. g. 
by disaggregation) then the yield can remain the same if 
the rates are subsequently adjusted, although this can have 
political repercussions; secondly, it is necessary to 
distinguish the cost to the Exchequer resulting from any 
change from the administrative costs which flow from the 
change. As far as disaggregation is concerned it is 
thought that the administrative costs of a change would be 
slight, as one result of the abolition of the rule will be 
to eliminate the need to liaise between the tax offices of 
husband and wife; a further result would be the abolition 
of the options for separate assessment and separate taxation 
and also substantial reductions in the administrative com- 
plications which arise on marriage or the termination of 
marriage. 
R3. Married couples are members of one household and have 
a joint income. This reason against the reform of the 
aggregation rule was first put forward in 1907 and has been 
repeated on a number of occasions since; the irrelevance 
of the "joint household" concept is considered at TO. above; 
as far as the concept of "joint income" is concerned it 
is not correct to say that husband and wife have a 'joint 
income in the United Kingdom, unlike the. continental 
countries. 
1 There is no law of community property in this 
country; since 1882 a system of separate property has been 
established and it is the fact that the property system 
differs from the tax system that has given rise to the' 
accounting difficulties mentioned in Chapter S. 
1. See Chapter 12. 
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R4. Aggregation does not stop people from marrying. Although 
this argument against reform was put forward with conviction 
in 1907, and again as recently as 1955, it has not been 
mentioned since; in the debates on the new clause in 1969 
Mr. Jenkin stated that the tax laws were preventing at 
least one couple from getting married and an Article in 
the Times on Saturday 11th July 19821 described the views 
of a couple with two children who decided not to get married 
because of the adverse tax laws. 
R5. All cases of hardship are met by partial disaggregation 
of wives earnings. This reason against the total abolition 
of the aggregation rule is somewhat more subtle as it is 
true to a limited extent. However, the tax system operates 
on a principle of horizontal equity and not on a "hardship" 
factor for other taxpayers and it is irrelevant to introduce 
such a factor for married women only. If the "hardship" 
factor were extended to other taxpayers it could be used 
to justify the confiscation of incomes in excess of a 
minimum subsistence level. Finally, it could be regarded 
as a "hardship" for a married woman to be taxed at her 
husband's higher tax rate on a small amount of, say, 
building society interest earned from savings made from 
her own earnings. 
2 
R6. Disaggregation would lead to tax avoidance through 
transfers of property. First mentioned in 1909 and repeated 
by Colwyn, Radcliffe and Meade, this argument against reform 
1. By Lorna Bourke. 
2. See Background Paper 3 which indicates that most invest- 
ment income consists of building Society interest or 
interest not taxed before receipt (including National 
Savings Bank interest); page 13, paragraph VII. 
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is repeated in the Green Paper. It does, however, over- 
look a number of points. First, disaggregation would 
result in a number of changes which are unrelated to 
inter-spouse transfers (e. g. doubling of reliefs and 
separate taxation of wives investment income derived, 
from earnings) and it appears unjust to deny these 
reforms merely because tax avoidance by income splitting 
might take place. In any event, although it is assumed 
that income splitting is undesirable, this has not been 
justified : non-married persons can make tax. effective property 
and income: transfers so long as they are bona fide but the 
loss of control is a genuine deterrent to abuse and the 
yield from the capital taxes on such transfers goes some 
way towards compensating for loss of income tax. 
' Even if 
the conclusion were to be reached that inter-spouse transfers 
should be controlled this could be effected by the enact- 
ment of "settlement" provisions similar to those at present 
in force and which apply to transfers for the benefit of 
minor children and this could then be accompanied by the 
abolition of the aggregation rule. 
R7. Husband and wife zet advantages with death duties. 
Mentioned in Colwyn, Radcliffe and Meade, this statement is 
more true today than it was when it was first mentioned 
(1914). However, the present capital transfer tax 
exemption, although generous, is not considered to be an 
adequate recompense for the refusal to disaggregate 
incomes : aggregation penalises couples with two incomes 
1. See further Part 5 of this Chapter - tax avoidance 
Page 624. 
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whereas the capital transfer tax exemptions only assist 
couples where one spouse wishes to make large transfers 
of capital to the other; the two categories of couple 
are not identical. To the extent that there is any 
validity in this point the solution is to disaggregate 
incomes and then adjust the capital taxes. 
' 
R8. Disaggregation would not be used in practice. Put 
forward as a reason against reform in 1914, this argument 
has, understandably, not been used since. The responses 
to the 1980 Green Paper have been overwhelmingly in favour 
of a change to individual taxation. 
R9. Disaggregation would result in the abolition of the 
married man's allowance. The married man's allowance was 
first introduced in 1920 and this reason against reform 
has been mentioned by the four main studies published since 
that date (Colwyn, Radcliffe, Meade and the Green Paper). 
However, it shows a deep confusion between the two distinct 
principles of aggregation and the allowances. It would be 
perfectly possible to effect disaggregation by the repeal 
of sections 37-42 Taxes Act without any amendment at all 
to the allowances which are governed by section 10 Taxes 
Act. Although it is most likely that the allowances would 
receive attention at the same time, and that the married 
man's allowance would in fact be abolished, it could be 
replaced by an even more advantageous system. 
2 
R10. The obligations of marriage are recognised by the 
married man's allowance. This reason against reform also 
1. See further Part 6 of this Chapter - The capital taxes - 
Page 627. 
2. See further Part 4 of this Chapter - the future of the 
allowances. 
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confuses the principles of disaggregation and the allowances : 
the married man's allowance is in fact not adequate to 
recognise the obligations of marriage within the system 
of the allowances' and, further, the system of aggregation 
cannot be justified merely by saying that the system of 
allowances is satisfactory as the two concepts are-distinct. 
Rll. At lower income levels a married couple are better 
off than two single persons. This reason against reform 
has only been available since 1942 when the wife's-earnings 
allowance was increased to that of a single person with no 
corresponding reduction in the married man's allowance. 
The argument is mainly concerned with the allowances, and 
not with aggregation, although perhaps it is true to say 
that some low income couples are better off than two single 
persons but this can only occur when the wife has little 
investment income but also has earnings, and where the 
wife has no wish to avail herself of a second set of reliefs. 
R12. Husband and wife both earning pay less tax than if 
all income earned by husband. In a progressive tax system 
this statement is true for all taxpayers so that where an 
income of any size is-enjoyed by one person, he will pay 
more tax than would be paid if-the same income were enjoyed 
by two or more persons. This statement cannot, therefore, 
be used to support the aggregation rule. 
R13.. Married women work for satisfaction and not for money. 
Originally put forward in 1969 to explaip. why a proposal 
for disaggregation of wives earnings was not then supported, 
this reason has wisely not been mentioned since; it does, 
1. See further Part 4 of this Chapter - The future of the 
allowances. 
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however, illustrate the lengths to which Government 
Ministers will sometimes go in attempting to defend the 
status quo. 
R14. The Royal Commission did not favour disaggregation. 
The views of the Royal Commission (in the Radcliffe 
Report) are fully discussed in Chapter 7; 
1 
although the 
Commission did not favour disaggregation it has been noted 
above2 that the inability of the Commission to see married 
couples as two persons rather than one seriously affected 
the quality of their recommendation. 
Rte. The present rule only adversely affects a few higher- 
rate taxpayers. This reason against reform is not in fact 
correct; the aggregation rule does not only affect a few 
higher-rate taxpayers. It affects any married woman with 
investment income of any amount whose husband either pays 
higher rate tax or where the couple have joint investment 
income in excess of the threshold so that the additional 
rate applies. About 2JM wives receive investment income3 
either jointly with their husbands or separately, and of 
total investment income, 32 per cent is received by wives 04 
Although the figures make it clear that most investment 
income is well within the threshold, so that the additional 
rate is not often relevant, it is likely that many wives 
with investment income will be married to husbands who are 
taxed at the higher rate on their earnings. 
5 The rule 
1. Page 361. 
2. Page 370. 
3. Background Paper 3 page 5. 
4. Background Paper 3 page 12 (iii). 
5. Although there are no statistics to support this. 
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therefore adversely affects women who are married to 
higher rate taxpayers, even though their own investment 
income is small; it also adversely affects all couples 
where advantage could be taken of a second set of reliefs. 
Even if the aggregation rule did only adversely 
affect a few higher rate taxpayers, that is no reason why 
it should not be reformed: an injustice to one category 
of taxpayers is still an injustice which should be remedied : 
this neBd. _ not result in any additional burden on standard 
rate taxpayers as it should be possible to adjust the higher 
rates of tax and bands so as to ensure that the burdens are 
shared equally between all categories of higher rate tax- 
payers. 
Conclusion 
From the above it will be concluded that the 
retention of the aggregation rule cannot be defended and, 
as it perpetuates an injustice against married persons, it 
should-be repealed. The question then arises as to whether 
it should be replaced by one of the alternatives to 
aggregation or merely abolished leaving a system of 
individual taxation. Both possibilities will now be reviewed. 
(3) Alternatives to the aggregation rule 
During the years since the aggregation rule was 
introduced no less than fourteen alternatives have been 
proposed and each will now be examined. 
Al. Partial disaggregation of wife+s earnings only. Originally 
introduced in 1894, abolished in 1920 and re-introduced in 
1971 the partial disaggregation of wife's earnings is still 
the only possible alternative to the aggregation rule but it 
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is not an adequate alternative to complete disaggregation; 
apart from the fact that the areas of aggregation'which 
remain create injustice and a tax on marriage, the 
procedural aspects of the option can cause difficulties; 
because the exercise of the election results in the loss 
of the married man's allowance, both spouses have to consent 
to its exercise and there is thus no entitlement for a 
married woman to have her earnings separately taxed : if 
her husband refuses to join in the election her earnings 
are taxed at his highest rate. Although it is possible for 
separate taxation to operate with separate accounting, this 
requires the additional exercise of the option for separate 
assessment with all the resulting complexities. 
A2. The quotient system. Originally proposed in 1907 and 
discussed by Colwyn, Radcliffe and Meade, and again con- 
sidered in the Green Paper, the quotient system is a 
genuine alternative to disaggregation; under this system 
the incomes of husband and-wife are added together and then 
halved and the allowances and rate bands are applied 
separately to each half. This system is most advantageous 
for a married couple and would give married persons 
advantages as compared with single taxpayers, especially 
where one spouse has a nil or low income. It is tempting 
to put forward the quotient system as the ideal way in which 
to tax married persons but it is thought that on the whole 
the system should not be recommended for adoption in the 
United Kingdom for the following reasons: - 
(1) The quotient system is adopted in a number of 
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continental countries1 where the system . of 
matrimonial property is that of the "community" 
where the spouses have a joint interest in assets 
acquired during the marriage; as the quotient system has 
to operate through joint accounting, with either 
husband's or joint liability, it is particularly 
appropriate to community property systems. 
However, in the United Kingdom a system of 
separation of goods has existed since 1882 : the 
difficulties which have arisen from the mismatch 
of the property laws and the accountability rules 
are fully discussed in Chapter 8 and it is thought 
that a quotient system would give rise to similar 
difficulties in the United Kingdom. Husband's 
accountability is not likely to be acceptable and 
joint liability would remove the privacy at present 
enjoyed by married men while at the same time 
placing a liability for her husband's income tax 
on a wife with nil or low income. - 
(2) The history of the aggregation rule in the United 
Kingdom reveals how difficult it has been to per- 
suade the authorities to reduce or eliminate the 
disadvantages of married persons; it is thought 
that the recommendation of a quotient system would 
stand very little chance of success and that it 
would be more. advisable to recommend reforms which 
might have some chance of being acceptable. 
1. France, Luxembourg, Germany; it is also available as a 
very recently (1980) introduced option in Ireland and 
also in the United States where a number of states 
operate systems of community property for married persons. 
600 
A3. Partial disaggregation of all income up to a 
specified limit. Originally put forward in 1914, this 
alternative to aggregation would meet the criticisms of 
those who consider that complete disaggregation would only 
benefit a few higher rate taxpayers, but it has a number 
of disadvantages. First, it would not wholly remove the 
tax on marriage; next, because the limit proposed is a 
joint limit, a wife's entitlement to partial disaggregation 
of her investment income could depend completely on the 
amount of her husband's earnings and investment income. 
Again, the proposal does not assist in removing the other 
adverse effects of aggregation, i. e. the loss of reliefs 
etc; finally, a system of joint accounting would be 
required unless husband's accountability was retained : the 
disadvantages of this are mentioned in A2 (1) above. 
A. A percentage deduction from the tax paid by a married 
couple. Also proposed in 1914, this was another somewhat 
desperate attempt to make some inroad into the aggregation 
rule but it is not considered to be an adequate alternative 
to complete disaggregation : it would not remove completely 
the tax on marriage; it would require at least a system 
of joint accounting; it would be complicated to administer 
(especially under the PAYE system); and it does not 
assist with the removal of'the other disadvantages of the 
aggregation rule. 
A. Separate taxation with wife allowance. This is the 
system adopted in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, 
and is optional in Ireland, Germany and the United States 
of America. It was mentioned by the Radcliffe Commission 
but not considered. The implications of'the "wife 
6o1 
allowance" will be considered later' but as far as 
aggregation is concerned it is thought that this is the 
best, and only, alternative. 
A6. Separate taxation with option to choose quotient system. 
This is a mixture of A2 and A5 and is the system adopted in 
Ireland, West Germany and the United States; it has 
advantages over the straight quotient system (A2 above) as 
the spouses are given the right to individual taxation with 
separate accounting if that is desired with the option of 
choosing the quotient system if the disadvantages of joint 
accounting are acceptable. However, although this sy6tem 
could be regarded as an ideal alternative to aggregation 
it is thought that it would not be acceptable to the 
authorities for the reasons mentioned in A2 (2) above, 
namely that it would shift the balance of advantage in 
favour of married persons, and it is for this reason that 
it will not be recommended. 
A7. Separate taxation of earnings : All investment income 
added to highest earner's income. Alternatives 7-10 were 
first proposed in the Meade Report and could be termed the 
Meade variants. This first Meade variant is in fact the 
system which is in force in Sweden although in Sweden each 
spouse enjoys a slice of investment income taxed individually; 
in Sweden the system operates with separate accounting. The 
disadvantages of this alternative are that it preserves the 
tax on marriage and further removes the possibility (albeit 
anomalous) which exists at present under which a couple 
where the wife has high earnings and high investment income 
and the husband has low, earnings and low investment income; 
1. See Part 4 of this Chapter - The future of the allowances. 
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can reduce the total tax liability by electing for dis- 
aggregation of the wife's earnings. Meade Variant l is 
therefore seen as a regressive alternative to the present 
system and it will be recalled that it was not considered 
to be satisfactory even in Sweden. 
' 
A8. Separate taxation for earnings. Quotient for invest- 
ment income. This is Meade Variant 2: the disadvantages 
of a quotient system for investment income are the same as 
those for the general quotient system mentioned in A2 above 
- namely, the necessity for joint accounting and the fact 
that the system is unlikely to appeal to the authorities 
as:. it would create positive advantages for married persons; 
it would also benefit couples with investment income 
(statutorily split) as against those with only earned 
income (no split); finally, it does not deal with the 
problem of the double set of reliefs. 
A9 A married couple progressive scale of one and a half 
times. Meade Variant 3 is the system adopted, to a limited 
extent, in the United States of America which operates a 
quotient system where the joint incomes are aggregated but 
where the rate bands which-are applied are not double those 
of a single person'but somewhere in between. This Variant 
would benefit couples with one-earner where one spouse has 
a nil or low income but its disadvantages are that it 
retains joint accounting; it does not completely remove 
the tax on marriage for two earner couples and it does not 
adequately deal with the other effects of aggregation (e. g. 
reliefs). In the United States of America this'system 
1. See Chapter 13 page 577. 
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operates as an alternative to an individual system of 
taxation and can therefore be chosen in those cases where 
it is beneficial but it is not compulsory. 
A10. Separate taxation of earnings : investment income 
taxed at l times scale on aggregated amount. This is 
Meade Variant 4 and is the system adopted in Norway; Norway 
is a "community'property" country and joint accounting is 
more appropriate under such a system than it would be in 
the United Kingdom. This alternative would benefit couples 
where one partner has little or no investment income but 
it would not remove the tax on marriage for couples where 
entitlement to investment income is more or less equally 
divided and it does not deal with the other effects of 
aggregation. 
All. Joint taxation. Joint taxation is the first of four 
alternatives proposed in the Green Paper. It would alter 
the sense of the aggregation rule in section 37 Taxes Act 
so as to impose a joint liability on husband and wife for 
tax on the joint income. Apart from the fact that this 
alternative does nothing to reduce the quantum of tax 
payable as a result of aggregation, thus perpetuating 
the tax on marriage, it has the serious disadvantage of 
removing the privacy at present enjoyed by married men and 
imposing a new liability on married women who may have 
little or no income. 
A12. Re-wording the aggregation rule. The second 
alternative proposed by the Green Paper was to re-word the 
aggregation'rule so as to "treat the income of husband and 
wife as if it were one income"' rather than, as at present, 
1. Paragraph 44. 
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to deem the wife's income as part of the husband's income. 
This alternative is of cosmetic significance only and 
solves none of the problems of aggregation. 
Ala. Option for individual taxation. The third alternative 
proposed by the Green Paper is an option for individual 
taxation; although, once the option was exercised, 
separate accounting would result, some exchange of 
information would be required before the option could be 
exercised; it would not be possible for one spouse alone 
to exercise the option; and it is not clear whether the 
option would remove all the other effects of aggregation; 
although perhaps a double set of reliefs would become 
available, the Green Paper does indicate that anti-avoidance 
measures would be needed to nullify inter-spouse transfers. 
A14. Option for equal split of allowances and rate bands. 
This fourth alternative proposed by the Green Paper is 
really only a variant on the existing option for separate 
assessment; although it would, to some extent, simplify 
the accounting procedures under that option it is still 
open to the criticism that it does nothing to reduce the 
adverse effects of aggregation and, once again, spouses 
would not be able to check whether the Inland Revenue had 
correctly apportioned the allowances and reliefs. 
Conclusion: 
Of all the alternatives to aggregation which have 
been proposed only two are free of disadvantages, namely 
the quotient system and individual taxation. Although the 
quotient system is advantageous to married couples, it does 
require a system of joint accounting (or husband's 
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accounting) and this could cause difficulties in the 
United Kingdom; the system also perpetuates a special 
treatment for married couples and it is the underlying 
theme of this thesis that, as far as the tax system is con- 
cerned, husband and wife should be treated as two 
individuals; finally there is no certainty that the 
introduction of a quotient system would deal with the 
question of the reliefs. In a number of countries where 
the quotient system is adopted, it is in fact an alternative 
to individual taxation so married couples cannot lose. 
However, in view of the difficulties which have been 
experienced in obtaining equal treatment for married persons 
it is thought that the quotient system would not be likely 
to find favour with the authorities and, if it were to be 
recommended, there might be no reform at all. The con- 
clusion, therefore, is that the only acceptable alternative 
to the present system is individual taxation. 
(4) The abolition of the aggregation rule 
As far as the aggregation rule is concerned' the 
adoption of individual taxation in the United Kingdom would 
be very simple to carry through into legislation as it 
would only be necessary to repeal sections 37-42 Taxes Act 
and to make a number of small amendments to the mortgage 
interest relief and similar provisions. It is considered 
that the individual basis of taxation is the only basis 
which provides a complete answer to the six fundamental 
1. The subjects of accountability and allowances are 
dealt with later. 
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reasons for reform put forward on so many occasions in the 
past. The six reasons are: - 
Fl. The tax laws should follow the property laws. The 
existence of the present aggregation rule is a historical 
accident : if income tax had been introduced into the 
United Kingdom after the enactment of the Married Women's 
Property Act 1882, as happened in Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada, individual taxation would have been the rule. 
Even in 1894 the delay in the tax laws catching up with 
the property laws was considered to be "astonishing". 
Because there has never been any sustem of matrimonial 
community property in the United Kingdom, the otherwise 
advantageous "quotient system" would not really be 
appropriate in this country, and the'same comment could 
be made of any system which would require joint accounting. 
F2. Reform is demanded by many people. Reform of the 
present rule, and the introduction of individual taxation, 
was first demanded in 1894 and has been regularly demanded 
ever since : although a number of other alternatives have 
been put forward by learned commentators the fact remains 
that the taxpaying public is overwhelmingly in favour of 
individual taxation. 
1 
FF3. The tax laws should be consistent between themselves. 
When estate duty was introduced the Inland Revenue chose to 
ignore all the reasons which had previously been put forward 
in favour of aggregation for income tax purposes and decided 
to treat husband and wife as separate persons (thus 
increasing their estate duty liability). Since then, the 
1. IFS commentary on responses to the Green Paper. 
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capital taxes have developed with a number of inconsistencies; ' 
it is thought that only with a system of individual taxation 
can all these inconsistencies be removed. 
F4. There should be no penalty on marriage. Almost all 
those who have expressed an opinion on this subject have 
been forced to conclude that it is wrong to place a tax 
penalty on marriage : the removal of such a penalty can only 
be achieved by the introduction of individual taxation, 
which is neutral as between husband and wife, or by a quotient 
system which gives positive benefits to married persons. It 
is interesting to note that two countries which give married 
taxpayers an option to. choose individual taxation or the 
quotient system (Ireland and West Germany) both have written 
constitutions which protect the equality of all citizens 
and the state of marriage and the family : if the United 
Kingdom had such a constitution the present tax laws would 
be repugnant to it. However, the quotient system is not 
recommended for adoption in the United Kingdom, for the 
2 
reasons outlined above and individual taxation is the only 
remaining system which removes all the tax penalties on 
marriage. 
Husband and wife are two persons and should be taxed 
as such. It is clear from many of the studies on this 
subject that the commentators believe that the fact of 
marriage detracts from the legal personality of the wife : 
this is'not stated openly but it underlies many of the 
comments made; in particular the concepts of "husband and 
1. See Chapter 5. 
2. Page 599. 
608 
wife", "family" and "household" are frequently confused with 
many resulting illogicalities. These subconscious attitudes 
may have been formed by the tax legislation itself but in 
all other areas of the law the old rule that a wife's per- 
sonality merged with that of her husband on marriage, has 
now been completely abandoned. 
l 
F6. The principle of equality gives the right to separate 
taxation. If income tax had been introduced in 1982-it 
would be impossible to justify any system for the taxation 
of spouses, other than the system of individual taxation. 
(5) The termination of marriage 
Before concluding this review of the future of 
the aggregation rule it may be helpful to consider how a 
system of individual taxation would apply on the termination 
of marriage and how it compares with systems adopted in over- 
seas jurisdictions. 
Under the present law aggregation ceases on the 
termination of marriage, whether by separation or death, 
when individual taxation is then applied. The introduction 
of a system of individual taxation during marriage would 
ease the transition on its termination and, further, would 
eliminate many of the inequities which now exist between 
married couples on the one hand and separated spouses on the 
other - it would remove the tax incentive to divorce. 
2 
l., Cf Midland Bank Trust Company v. Green (1981) 3ALL E. R. 744 
(conspiracy) and Routhan v Arum District Council (1981) 
3 E. R. 752. (Rates). 
2. See Chapter 3. 
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(6) Overseas jurisdictions 
In Chapter 13 the conclusion was reached that 
it is to the common law jurisdictions that one must look 
for guidance in considering an appropriate system for the 
United Kingdom; Australia, New Zealand and Canada have 
always adopted individual taxation; Ireland has recently 
adopted individual taxation with the option of a quotient 
system and the United States of America has an option 
similar to that of Ireland. The predominating system 
adopted -in-the common 
law countries is, therefore, 
individual taxation. 
(7) Conclusions 
One is lead to the conclusion, therefore, that 
the aggregation rule should be repealed so that husband and 
wife are treated as separate individuals. for all tax pur- 
poses; the remaining Parts of this Chapter proceed on 
the basis that such a reform should be implemented. 
3. The Future of the Accountability Rule. 
1 The present system 
2 Joint liability 
3 Individual liability 
4 Conclusion 
If the aggregation rule were abolished by the 
repeal of sections 37-42 Taxes Act and other consequential 
amendments, the principle of husband's accountability would 
automatically be repealed at the same time. It may be 
useful here to consider whether that would be desirable 
or whether some alternative rule should be introduced. 
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There are three possibilities : either to retain the 
present system, with the option for separate assessment, 
or to provide for joint liability; or to allow individual 
accountability to operate. 
(1) The present system 
The deficiencies of the present system are fully 
discussed in Chapter 8 and may be summarised as follows: - 
(1) Although the primary liability for making a wife's 
return rests on the husband, the Inland Revenue 
also have the additional right to require a wife 
to make a return, Jut this does not discharge the 
husband's responsibility; 
(2) A husband has complete privacy but the wife has 
none; 
(3) A husband is liable to make a return of his wife's 
income but has no right to demand the information 
from her and has no sanction if she refuses to 
provide it; 
(4) A husband is responsible for paying his wife's tax 
but has no entitlement to recover it from her; 
(5) A wife's repayments are sent to her husband unless 
she is taxed under schedule E and the joint income 
is not liable to higher rate tax; 
(6) A married woman's allowances, expenses and reliefs 
must be claimed by her, husband and she cannot 
insist that such a claim be made;. 
(7) A husband is entitled to his wife's reliefs and 
allowances, including mortgage interest relief 
611 
on interest paid by her on a mortgage on a house 
solely owned by her; she can only be given the 
relief with his consent. 
An option for separate assessment will solve 
these problems but creates difficulties of its own : the 
accounting is extremely complex; the option is not widely 
known; neither spouse has sufficient information to check 
that the allocation of reliefs and allowances has been 
carried out correctly by the Inland Revenue; and the system 
of allocation of reliefs means that the spouses can guess 
at each other's income, thus reducing the privacy of the 
husband without giving complete privacy to the wife. 
(2) Joint liability 
It is clear that the present system is unsatis- 
factory and there is no doubt that joint liability and 
accounting would solve a number of the problems outlined 
above. However joint liability is open to the two serious 
objections that it destroys the husband's right to privacy 
and imposes a new obligation for the husband's tax on the 
wife, who may have little or no income. 
(3) Individual liability 
The conclusion is therefore reached that only a 
system of individual liability adequately meetm all the 
objections made to the present system and to joint 
liability. Individual liability would also ease the tran- 
sition at the termination of marriage when a married woman 
immediately becomes personally liable for her own income 
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tax affairs. Finally, all the overseas countries which 
l 
adopt individual taxation also adopt individual liability. 
(4) Conclusion 
Although aggregation and accountability are 
separate concepts, and one can exist without the other, 
nevertheless it is concluded that if the aggregation rule 
in sections 37-42 Taxes Act is repealed, in order to 
abolish the principle of aggregation, then the repeal of 
the principle of husband's accountability should also 
follow, making husbands and wives individually responsible 
for their own tax affairs. 
4. The Future of the Allowances 
1 The position on abolition of aggregation 
2 The position under individual taxation 
3 The married woman's right to a full 
personal allowance 
4 The nil or low income spouse 
5 Transferred income 
6 Overseas comparisons 
7 Support for dependants 
(8 The transferable allowance 
(9 A compromise solution 
10 The political implications of change 
11 The cash benefit alternative 
12 Conclusion 
(1) The position on the abolition of aggregation 
The future of the allowances does not depend on 
the future of the aggregation rule, although the concepts 
are not frequently distinguished. It may therefore be' 
helpful to commence this consideration of the future of 
the allowances by describing the results of the repeal of 
the aggregation rule and the effect that would have on the 
allowances. 
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The repeal of sections 37-42 Taxes Act would 
leave unamended the provisions of section 8 Taxes Act; 
a husband would therefore remain entitled to the higher 
married man's allowance under section 8(1)(a) and to a 
further allowance in respect of his wife's earnings under 
section 8(2). However, a married woman would automatically 
become an individual in her own right and so she would, in 
addition, become entitled to her own single personal 
allowance under section 8(l)(b) for use against either her 
earned or unearned income. Clearly, this result would be 
over-advantageous for 'a married man and consideration would 
then need to be given to a restructuring of the allowances 
to accord with the system of individual taxation. 
(2) The position under individual taxation 
The logic of individual taxation would point 
towards the desirability of both husband and wife receiving 
a single person's allowance. This could be achieved by the 
simple repeal of sections 8(l)(a) and (2) leaving both 
husband and wife to be taxed as single individuals. The 
husband would lose the married man's allowance' and the 
wife's earned income allowance and the wife would gain an 
allowance of her own. 
(3) The married woman's right to a full personal allowance 
The view has been expressed on a number of 
occasions that a married woman should not be entitled to 
1. The loss of the married man's allowance was strongly 
recommended by the Meade Committee and by the Equal 
Opportunities Commission. 
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use her personal allowance against investment income on 
the ground that this represents a "state subsidy" for the 
idle rich. Now this argument ignores two facts; first all 
men and single women are entitled to use their personal 
allowance against investment income and, indeed, a married 
man can use his higher married man's allowance against 
investment income; there is no justification for refusing 
a "state subsidy" to idle rich married women while retaining 
it for idle rich men and single women. If it were proposed 
to withdraw the personal allowance for all investment income 
then perhaps the point could be justified but the con- 
sideration of such a proposal is outside the scope of this 
thesis. Secondly, any special treatment of this nature for 
married women only, immediately creates a penalty on marriage. 
For these two reasons it is thought that there is no 
justification for restricting a married woman's personal 
allowance to earned income. 
(4) The nil or low income spouse 
It is clear that a system of individual taxation 
requires that special consideration be given to the case of 
the nil or low income spouse who is not able to utilise the 
full personal allowance : it is sometimes thought that the 
logic of individual taxation would result in such allowance 
being lost but this conclusion ignores the arrangements 
which at present exist for transferred income. 
(5) Transferred income 
All taxpayers who do not enjoy sufficient income 
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to utilise their personal allowances may take advantage 
of the deed of covenant procedure and use the balance of 
their allowance against income transferred to them by 
another taxpayer : the payer deducts tax at the basic 
rate on payment and the recipient reclaims tax from the 
Inland Revenue. 1 There is an argument that this procedure 
is anomalous2 but the fact remains that it is at present 
available for all taxpayers other than married women and 
infant children; it is this procedure which, in effect, 
gives tax relief for maintenance paid on the termination 
of the marriage. When the aggregation rule is abolished 
the procedure would automatically become available for 
married women if the consequential amendments in the "settle- 
ment provisions" are repealed. Under this procedure, it is 
the recipient who is entitled to the allowance and who is 
entitled to claim a repayment from the Inland Revenue. 
Accordingly, if no further legislation were enacted, 
and if the references to spouses were deleted from the 
"settlement provisions", this procedure would entitle a 
3 
nil or low earning spouse to utilise the full personal 
allowance. However, it is appreciated that this particular 
procedure could give rise to administrative difficulties if 
used by the 6-M spouses with nil or low incomes; each would 
have to complete a tax return form and would be entitled to 
a repayment at the end of the tax year; further, details 
1. For a full description of the procedure see Potter and 
Monroe, Tax Planning with Precedents. 
2. See B. T. R. 1981 PP. 263,282 and 284. 
3. Especially sections 445 and 447 Taxes Act. 
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of the payment would have to appear on the paying spouse's 
tax return : accordingly, for administrative reasons-it 
may be desirable to look for a solution in another direction 
but the fact should not be lost sight of that the mere 
abolition of the aggregation rule and its consequential 
amendments would make the transferred income procedure. available 
for married women in the same way as it is available for 
all other taxpayers. 
(6) Overseas comparisons 
In considering alternative solutions to the way 
in which a personal allowance can be enjoyed by a nil or 
low earning spouse it may be helpful to recall the ways in 
which the matter is dealt with in some overseas countries. 
The five countries operating the quotient system do not, 
of course, have any difficulty and all the other countries 
mentioned in Part III make some allowance for a supported 
spouse. Of the countries which adopt individual taxation, 
Australia gives a rebate for any person who contributes 
towards the maintenance of a spouse, daughter, housekeeper 
or parent, New Zealand gives a dependent spouse rebate 
(in practice also allowed for a de facto spouse) which is 
reduced by reference to the supported spouse's income; 
and Canada permits one spouse to claim the unused portion 
of the other spouse's allowance if a joint return is filed. 
Of the continental countries, Italy gives a 
"wife allowance" which is twice the amount of the single 
allowance, but which is lost if the wife has income in 
excess of a stated limit; Belgium gives a complicated 
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system of allowances which are on the whole more 
advantageous than two single allowances and the Netherlands 
is the only country to follow the present United Kingdom 
practice of giving a nil-earner couple less than two 
single allowances. Of the three Scandinavian countries, 
Norway gives more than double allowances to a married couple 
and Sweden and Denmark give double allowances with the 
right to utilise the other spouse's unused portion. 
It is considered that it is to the countries which 
have a common law jurisdiction, and which now operate 
individual taxation, to which one should look for guidance 
for the future of the United Kingdom system and here two 
distinct possibilities are revealed ; first the allowance 
given to the supporting spouse, as in Australia and New 
Zealand, possibly reducing by reference to the supported 
spouse's income as in New Zealand; or the use by one spouse 
of the unused portion, of the other spouse's allowance if a 
joint return is filed, as in Canada. Each of these 
possibilities will now be considered. 
(7) Support for dependants 
There are a number of precedents in the United 
Kingdom tax system for an allowance to be made available 
to taxpayers who support others; the wife allowance was 
introduced on this basis and this was the basis of the old 
child allowance and is presently the basis of the additional 
allowance in respect of children for single parents con- 
tained in section 14 Taxes Act; it is also the basis for 
the housekeeper allowance under section 12 Taxes Act and 
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for the dependent relative allowance under section 16. A 
feature of all these allowances is that they. are given to 
the supporting (and not to the supported) taxpayer. None 
of these allowances amount to a full personal allowance and 
indeed it is understood that no increase will be made in the 
housekeeper and dependent relative allowance as they are 
considered to be anomalous; but the additional allowance in 
respect of a child, in section 14, is substantial (being 
the difference between the married man's allowance and the 
single person's allowance) and is regularly increased in 
line with the personal allowances. Although this allowance 
does not regress according to the income enjoyed by the 
child, such regression was a feature of the old child 
allowance; Section 10(5) Taxes Act provided that where 
a child was in receipt of income in his own right in excess 
of a certain figure the child allowance was reduced by the 
amount of the excess. It would not, therefore, be difficult 
to enact a provision for a dependent spouse allowance equal 
to the full single personal allowance with a provision that 
the allowance should reduce by reference to the income 
(earned or unearned) of the supported spouse. 
Here it may be noted that if, as in the old child 
allowance, provision was made for the reduction of the 
allowance only after income reached a (small) limit, then 
'the supported spouse's right to privacy in respect of small 
amounts of investment income could be maintained and, to 
the extent that a pound for pound reduction would be a 
disincentive for the supported spouse to seek work, such 
disincentive would be reduced. 
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If a spouse allowance were enacted on these lines 
then there would be no advantages to be gained from the use 
of the deed of covenant procedure which would not then be 
utilised by married women. Throughout this thesis the 
point has constantly been made that married women should be 
treated in exactly the same way as all other taxpayers and 
it may therefore appear illogical to propose a new allowance 
for spouses only. Of course, such an allowance could be 
formulated as a dependent's allowance and made available to 
all taxpayers who supported other taxpayers with nil or low 
incomes, or perhaps limited to certain categories of 
dependent as in Australia. However, such taxpayers can, in 
any event, utilise the deed of covenant procedure and the 
'spouses allowance' is in fact proposed on the basis that 
if a large number of supported spouses used the deed of 
covenant procedure, many administrative problems would be 
created. The 'spouse allowance' does not therefore create 
a new allowance only for spouses but merely proposes a 
special procedure for spouses to claim the allowance to 
which they are, in any event, entitled. 
(8) The transferable allowance 
The enactment of a spouse allowance on the lines 
proposed would in practice achieve the same result as the 
"transferable allowance" proposed in the Green Paper and 
in use in Canada. However, the transferable allowance has 
a somewhat different emphasis as its use requires the 
consent of the supported spouse, whereas the spouse allowance 
would be claimed solely by the supporting spouse. The 
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transferable allowance makes it clear that it belongs 
initially to the supported spouse and in Canada the 
allowance can only be .. 
transferred if the spouses file 
a joint return. 
The principles underlying the transferable 
allowance are considered to be preferable but ultimately 
it is the most practical and, acceptable system which will be 
adopted.. It is thought that the requirement of a joint 
return might not be very acceptable in the United Kingdom 
as it would destroy the husband's right to privacy and 
would, in any event, represent a departure from the 
principles of individual taxation. 
(9) A compromise solution 
A compromise solution. therefore might be to 
provide that the new spouses allowance could only be claimed 
by the supporting spouse if the supported spouse makes a 
claim that the allowance should, be transferred : this 
could be done by the submission of a tax return showing 
a nil or low income and consenting to the use of the 
unused personal allowance by the supporting spouse. A 
requirement, for married women to submit'their own tax 
returns would have another advantage, namely, to assist in 
reducing tax evasion. Under the present rules a married 
woman is at no time oblige' (or even permitted) to make a 
return of her income and is under no legal obligation to 
declare it to her husband for inclusion in his return : 
the view has been expressed that very many married women 
1. Except where an option for separate assessment is in 
force. 
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with low casual earnings completely escape the tax net 
in this way : if they were required to complete a tax 
return this position would be regularised. Alternatively, 
a simple claim would suffice and there is already a 
precedent for such a procedure in section 36 Finance Act 
1976 which provides for the transfer of certain unused 
allowances and reliefs between the spouses in the first 
year of marriage. 
(10) The Dolitical implications of change 
Under the reforms proposed the higher married 
man's allowance would be lost but all married couples 
(including one-earner couples) would enjoy two single 
personal allowances. The two-earner couple (or rather, 
the husband of a two-earner couple) would lose; the one- 
earner couple would gain. It is thought that it is the 
loss of the married man's allowance by the husband of a 
two-earner couple which is contributing to the delay in 
reforming the present tax system : at present the higher 
married mans allowance is worth £5 per week to a standard 
rate taxpayer and politically it may be disadvantageous to 
reduce take-home pay by this amount : although the failure 
to enact reform is penalising the one-earner couple, this 
factor is not so widely appreciated and is therefore a 
less sensitive issue politically. Although this political 
difficulty is appreciated, and should not be underestimated 
in view of the reaction caused on the introduction of child 
benefit, ' it is thought that sooner or later the issue 
1. See Equal Opportunities Commission Consultative Document 
"Income Tax and Sex Discrimination" page 44. 
622 
will have to be faced and some way found of introducing 
reform with the minimum of reaction. The Green Paper 
proposes a system of "phasing" of allowances which could 
be adopted. 
I 
(11) The cash benefit alternative 
Before leaving the subject of the allowances it 
may be helpful to explain shortly why the cash benefit 
alternative to the allowance for a dependant spouse is 
not favoured. First, it will be clear from what has been 
said that the present tax system will entitle a married 
woman to her own personal allowance when aggregation is 
abolished : it would be anomalous to remove this right 
from a married woman when it is enjoyed by all other 
taxpayers. Secondly, the proposed cash benefit is intended 
to be limited to those with children or other home res- 
ponsibilities : these will be extremely difficult to define 
but, in any event, other taxpayers do not have to justify 
their entitlement to an allowance in this way and there is 
no reason, therefore, why married women should be obliged 
to do so. Next, the system of tax allowances and the system 
of cash benefits are constructed on different principles : 
a tax allowance is given to all individuals because they 
have personal identities; cash benefits are given in case 
of defined need only. Finally, tax allowances are a 
reduction from taxable income and reduce an individual's 
tax bill : cash benefits are paid to all persons, even 
those who do not pay tax, and have no reference to a tax 
1. Paragraph 100. 
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computation. 
There may be a case for the payment of a cash 
benefit to women with home responsibilities, in addition 
to their personal tax allowance, and this would, of 
course, benefit those with no taxable income, but such a 
consideration is outside the scope of a thesis on the 
tax treatment of the family. 
(12) Conclusion 
When the'-aggregation rule is repealed each 
married woman will become entitled to the single personal 
allowance in her own right for use against earned or 
unearned income. It is likely that the married man's 
allowance and the wifets earned income allowance will then 
be abolished leaving both husband and wife with a single 
allowance each. In order to simplify the utilisation of 
the allowance of a nil 'or low earning spouse it is 
suggested that a spouse allowance, equal to the single 
person's allowance, be provided for a spouse who-supports 
another spouse such allowance to be reduced by reference 
to the income of the supported spouse. In order to 
preserve the principle of individual taxation the spouse 
allowance could be given conditional upon the supported 
spouse either completing a separate tax return form, 
showing a nil or low income, and authorising the use of 
the unused allowance by the supporting spouse or, 
alternatively, a claim procedure could be introduced, 
similar to that in section 36 Finance Act 1976, so that 
the unused allowance of the supported spouse may be trans- 
ferred. 
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5. Tax Avoidance 
1) Prohibitions on covenanting income 
2 Transfers of income-producing assets 
3 Overseas comparisons 
4 The principle of individual taxation 
5 Position on the termination of marriage 
6 Conclusions 
In many of the studies and criticisms of the 
present rule statements are made to the effect that, if 
the aggregation rule were repealed, it would be necessary 
to enact anti-avoidance provisions. These could take two 
forms : either a prohibition against covenanting income 
or a prohibition nullifying the tax effectiveness of 
transfers of income-producing assets. These will be con- 
sidered separately. 
(1) Prohibitions on covenanting income 
There appears to be no justification for 
nullifying transfers of income between husband and wife 
when the procedure is available for all other taxpayers 
(except minor children). If an unmarried man can covenant 
income to a woman, the same procedure should be available 
to a married man. However, if the recommendations 
previously made in this Chapter on the future of the 
allowances are enacted the covenanting procedure would 
be superfluous : that procedure is only effective to utilise 
unused personal allowances and does not save any higher 
rate tax; if the personal allowances are utilised in the 
way described no advantages would be gained from covenanting. 
(2) - Transfers -of income-producing assets 
Under the new proposed allowance system transfers 
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of income producing assets would not be necessary in order 
to utilise the personal allowances but would be advantageous 
to equalise incomes and save tax when one spouse pays a 
higher rate of tax than the other. Before considering 
the justification for nullifying such transfers reference 
will be made to the treatment adopted in certain overseas 
countries. 
" (3) Overseas comparisons 
It will be recalled that in five of the countries 
mentioned' a system of statutory income splitting has been 
adopted : thus, far from prohibiting tax avoidance through 
inter-spouse transfers, this is, - in fact, effected by 
statute. Three of the countries mentioned2 adopt an 
alternative system of. individual taxation. Of the three 
remaining common law countries, two (Australia and New 
Zealand) permit bona fide transfers between spouses but 
give no substantial capital tax exemptions to spouses; 
Canada, on the other hand, has enacted-detailed "attribution 
rules" on the lines of the settlement provisions in the 
United Kingdom, but does give spouses substantial exemptions 
from capital taxes. 
From the above it will be seen that income- 
splitting by means of property transfers is not, of itself, 
considered to be unjustifiable in those overseas juris- 
dictions which adopt an individual basis of taxation, the 
only exception being Canada which has not adopted an 
individual basis for capital taxes. 
1. France, Luxembourg, West Germany, Ireland, U. S. A. 
2. West Germany, Ireland, USA. 
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(4) The principle of individual taxation 
It is considered that a consistent application 
of a system of individual taxation requires that bona fide 
transfers of income producing assets between spouses 
should be recognised both for the purposes of income tax 
and the capital taxes. Where husband and wife are taxed 
separately such a transfer may effect a saving of income 
tax but this result would be achieved if the parties were 
not married and to render the transfer ineffective only 
for married persons would constitute a tax on marriage. 
Further, to be effective for income tax purposes, a 
transfer must genuinely pass the title to property without 
any reservation to the disponor; such a provision will, 
in itself, be a deterrent to abuse, especially in view of 
the current high divorce rate. Finally, any income tax 
saved as a result of equalisation of assets may be recouped 
from the capital taxes imposed on the transfer' 
The alternative procedure, of prohibiting inter- 
spouse transfers, but retaining substantial capital taxes 
exemptions, is considered to be less satisfactory for 
three reasons : first, it does not accord with the principles 
of individual taxation which treat spouses in the same way 
as all other persons; secondly, it gives tax advantages 
to spouses who wish to transfer large amounts of capital to 
each other while penalising spouses who may be paying high 
rates of income tax. Finally, it ignores the fact that 
many spouses may already enjoy an equitable interest in 
the assets owned by the other spouse, which right would 
1. See Part 6 of this Chapter. 
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become enforceable on divorce or death :a legal transfer 
of such rights may merely be an acknowledgement of an 
existing beneficial interest and should, therefore, be 
recognised as effective if bona fide and genuine. 
(5) Position on termination of marriage 
Once a marriage has been terminated by separation, 
bona fide transfers of property between the ex-spouses are 
fully recognised as effective for income tax purposes and 
such recognition where the spouses are married will help 
to reduce the present imbalance of the treatment of 
married spouses on the one hand and separated spouses on 
the other. 
(6) Conclusion 
The view is therefore taken that there is no 
justification for refusing to recognise as tax effective 
genuine bona fide'transfers of income producing assets 
between spouses but that such transfers should be chargeable 
with the usual capital taxes which apply to other taxpayers. 
The capital taxes will now be discussed. 
6. The Capital Taxes 
If the recommendations previously mentioned in 
this Chapter are implemented and fully individual taxation 
introduced for husband and wife, consideration would have 
to be given to the capital taxes. 
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(1) Capital gains tax 
Individual taxation would mean that each spouse 
would enjoy a separate set of reliefs, including the 
annual exemption and the principal private residence 
exemption. Capital gains tax would, in theory, become 
chargeable on disposals between spouses but as most of 
these would be for no consideration the general exemption 
under section 79 Finance Act 1980 would apply so as to 
render the disposal on a no gain no loss basis. The 
changes would be beneficial for spouses except in the 
unlikely case where one spouse sold an asset to the other 
where the gain was not covered by an existing exemption. 
One small disadvantage of the change would be that the. 
losses of one spouse could no longer be set against the 
gains of the other. 
(2) Capital transfer tax 
Under a system of individual taxation each spouse 
would, as now, enjoy a complete set of exemptions but tax 
would otherwise be charged on transfers between spouses. 
However, with the recent reduction of cumulation to ten 
years, this disadvantage has been considerably reduced. 
It would be for consideration whether some special 
relief should be retained for certain transfers between 
spouses on death. Australia provides such an exemption for 
small estates only and New Zealand provides a special 
exemption for a "Joint Homestead". However, it is thought 
that, in most cases, spouses will be entitled in any event 
to a half interest in the matrimonial home, either at law 
or in equity, and the current exemption limit will be 
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sufficient in most cases to cover the remaining half. Like 
other taxpayers, spouses would be entitled to make use of 
lifetime transfers to take advantage of the lower rates 
and of the ten year cumulation rule to transfer assets over 
a period of time. Clearly more capital transfer tax will 
become payable by spouses but it is thought that this 
would be acceptable if it were accompanied by a full 
change to individual taxation for income tax and capital 
gains purposes. 
(3) Conclusion 
Under a system of individual taxation spouses 
should be treated in all respects as other individuals, 
and this includes the capital taxes. The imposition of 
capital taxes on inter-spouse transfers would help to com- 
pensate for any income tax saving which might result. 
7. Children. 
1 Introductory 
2 Aggregation 
3 Allowances 
4 Tax avoidance 
5) Conclusions 
(1) Introductory 
In considering the position of children in the 
family unit for tax purposes one is made awa: 
paucity of information and comment. Whereas 
ment of husband and wife has been studied on 
occasions, some in great detail, very little 
has been given to the position of children. 
In very many respects children are 
re of the 
the tax treat- 
a number of 
consideration 
already treated 
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as individuals in the United Kingdom tax system : the 
extent to which this is satisfactory will be discussed against 
the background of the three principles of aggregation, 
allowances and tax avoidance. 
(2) Aggregation 
Apart from a temporary aggregation of the infant 
child's investment income between 1968 and 1972, and a 
recommendation that a child's wealth be aggregated with the 
parents for the purposes 'of wealth tax, a proposal to 
aggregate a child's income with the family would be unlikely 
to be acceptable in the United Kingdom. Only one of the 
countries mentioned in Part III1 continues to aggregate a 
child's income but credits against tax are also available 
for each child so, in those cases where a child has little 
or no income, the provisions would result'in a net gain. 
Italy abolished aggregation-in 1974 and Germany abolished 
it in 1964 after it had been declared unconstitutional. 
France and Luxembourg both operate the very favourable 
family quotient system under which, although the child's 
income is aggregated with that of its parents the existence 
of the child results in a further division of the total 
family income before the rate bands are applied. 
It is thought that if aggregation did exist in 
the United Kingdom, then a recommendation should be made 
for its repeal : children are separate persons in truth and 
should be treated as such for tax purposes. Even though 
the advantageous quotient system appears to be initially 
1. Belgium. 
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attractive, it requires taxation of the unit of husband, 
wife and children and, for the reasons mentioned in Part 2 
of this Chapter, the quotient system is not recommended for 
husband and wife. 
(3) Allowances 
The only allowances now available for children 
are those given to single (including separated) parents 
under section 14 Taxes Act but all children receive child 
benefit. 
Of the overseas countries mentioned, some give 
child allowances or rebates and others give cash benefits 
but there appears to be no underlying principle that can 
be extracted to determine which are most appropriate; 
benefits are given by Australia, West Germany and the 
Netherlands and allowances or rebates by New Zealand, 
Canada, Ireland, Italy and Belgium; France and Luxembourg, 
of course, obtain the equivalent of allowances through the 
quotient system. 
Of course, child benefits are enjoyed by all 
parents whether taxpayers or not, whereas the allowances 
are only of assistance to parents who pay tax and no doubt 
it must ultimately be a political decision as to which is 
to be preferred. But in a system of cash benefits, the 
child allowance for-single parents is an anomaly which can 
result in injustice. If a man and a woman are not married 
and live together with two children, they can claim two 
child allowances under section 14; if the man and woman 
are married then they cannot claim the allowances. This is 
genuinely a tax on marriage. The single parent's allowance 
632 
is equal to the difference between the married man's 
allowance and the single person's allowance and was 
enacted to put unmarried mothers in the same tax position 
as married men. Under the system of individual taxation 
now proposed the higher married man's allowance will be 
abolished and it is thought that the additional allowance 
under section 14 should be abolished at the same time. 
However, there may be a case for replacing the allowance 
with an additional benefit for persons having care of a 
child but it should be borne in mind that both married and 
unmarried parents have child care responsibilities and any 
assistance should be extended to all parents. 
Whatever may be the merits of benefits as against 
allowances it is thought that there would be much to be said 
for the re-introduction of a child allowance and this could 
amount to the full personal allowance. Underlying this 
suggestion is the fact that a child who is lucky enough 
to enjoy income of his own (earned or investment) can claim 
a full personal allowance but a child who is supported wholly 
by his parents cannot transfer any of that allowance to his 
parents. Although children are smaller than adults their 
needs can exceed those of adults and this is not recognised 
in the tax system. The view could be taken that a child 
should be treated like a supported spouse and should be able 
to transfer the unused portion of his personal allowance to 
his supporting parents following the procedure outlined 
earlier in this Chapter. 
(4) Tax avoidance 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 there are a number of 
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tax avoidance provisions designed to nullify transfers of 
income or income producing assets to children. Again, 
some overseas countries have similar provisions (Australia, 
Canada, Ireland) and some, on the contrary, achieve 
statutory income-splitting through the quotient system 
(France, Luxembourg). 
As far as transfers under deed of covenant are 
concerned it is difficult to see why these should be tax 
effective for a son or daughter of 18, but not for one of 
16 or 17. Deeds-of covenant are only effective to save 
basic rate tax and cannot be used to split income in 
order to save higher rate tax : accordingly if a child 
allowance were enacted as mentioned above, the anomalies 
created by the deed of covenant procedure would be resolved. 
4 
As far as transfers of income-producing assets 
are concerned, the settlement provisions nullify these in 
most cases but it is difficult to see why income or assets 
transferred to a child under an order of the court are 
recognised as tax effective to split income whereas such 
arrangements are prohibited in other circumstances. 
The view could be taken that all genuine and 
bona fide transfers of income and income-producing assets 
should be regarded as tax-effective in order to recognise 
the responsibilities and financial obligations imposed on 
parents by their children and in order to eliminate the 
anomalies which arise on divorce. 
(5) Conclusions 
There is little evidence of any demand for the 
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reform of the tax laws as they affect children. Any 
proposal to aggregate a child's income with its parents 
should be resisted : although the quotient system is 
beneficial it relies on joint taxation of husband and 
wife as well, which cannot be recommended. The additional 
allowance for children will probably be repealed with the 
repeal of the higher married man's allowance, thus. removing 
an injustice to married persons. There is an argument for 
permitting all children to transfer their personal allowances 
to their parents, in the way suggested for spouses earlier 
in this Chapter, so as to recognise the financial 
obligations and responsibilities of parents, and, for the 
same reason, the tax avoidance provisions should be repealed, 
which would also have the effect of removing some of the 
anomalies which exist which give advantages to divorced 
parents as against married parents. Children are 
individuals too, and should be treated as such. 
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CHAPTER 17 
CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this thesis was stated to be 
to determine a method for taxation of the family unit, 
bearing in mind changing economic and social conditions. 
Chapter I examined the rule, originally enacted in 1799 
and 1805 that, for income tax purposes, the income of a 
married woman is deemed to belong to her husband. 
Chapter 2 considered the statutory exceptions to the rule, 
enacted in 1914 and 1971, which made some attempt to adapt 
the original rule to changing social conditions. Chapter 3 
described the rules which apply on the beginning and end 
of marriage and illustrated, by a comparison of married and 
divorced persons, the anomalies which continue to cause 
injustice. Chapter 4 traced the development of the 
distinct income tax rules affecting children and Chapter 5 
described the provisions of the capital taxes. Chapter 6 
concluded Part I. 
Part II considered the studies and criticisms of 
the existing system differentiating between the distinct 
concepts of aggregation, accountability and the allowances. 
The historical treatment revealed a continuing sense of 
dissatisfaction at the failure to adapt the legislation to 
the changes in social conditions, in particular to the 
changes in the proprietary and contractual rights of 
married women. 
Part III examined the tax treatment of the family 
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unit in 14 different overseas countries. These were 
arranged into three groups, by reference to the nature 
of their jurisdiction. The common law countries had 
all adopted individual taxation whereas joint taxation 
was almost universal in the civil law and Scandinavian 
countries, all of which adopted a system of community 
of matrimonial property : this analysis revealed a 
continuing development in the laws of matrimonial property 
and the contractual capacity of married women together 
with similar developments in income tax law. 
Part IV discussed the direction for reform and 
concluded that, for all cases and in all circumstances, 
husband and wife should be taxed as separate individuals 
for all tax purposes. Although there is very little evidence 
of any desire for the reform of the present tax rules 
relating to children, the view is also expressed that 
there is much to be said for treating all children as 
individuals, too. 
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